The effectiveness of housing allowance in welfare states: a comparative study in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden and South Korea by Jung, Min Ah
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jung, Min Ah (2013) The effectiveness of housing allowance in welfare 
states: a comparative study in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and South Korea. PhD thesis. 
 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/4679/  
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
  
 
 
The Effectiveness of Housing Allowance in Welfare States:  
A Comparative Study in the United Kingdom,  
the Netherlands, Sweden and South Korea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Min Ah Jung  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of PhD 
 
 
School of Social and Political Sciences  
College of Social Sciences 
 
 
 
University of Glasgow 
 
October 2013 
 2 
Abstract  
 
 
The financial burden arising from expenditure on housing is associated with the income 
and housing problems of low-income households. This research examines the effectiveness 
of housing allowance in solving these problems and thus achieving social and housing 
policy objectives, i.e. improving income maintenance, enhancing housing affordability and 
providing work incentives. It also explains how the various institutional features of 
housing allowance systems make changes in achieving different policy objectives. Taking 
into account the fact that housing allowance programmes operate alongside other 
institutions of the welfare state that vary among countries, this research compares the 
effectiveness of housing allowances in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
South Korea using five indicators−Residual income after rent payment, Poverty rate, Rent 
to Income Ratio, Income Replacement Ratio and Effective Marginal Tax Rate.  
 
The findings show that housing allowance is an effective policy instrument across 
countries in the following ways. First, it contributes to the improvement in residual income 
after housing costs and the decrease in poverty rates among low-income tenants. Second, 
the housing allowance reduces the financial burden arising from expenditure on rent. Third, 
in contrast to the positive effects of housing allowances in improving income and housing 
problems, their provision as part of in-work benefit relates to the increase in work 
disincentives indicating the higher possibility of working-poor tenants being trapped in 
unemployment and poverty. Fourth, despite variations in the features of the welfare and 
housing regime, the design of the benefit arrangement explains many of the differences in 
the effectiveness of housing allowance in the four countries. Fifth, subsidising a great share 
of housing costs is an important factor related to the improvement in income maintenance 
and housing affordability. Sixth, basing the provision of housing allowance on actual rent 
is also essential in solving the income and housing problems of low-income tenants.  
 
Findings relating to the institutional feature of housing allowance are the basis for the 
recommendation that the Korean housing allowance system should be reformed to reflect a 
household‘s actual need.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
 
1.1 The Interest of Research   
 
 
For decades, welfare states have been intervening directly or indirectly in the national 
housing system. In Western welfare states, the government‘s intervention in tackling 
housing problem is characterised as housing construction from the supply-side perspective 
and the form of rent subsidies from the demand-side perspective. In contrast, the South 
Korean government has primarily focused on the housing supply since the 1960s. For low-
income households that cannot afford housing on the private market, the government offers 
public rental units below market rent. However, there were no rent subsidies until the 
social security system started to make allowances for housing costs in 2000.  
 
As a demand-side housing subsidy, the housing allowance makes it possible for 
households to secure their current residency with financial support for housing costs. 
Moreover, these households could have additional opportunities for non-housing 
consumption with the growth in the residual income after rent payment. In this respect, the 
provision of housing allowance is ―better targeted‖ to households needing housing cost 
support and it is ―more flexible‖ because it is based on household income, need changes 
and differences in family features, than supply-side housing subsidies are (Council of 
Europe, 2008, p. 50).  
 
Moreover, numerous policy aims could be achieved by the provision of housing allowance. 
Social policies are intended to help households maintain their income and the housing 
policies are designed to enable needy families to find affordable places to live. As part of 
the national social security system, the rent subsidy is available to low-income households 
participating in welfare-to-work programme. This research therefore focuses on the 
effectiveness of the national rent subsidy for achieving its three goals: improving income 
maintenance (social policy), enhancing housing affordability (housing policy) and 
providing work incentive (welfare-to-work transition) for low-income households. This 
study also examines the features of housing allowance system. This is because these 
features could affect the effectiveness of rent subsidy programme. Therefore, the research 
will address the design of housing allowance system and investigate the connection 
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between these features and changes in its beneficiaries‘ income and housing cost-related 
problems.  
 
Each welfare state has its own benefit arrangements and operations. In addition, the 
implementation of housing allowances varies according to national systems. These 
allowances reflect particular national contexts, such as policy circumstances and the 
tradition of national intervention in the housing market. A comparative analysis can 
explain differences in the results and offer valuable insights. In this respect, the study will 
compare the effectiveness of the national rent subsidy programmes the United Kingdom 
(UK), the Netherlands, Sweden and South Korea (S. Korea). These four countries represent 
different welfare regimes, as defined by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) and housing 
regimes, as defined by Kemeny (1995). The features of regimes are related to the policy 
programme, policy system and national context. Therefore, it is useful to compare rent 
subsidy programmes in several regime countries to explain differences in the results.  
 
The UK is liberal welfare regime with a dualist housing regime. The housing regimes in 
the Netherlands and Sweden are similar ‗universal regimes‘. However, Sweden has a 
social-democratic welfare regime and the Netherlands has a corporative welfare regime (or 
hybrid of the corporative and social-democratic welfare regimes). While S. Korea‘s 
welfare regime is categorised as a separate regime from these three European countries, its 
housing regime is defined as dualist one, like that of the UK. Among the four countries, the 
Dutch and the Swedish rent subsidy programmes adopt a similar ‗gap‘ structure. Their 
housing allowances do not subsidise 100% of housing costs. These housing allowance 
systems require households to pay some portions of housing costs. At the same time, they 
subsidise part of the remainder at a high subsidisation rate for the low range of housing 
costs and a low rate for the high range up to the benefit cap, thus there is a gap between the 
sizes of housing costs and housing allowance provision.  
 
In the UK, while one subsidisation rate of 100% for the eligible housing cost is applied, the 
system also imposes benefit caps in order to control benefit expenditure and discourage 
abuse of the benefit. Moreover, while the same benefit rule is applied to all tenants in the 
Netherlands and Sweden, different benefit rules are applied to the social housing and 
private housing tenants in the UK. This difference in benefit arrangements reflects varied 
situations of tenants in private and social rental housing systems of two housing regimes.  
 
 14 
Although these three European countries have varied subsidisation structure, their benefit 
rules are similar in that the size of the receipt is calculated based on the actual housing 
costs. In contrast, the benefit calculation of the Korean rent subsidy programme is not. 
Before 2008, the same housing allowance was paid to the households of the same size. 
After 2008, a fixed portion (less than 20%) of the social assistance was allocated for 
housing costs. In addition, family features, such as household income, size and 
composition are related to the difference in the size of rent subsidy across countries, except 
S. Korea. Furthermore, the Korean rent subsidy offered by the national social security 
system is much newer, having been introduced only in 2000. Therefore, this research could 
make recommendations for improving the Korean housing allowance system. 
 
 
1.2 Terminology of Housing Allowance  
 
 
Although the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and S. Korea have the national support scheme 
for housing costs within social security system or housing policy, the policy titles vary, for 
instance, Housing Benefit in the UK and Rent Allowance in the Netherlands. In order to 
make the comparison easier, this study adopts ‗housing allowance(s)‘ as a term for the 
financial supports for housing costs paid to the low-income households, as a means-tested 
benefit which is offered within the national social security system or housing policy 
boundary. Concerning the national rent subsidy programme in each country, the housing 
allowance refers to Housing Benefit and Local Housing Allowance in the UK, Rent 
Allowance in the Netherlands and Housing Benefit of the National Basic Livelihood 
Security system in S. Korea. In Sweden, there are three housing costs support schemes 
within the social security system: the housing allowance for families with children, the 
housing allowance for young people without children and housing supplement for 
pensioners. The housing allowance comprises these three schemes for Sweden.   
 
 
1.3 The Aim and Question of Research 
 
 
This study aims to examine the effectiveness of housing allowance for low-income tenant 
households. It also seeks to explain how varied institutional features of housing allowance 
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systems make changes in income maintenance, housing affordability and work incentives 
in countries. Therefore, the comparative analysis focuses on the changes in income 
maintenance, housing affordability and work incentives by the provision of housing 
allowance and explains the difference amongst the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and S. 
Korea. Lastly, this study makes recommendations for the improvement in S. Korea's 
housing allowance system.   
 
This research will address the three main questions.  
(1) How was the housing allowance designed?  
As a basis for the understanding of the national context and the evaluation of the 
housing allowance scheme in each country, this study will focus on:   
- The development of housing allowance under the housing and social policy  
- The design and feature of the housing allowance scheme  
 
(2) Is the provision of housing allowance effective in achieving social and housing 
policy objectives for improving the low-income household‟s living condition?  
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of housing allowances, this study will 
examine changes in the achievement of following policy objectives by the housing 
allowance: 
- Improving income maintenance (social policy)   
- Reducing housing affordability problem (housing policy)  
- Work incentive change (welfare-to-work transition)  
 
(3) How does the feature of housing allowance system relate to the varied changes in 
income and housing problems of low-income households?  
This study will identify the important features of housing allowance systems in 
relation to the differences in income maintenance, housing affordability and work 
incentive changes in the four countries and explain how they are associated with the 
results.   
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1.4 The Structure of Thesis 
 
 
This thesis consists of nine chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 will review 
previous housing and welfare policy studies in order to understand the issues of housing in 
the welfare states contexts and in the development of housing allowance system. This 
chapter will also discuss the main issues of income, poverty, housing cost and work 
incentives of housing allowance recipients to give the theoretical backgrounds for this 
study. Chapter 3 will present the analytical framework, methodology, indicators and 
variables of this research.  
 
The next four chapters will carry on the comparative analysis of the housing allowance 
effectiveness in the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and S. Korea. The first two sections of 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 explore the developmental process and the features of housing 
allowance system. The subsequent sections of those chapters will examine the effects of 
the housing allowance system in improving income maintenance, reducing housing 
affordability problems and providing work incentives. The datasets from each county will 
be used for the quantitative analysis of the effectiveness of housing allowance. Within a 
country, the results will be compared by different family features: household income, 
family composition, tenant tenure type and employment status.  
 
The results will be compared by country and household type in Chapter 8. Throughout the 
comparative analysis, I will identify the connection between the effectiveness of the 
housing allowance and the design factors affecting the changes in income maintenance, 
housing affordability, and work incentives and explain the differences in results among the 
four countries.  
 
Chapter 9 will summarise the research findings.  
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Chapter 2. Housing and Welfare: Regime, Housing Allowance and Issues 
of Income and Housing in Welfare States  
 
 
Introduction  
In welfare states, the provision of housing allowance is not related only to the social 
security system, but also to the housing system and the wider welfare system. Owing to 
this intertwined characteristic of the housing allowance, the theoretical background of this 
research comprises varied aspects of ‗housing‘. Therefore, this chapter explores housing in 
the context of housing and social policy in the welfare state. I will explain housing as 
research subject in housing and welfare regime studies in Section 2.1. Subsequently I will 
address the feature of housing allowance as housing cost subsidy system in welfare states 
in Section 2.2. Last, I will deal with housing-related income problem, housing 
affordability, work incentive issues as the main concerns of the analysis of housing 
allowance effectiveness in Section 2.3.   
 
 
2.1 Housing, Welfare State and Regime Typology     
 
 
After World War II, one of the most prominent tasks of Western countries was tackling 
acute housing shortages and thus the housing system has developed with other welfare 
systems, i.e. social security, education and health care, which are regarded as pillars of the 
welfare state. However, unlike social security, education and health care, housing has been 
characterised as the ―wobbly pillar‖ (Torgersen, 1987) of the welfare state. This is because 
housing has distinct features differentiating it from the other three welfare pillars; the 
‗ambiguous place of housing in welfare state‘ and ‗the wide variations in the kinds of 
housing provided‘ and ‗the vulnerability of housing to public expenditure reduction‘ 
(Kemeny, 2001, p. 55). The ‗ambiguous place of housing in welfare state‘ means that 
housing is positioned in a ‗grey zone‘ between the universal provision of welfare states and 
major consumer goods (Kemeny, 1995, p. 173). While the provision of social security 
benefits, health care, education and housing are universal, housing is also considered 
subject to market provision and individual purchase with higher financial contribution to 
cost than health care or education (Kemeny, 2001). Accordingly, it is sensible that welfare 
state researchers have investigated areas of welfare provision, such as social security and 
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health care and housing has not been placed within the mainstream of welfare state 
research (Kemeny, 2001, 1995; Dewilde & De Keulenaer, 2003). In Esping-Andersen‘s 
(1990) classic work, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, which is path-breaking 
literature on the welfare state typology, the author did not include housing as part of the 
welfare provision that characterises a welfare regime. 
 
Adding to the duality attribute of housing, Kemeny (2001) emphasised that housing is 
‗embedded in social structure‘ to a significant extent (ibid, p. 56). Therefore, housing could 
be a key factor in understanding welfare systems and a shift in housing is more likely to 
have an effect on the social structure. This interrelated feature of housing and social 
structure or the wider welfare system has been the concern of welfare state researchers. 
While the recent housing literature has expressed interest in the relationship between the 
housing system and the welfare system or welfare regime, this feature of housing 
contributed alongside the duality of housing to its exclusion in early studies of comparative 
welfare states (Kemeny, 2001). For instance, Wilensky (1975) did not include housing in 
the modelling of residual and institutional welfare states because housing is a complex area 
and distorts the interpretation of other areas in welfare states (Wilensky, 1975). 
 
Housing Research and Regime Typology   
Esping-Andersen‘s welfare regime typology focused on the distinction of welfare 
provision modes by the state, market and family and emphasised differences in the degree 
of welfare states‘ decommodification and stratification which result from welfare regimes 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). According to this typology, welfare states are categorised into 
three welfare regimes, i.e. liberal, conservative-corporatism and social-democratic. 
Following Esping-Andersen‘s classic work, the classification of welfare states has been the 
mainstream comparative social policy research (Abrahamson, 2011). Moreover, welfare 
regime typologies have been amended to achieve enhanced analysis results for housing 
studies.  
 
Barlow and Duncan (1994) discussed certain features of welfare regimes in the context of 
European countries in regards to the provision of housing. A conservative-corporative 
regime has generalised but direct national support, although there is the restriction of 
public sector growth. On the other hand, in liberalised welfare states, there is a lower 
degree of state intervention. In countries that adopt a social-democratic regime, the state is 
directly involved in the supply of housing, particularly social housing that is accessible to 
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all. However, rudimentary states traditionally are not involved in housing production, 
although national variances exist in practice (Barlow & Duncan, 1994). In addition, 
Hoekstra (2003) provided a comprehensive review of the Belgian and Dutch housing 
systems by applying the concepts of stratification and decommodification to housing. 
Decommodification was defined as the extent to which households can provide their own 
housing independent of the income they acquire on the labour market, translated into 
housing subsidisation and price regulation. The stratification is linked with the process of 
housing allocation and state intervention (Hoekstra, 2003, p. 60).  
 
The well-known classification for housing regimes is Kemeny‘s (1995) rental regime 
(‗dual‘ and ‗unitary‘) typology. In Kemeny‘s (1995) view, a housing shortage encourages 
the government to supply social rental housing (‗cost rental‘ housing). However, with time, 
the lack of housing is solved and the real value of outstanding debt in relation to social 
housing stocks decreases due to inflation. The cost rental housing thus becomes more 
competitive because social housing rent is likely to decrease due to the decreased burden of 
debt payment, i.e. the ‗maturation‘ of social housing occurs. If social housing‘s maturation 
progresses and subsequently attains a level showing the potential to lower rent costs, the 
government would then be required to choose policy strategy influencing this process. One 
course of policy approaches involves inducing competition between profit rental and cost 
rental housing or allowing a dominant position for cost rental housing, thus resulting in a 
more integrated rental market, i.e. the unitary rental system in Sweden and the 
Netherlands. Another course would be to control the cost of rental housing, promote 
homeownership and maintain separate rental markets for the cost rental and profit rental 
sectors, i.e. the dualist rental system in the UK (Kemeny, 1995).  
 
However, according to comparative housing and welfare state studies, welfare regime and 
housing regime typologies have advantages and drawbacks. As Doling (1997) noted, one 
country cannot be seamlessly incorporated within a model. In addition, Stephens et al. 
(2010) highlighted that the association between welfare regime and housing regime has not 
been clearly established with these typologies. The welfare system and housing system 
could influence each other because they operate within one welfare state and the 
government‘s stance or ideology changes either one of them. Moreover, the sub-system of 
the entire welfare system or housing system could be operated differently even in the same 
regime. Nevertheless, the scope of housing studies has widened with the adaptation of 
welfare or housing regimes for comparative analysis of housing and welfare systems in 
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welfare states. For instance, increasing numbers of studies are looking at the relationship 
between housing system and income distribution (e.g. Heylen & Haffner, 2012; Stephens 
& Van Steen, 2011; Griggs & Kemp, 2012) and the homeownership and welfare state shift 
(e.g. Ronald & Doling, 2010).   
 
Welfare regime typology is also applied in the Asian welfare state research. Compared to 
welfare regimes in Western countries, Asian countries are regarded as having their own 
cultural characteristics from the Confucianism tradition and distinct economic 
developmental routes. At the onset of welfare regime discussion in Asian countries, the 
Asian welfare regime carried different labels reflecting these characteristics (Abrahamson, 
2011): ‗Fourth World‘ or hybrid between conservative and liberal welfare state regime 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1997) and Confucianism welfare regime (Jones, 1993). However, 
the concept of the Confucianism welfare regime has faded. As Walker and Wong (2005) 
pointed out, ‗the explanatory power of Confucianism has been overemphasised with 
reference to both the past and the present of welfare regimes in East Asia‘ (Walker & 
Wong, 2005, p. 214).  
 
Another stream of Asian welfare regime research is focused on the productivity dimension 
of East Asian countries (mainly Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, S. Korea and Taiwan) 
(Holliday, 2000). However, as Hudson and Kühner (2011, 2009) and Hudson (2012) 
observed, these East Asian countries do not fit the productivist welfare model with the 
analysis of production dimension (education investment of public education spending and 
training investment of active labour market policy budget) and protection dimension 
(income protection of income replacement by social benefits and employment protection). 
For instance, S. Korea fell into the weak productive but protective dimension due to the 
policy shift from productive intent to labour market protection after the economic crisis in 
the late 1990s.  
 
It is agreed that the welfare states of East Asia share common experiences in the arena of 
housing policy (Kwon, 1998, 2005; Phang, 2007; Lau, 2007; S. Park, 2007; Hirayama, 
2007; Wang, 2007; Tang, 2007; Groves et al., 2007; Y. Kim, 2008; P. Kim, 2010; Ronald 
& Doling, 2010; La Grange & Jung, 2013). In terms of housing, the provision of housing is 
recognised as an efficient means of solving housing shortage and a diligent work ethic has 
been promoted through a national campaign of homeownership. Therefore, state-run 
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housing organisations, such as the Korea National Housing Corporation
1
 in S. Korea and 
Singapore‘s Housing and Development Board, have been responsible for the supply of 
large-scale state housing building projects (Groves et al., 2007).  
 
However, in terms of welfare regime typologies, as Esping-Andersen (1999) emphasised, 
the welfare regime models present simplified ideal types that cannot fully capture the 
complex reality of actual welfare regimes. Moreover, as Doling (1997) acknowledged, one 
country does not perfectly fit a welfare regime model. Even countries at the same 
economic developmental stage could have different tendencies and their transitions may 
not be exactly consecutive. In this respect, these welfare state regimes have experienced 
‗soft convergence‘ in response. Hence, as Kemeny (2001) highlighted, rather than the 
‗proliferation of typologies‘ (ibid, p. 58), the focus should be on understanding three 
relationships between housing and the welfare state: the general level, housing and the 
three welfare pillars and housing and other areas of welfare (ibid, p. 68).   
 
 
2.2 Housing Allowance as Part of Housing or Welfare System    
 
 
Concerning comparative housing research or welfare regime studies, the focus has been on 
the way in which the national housing system works to respond to the demand and supply 
in the public and private sectors. From the perspective of policy instrument, the housing 
allowance has been provided in this process to support housing costs as a result of state 
intervention.   
 
2.2.1 The Development of Housing Allowance  
 
In many countries, the government has directly or indirectly intervened in housing market 
with housing subsidies. The provision of housing subsidies aims to encourage or enable 
consumers to buy more or better housing than they would otherwise be able to purchase 
(Mullins & Murie, 2004, p. 158). Housing subsidies have been categorised into the supply-
side and demand-side subsidies. The government supplies housing directly or it provides 
subsidies to housing builders to promote housing construction, i.e. ‗bricks and mortar‘ or 
producer subsidies. With regards to demand-side intervention, the government provides 
                                                 
1
 Now, the Korea Land and Housing Corporation.  
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financial support for housing cost expenditures for the household to encourage the 
consumption of housing, i.e. consumer subsidies (Doling, 1997; Howenstine, 1975; Kemp, 
2000a, 2007a; Mullins & Murie, 2004; Olsen, 2000; Priemus & Kemp, 2004; Quigley, 
2011). 
 
Until the 1970s, the major housing subsidies were supply-side subsidies (Kemp, 2000a). 
This might be related to the weakness of demand-side subsidies: The effects of the 
demand-side subsidy on the promotion of housing construction or the housing price change 
in the short term may be indirect (Howenstine, 1975). Moreover, Doling (1997) 
highlighted that the policy shift from a producer subsidy to a consumer subsidy being 
implemented in European countries has not been consistent across countries. Kemeny 
(1995) noted that the decline in construction-related subsidies was linked to the changed 
situations apparent within the national housing system, i.e. the decreased need for housing 
construction due to improvements related to the housing shortage problem and the 
maturation of social housing has resulted in reduced expenditures for housing construction 
costs (Kemeny, 1995). 
 
Nevertheless, from the 1970s through the 1990s, many countries increased demand-side 
subsidies through gradual replacement of supply-side subsidies with housing allowances 
(Kemp, 2000a, 2007a; Priemus & Kemp, 2004; Council of Europe, 2008). Kemp (2000a) 
emphasised that the emergence of the income-related housing allowance in the 1970s is 
commonly linked to the changes implemented in other policies through the description of 
four key elements that played a role in changing ideas about housing policy. The elements 
involve the evolution of housing provision from the state to a market or quasi-market 
sector; the surging emphasis on consumer‘s choice of poor households; the decrease in 
severe housing shortages; the increased attention to income-related problems; and the 
improvement in targeting housing expenditure assistance to households in need. The 
personal assistance with housing expenditure delivered remarkable help to households 
during the period of reduction in the implementation of construction subsidies.  
 
Moreover, the housing allowance as an income supplement indicates that the arenas of 
social policy and income maintenance policy started to address the housing needs of low-
income households. Griggs and Kemp (2012) highlighted that housing allowance as 
income support is required because of the three attributes of rent payment. First, 
households can experience income risk caused by earning loss or earning reduction from 
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changes in working patterns, e.g. unemployment, retirement or leaving for health problem 
or increased family responsibility. Second, rent payment is the largest single expenditure 
item in the household budget. Third, a regional rent price differential which is greater than 
those in earnings exists.  
 
2.2.2 The Feature of Housing Allowance 
   
Welfare states have established housing allowance systems that reflect each country‘s 
social and housing systems, which are embedded in wider welfare systems. In-cash forms 
(housing allowance) or vouchers that consumers can spend only on housing costs are 
widely used types of customer subsidy for housing cost. Although the types and 
institutional features of housing allowances vary across countries, the aim of a housing 
allowance would be similar. As the Council of Europe‘s guideline on housing allowances 
states, ―the goals for housing allowance system should be to improve access to decent, 
affordable housing for all households on low incomes and to function as a safety net for 
these households against increase in housing expenditure or decrease in income" (Council 
of Europe, 2008, p. 88). Therefore, when a housing allowance subsidises housing costs 
paid by low-income households, those households can reduce housing cost expenditures 
and therefore more of the household income can be spent on non-housing goods (Kemp, 
2007a).  
 
The fact that housing costs account for a large portion of the budget of a low-income 
household (Alcock, 2006; Freeman et al., 1999; Kemeny, 1992, 1995; Kemp, 2000a; 
Griggs & Kemp, 2012) refers to the importance of income supplementation for housing 
cost expenditures for the poor through welfare provision. For this reason, the housing 
allowance is a means-tested benefit for which eligibility is limited to low-income 
households. In addition to household income, family composition and size of housing cost 
expenditure, commonly affect decisions about eligibility for the housing allowance (Kemp, 
2000a).  
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Table 2.1 Housing Allowance Scheme in Welfare States 
Country  Welfare regime Rental housing 
system 
Housing allowance scheme 
France   Corporatist  Unitary  Separate housing allowances for all tenures 
(Three schemes: ALF, ALS and APL). 
  
Germany   Corporatist Unitary  One allowance scheme for tenants receiving 
social assistance benefits and another scheme 
for homeowners and tenants not receiving 
social assistance.  
 
Sweden   Social democratic Unitary  Separate housing allowances for main part of 
housing costs (Housing Allowances for Non-
Pensioner and Housing Supplement for 
Pensioner). 
 
The 
Netherlands 
 Corporatist/ 
Social democratic* 
Unitary  Social assistance benefits subsidise a part of 
housing costs and a separate housing 
allowance scheme finances rents for all tenant 
tenures. 
 
The UK   Liberal  Dualist  Separate housing allowance schemes for 
tenants in private and public sectors. Social 
assistance benefits do not make allowances for 
housing costs. 
 
Australia   Liberal  Dualist  Rent rebate for social housing tenants. 
Separate housing allowance scheme 
(Commonwealth Rent Assistance) for private 
tenants.  
 
The US  Liberal Dualist  Different housing assistance programmes for   
social housing sectors. 
Housing Voucher is provided for the low-
income households. 
Source: Ditch et al. (2001) Table 3.2; Esping-Andersen (1990); Kemeny (1995, 2006).  
Note: *The Netherlands is regarded as having a hybrid welfare regime of corporatist and 
social democratic welfare regimes.  
 
In the literature, types of housing allowances are identified according to the way in which 
housing allowance relates to the social security benefit system (Kemp, 1997, 2000a; Ditch 
et al., 2001; Hulse, 2002). Housing allowances are categorised as (1) social assistance or 
income support, which is a part of main income-related social security benefit and makes 
up the major income deficit of low-income households for living (e.g. the UK‘s HB), (2) 
separate income support or income supplement, which is not a main income-related social 
benefit and supplements the general social security benefit (e.g. housing allowances in 
continental Europe), (3) housing assistance, which is for housing costs expenditure and 
independently provided from income-related benefit. In terms of national policy, whilst the 
first and second types of housing allowances are regarded as benefits of social or income 
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policy in most countries, the third type of housing allowance is a part of housing policy, for 
instance the Netherlands‘ rent allowance and the US‘s Housing Voucher.  
 
Moreover, the housing allowances differ according to the types of benefit structure−‗gap‘ 
structure and residual income structure (Kemp, 1997, 2000a; Ditch et al., 2001; Hulse, 
2002). In countries adopting a ‗gap‘ structure for housing cost subsidisation, housing 
allowance claimants are required to pay housing costs with their own income. The housing 
allowance subsidises housing costs exceeding a certain standard with different 
subsidisation rates−a high rate for low-range of housing costs and a low rate for high-range 
of housing costs up to benefit cap. For instance, recipients of the housing allowance in the 
Netherlands are expected to pay a certain percentage of rent with their incomes and the 
size of this self-contribution depends on household income and family composition 
(Priemus, 1998; Priemus & Elsinga, 2007; Haffner & Boumeester, 2010). In contrast, the 
housing allowance adopting residual income approach makes up for the difference between 
the minimum standard of disposable income after housing cost expenditures and the actual 
residual income after housing costs of beneficiaries.   
  
Moreover, these features indicate that housing allowance models are differently 
interrelated with social benefit systems across countries. For instance, if the housing 
allowance is provided as income supplement, the general (and generous) social security 
benefit enables the beneficiary to pay some of housing costs. In this case, the benefit 
formula of housing allowance adopts the gap structure requiring the personal contribution 
to housing costs expenditure, as with the housing allowances in the Netherlands and 
Sweden. However, when it comes to housing allowance as income support, the benefit is 
designed to subsidise the main housing cost. In particular, if these are not social benefits 
subsidising housing costs in welfare system, the housing allowance system is unlikely to 
adopt the ‗gap‘ structure. For example, the UK housing allowance could fully subsidise the 
eligible rent for housing allowance claims for some households. This is associated with an 
aspect of the social security benefits; neither the social insurance benefit nor the social 
assistance benefit make allowances for housing cost payments (Stephens et al., 2010).  
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2.3 Issues of Income Poverty, Housing Affordability and Work Incentives  
 
 
The income-related housing costs subsidy, i.e. housing allowance, is generally regarded as 
an instrument of housing policy because it secures sustainable residency with acceptable 
quality for low-income households. However, the housing allowance plays a role in 
maintaining a household‘s income by reducing the housing cost burden of low-income 
families (Heylen & Haffner, 2012; Griggs & Kemp, 2012). Therefore, the housing 
allowance system encompasses issues concerning low-income households‘ financial and 
residential problems (Kemp, 2000a).  
 
2.3.1 Housing Cost, Income and Poverty  
 
Social policy is concerned with a number of different policy objectives, including 
compensation for industrial injuries, income maintenance and redistribution (Sainsbury, 
1999). Therefore, the income support from the national social security system varies across 
features of the target population. Generally, the social security benefits are categorised into 
three groups representing different ranges of beneficiaries and types of allocation. The first 
group is ‗universal‘ or ‗categorical benefits‘ that are not based on means tests or 
employment status but paid to citizens who belong to certain groups within the population, 
e.g. child benefit. The second group is ‗social insurance‘, which is usually based on the 
recipient‘s contribution to benefit payments and employment status. The third group is 
‗social assistance‘, which is provided to those who pass a means test for eligibility 
(Atkinson, 1989). Within the income allocation of the social security system, the housing 
allowance could be categorised as a social assistance benefit. Social assistance benefits are 
delivered as a safety net to individuals or households with insufficient income. 
Accordingly, social assistance benefits are viewed as proper instruments for evaluating the 
capability of the state to care for more vulnerable individuals and the suitability of the 
benefit provision as a ―last resort‖ (Kuivalainen, 2004, p. 59). 
  
In most countries with a housing allowance system, an income-related housing allowance 
is a social assistance benefit with means test. Even in countries where the housing 
allowance is a tool of housing policy, this benefit is a means-tested benefit for low-income 
or the lowest-income households. As Griggs and Kemp (2012) pointed out, housing costs 
subsidies for low-income households are required due to the attributes of housing cost 
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payments. Housing cost payments are the largest and least flexible expenditure; housing 
costs need to be paid regardless of the household‘s income risk stemming from earnings 
loss or reduction. Here, the issue of income maintenance after housing cost expenditures 
for adequate quality housing is of concern. Undoubtedly, if the national support for 
housing costs is small, there is a stronger link between housing and poverty (Dewilde & De 
Keulenaer, 2003).  
 
The Relationship between Housing Costs and Income: Housing Affordability  
In terms of housing and income problems, what we consider first is the extent to which 
households spend their income on housing and non-housing consumption. This issue is 
related to housing affordability issue in housing policy studies. Housing affordability refers 
to the ―relationship between household income and housing expenditure‖ (Kutty, 2005, p. 
115). If the housing cost expenditure of the household in relation to its income is 
―reasonable or moderate‖, housing is affordable (ibid). The conventional method of 
affordability assessment involves comparing housing cost expenditure with household 
income, i.e. the ratio of housing costs to income (Chaplin et al., 1994; Freeman et al., 
1999; Freeman & Whitehead, 1995; Marsh & Riseborough, 1995; Marshall et al., 2000; 
Randolph, 1992). The calculation of this ratio is tecnically simple (Chen et al., 2010) and 
can be performed with information on the household‘s rent and income (Freeman et al., 
1999); therefore, this ratio measurment has been widely used for the assessment of housing 
affordability and recent research has applied it with its an alternative indicator of housing 
affordability, i.e. residual income measure (e.g. Griggs & Kemp, 2012; Thalman, 2003) or 
price-to-income ratio (e.g. Haffner & Boumeester, 2010).  
 
Whilst the measurement is based on a simple formula, the results vary according to the 
definition of household income, e.g. net income or gross income and the scope of housing 
costs, e.g. rents, heating, service charges and mortgage interest. Concerning tenant 
households, the measurement of housing affordability varies depending on the inclusion or 
exclusion of the housing allowance as well as income tax and social security contributions.  
 
Freeman et al. (1999) defined these ratios as follows:   
 
Rent-to-Income Ratio 1 = dwelling rent ÷ net income  
Rent-to-Income Ratio 2 = (dwelling rent – housing allowance) ÷ net income 
Rent-to-Income Ratio 3 = dwelling rent ÷ (net income + housing allowance) 
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Rent-to-Income Ratio 4 = dwelling rent ÷ gross income  
Rent-to-Income Ratio 5 = (dwelling rent – housing allowance) ÷ gross income 
 
In addition, Haffner and Boumeester (2010) conceptualised net and total ratios for their 
study as follows (Table 2, p. 801):   
 
Net ratio = net rent (gross rent – housing allowance) ÷ disposable income  
Total ratio = total housing expenditure (gross rent + incidental expenditures) ÷ disposable 
income  
 
Regarding the ratio measurement, a standard ratio for judging the prevalence of 
affordability problems is used as a rule of thumb, e.g. housing costs up to 30% of income 
in the US for the federal housing assistance programme (Kutty, 2005). However, housing 
research has noted the limitation of this single ratio approach (Freeman et al., 1999; Kutty, 
2005; Thalman, 2003; Hancock, 1993; Kearns, 1992; Marsh & Riseborough, 1995; Stone, 
2006a). The conventional ratio measure approach may not accurately address differences 
in household incomes (Kearns, 1992). If households with different incomes have the same 
ratios, one may assume that they are in the same conditions. However, the interpretation of 
high and low ratios relies on the differences in household income. Whilst better-off 
households, even with a high ratio, could have sufficient income for non-housing 
consumption, worse-off households, even with a low ratio, would have insufficient income 
to meet non-housing needs. Moreover, if other conditions are similar, a high ratio 
expresses a household‘s preference for a large quantity or high quality of housing (Lerman 
& Reeder, 1987), i.e. ―residential comfort‖ (Thalman, 2003, p. 292), rather than a high 
housing cost burden placed on household finances.  
 
In addition, the housing affordability ratio does not provide any information on the 
consumption of decent housing (Hancock, 1993). The research has emphasised that 
housing affordability is associated with the household‘s need for decent housing, for which 
the monthly payment represents a significant percentage of income (Freeman et al., 1999; 
Hancock, 1993; Kearns, 1992; Marsh & Riseborough, 1995; Bramley, 1990; Chaplin et al., 
1994; Maclennan & Williams, 1990). One can see this in the definition of housing 
affordability: ―Affordability is concerned with securing some given standard of housing (or 
different standards) at a price or rent which does not impose, in the eyes of some third 
party (usually government) an unreasonable burden on household incomes‖ (Maclennan & 
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Williams, 1990, p. 9). Furthermore, Bramley (1990) stated that ―households should be able 
to occupy housing that meets well-established (social sector) norms of adequacy (given 
household type and size) at a net rent which leaves them enough income to live on without 
falling below some poverty standard‖ (Bramley, 1990, p. 16).  
 
Such definitions provide two key elements for understanding the meaning of housing 
affordability. First, it should be possible for households to secure adequate quality of 
housing within their finances. However, when the expenditure-to-income measure is used, 
a low ratio merely indicates a ‗reasonable‘ burden for housing costs on household income. 
Moreover, this conventional ratio measure does not express whether the household 
consumes housing appropriately in a particular housing market. Therefore, suggested 
alternatives to the housing cost burden ratio measure are imputing the standard of housing 
expenditure regarding attributes of housing in a given housing market and comparing 
housing costs to income ratios obtained with this standard expenditure and the actual 
expenditure of households (e.g. Thalman, 1999, 2003; Lerman & Reeder, 1987). Thalman 
(1999, 2003) developed housing affordability measures combining a conventional housing 
cost-to-income ratio with quality-based and housing expenditure measures to examine 
housing affordability conditions and distinguished between patterns of overconsumption 
and actual housing affordability problems (higher contract rent costs than standard or lack 
of income for housing consumption).   
 
Also, the housing cost burden measure does not present the financial situation after 
housing cost payment: whether the household can meet the non-housing needs after 
housing expenditure (Kutty, 2005). The relationship between housing consumption and 
non-housing consumption, i.e. ―the opportunity cost of housing vis-à-vis other goods and 
services‖ (Whitehead, 1991, p. 873) is important. Since low-income households‘ resources 
are limited, the size of housing costs influences the size of the cost to be paid for other 
goods and services needed for living (Freeman et al., 1999). However, when the rent 
expenditures place an ―unreasonable burden on household incomes‖ (Maclennan & 
Williams, 1990, p. 9), the purchase opportunity for non-housing items is reduced and the 
household incomes after rents payment may fall below ―some poverty standard‖ (Bramley, 
1990, p. 16). The effects of unreasonable rents on income and housing problems could be 
more severe for low-income households than other types of households. Their financial 
discretion for non-housing expenditures would decrease after housing cost expenditure 
(Kutty, 2005; Stone, 2006a).  
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Income Maintenance after Housing Cost Expenditures: Above or below Poverty Line  
The housing cost expenditures intensify income problems for low-income households. 
However, the housing cost-to-income ratio does not present the amount of household 
income to determine whether a household is in poverty. To deal with income problems 
arising from housing cost expenditures, housing studies have advocated a new measure of 
housing affordability indicating income after housing cost payment, i.e. residual income 
measure. The residual income approach emphasises ‗the standard of living‘ after housing 
cost expenditures (Kutty, 2005, p. 121). There is a common fundamental consideration that 
residual income measurement is concerned with the amount of income after payment of 
housing costs directed towards general living consumption as well as with whether or not 
the minimum standard of living can be achieved.  
 
Regarding this issue, Whitehead (1991) suggested measuring the absolute amount of 
residual household income after rent payment as well as the housing costs-to-income ratio 
(Whitehead, 1991). In other studies, the concept of residual household income after 
housing costs
2
 has been adopted along with the housing cost-to-income ratio measurement 
to assess housing affordability (Freeman et al., 1997; Freeman et al., 1999; Chaplin et al., 
1994; Freeman & Whitehead, 1995; Marshall et al., 2000; Randolph, 1992; Thalman, 
2003; Stone, 2006a, 2006b; Kutty, 2005). 
 
Overall, the assessment of the residual income after housing costs, i.e. the extent to which 
households‘ income is maintained after housing cost expenditures, considers a number of 
different variables, including housing allowance, income, rent and minimum cost of living. 
As Table 2.2 shows, such elements are not expressed in the same way. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
2
 Although the residual income measurement has been implemented through the measurement of housing 
affordability, this research will apply the residual income measurement to evaluate the income maintenance 
after housing cost payment.  
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Table 2.2 Measurement of Residual Income after Housing Costs  
Research  Calculation  
Randolph (1992) Net weekly household income + estimated Housing Benefit – (estimated 
household applicable amount + Housing Benefit earned income disregard) 
*1.2 – weekly basic rent – weekly eligible service charge 
 
Chaplin et al. (1994) Net income + Housing Benefit earned income disregard + Housing 
Allowance – Rent – Income Support applicable amount 
 
Freeman & Whitehead 
(1995) 
Net income + Housing Benefit earned income disregard – Rent – Income 
Support applicable amount  
 
Freeman et al. (1999) Net income + Housing Benefit – Minimum housing expenditure – 
Minimum non-housing expenditure  
 
Marshall et al. (2000)  Income – Rent – Income Support + Housing Benefit 
 
Stone (2006a, 2006b) ‗Shelter poverty‘  
Disposable income – Housing consumption  
= Non-housing consumption > standard  
 
Kutty (2005)  ‗Housing-induced poverty‘  
Non-housing consumption after Housing expenditure > 2/3 of Official 
poverty line in the US 
Source: Freeman et al. (1999); Chaplin et al. (1994); Freeman & Whitehead (1995); 
Marshall et al. (2000); Randolph (1992); Stone (2006a, 2006b); Kutty (2005).  
 
By applying the residual income approach, Kutty (2005) and Stone (2006a) proposed a 
new concept indicating the relationship between housing expenditure and household 
income, i.e. ‗housing-induced poverty‘ (Kutty, 2005) and ‗shelter poverty‘ (Stone, 2006a), 
respectively. Both concepts focus on the income poverty arising from expenditure on 
housing costs. This situation occurs when a household cannot afford non-housing goods 
due to high housing cost expenditures. Even when the housing costs-to-income ratio is 
low, the household income left may not be sufficient to purchase non-housing goods 
meeting the standard of living, especially for low-income households. Therefore, rather 
than amount of income, the extent to which the residual income after housing cost payment 
could afford necessary non-housing consumption is significant.   
 
As Kutty (2005) observed, ‗housing-induced poverty‘ measures are more likely to be 
sensitive enough to capture households that cannot afford non-housing goods after housing 
cost payments if their housing cost-to-income ratio is lower than standard. Moreover, 
recent housing studies applying these housing cost-related poverty measures have shown 
the varied prevalence of ‗income poverty‘ and ‗housing poverty‘ and indicated the 
influence of housing cost expenditures on income problems (Stephens & Van Steen, 2011; 
Chen et al., 2010; Stone, 2006b). 
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As these residual income measures address housing cost-related poverty, the standard 
defining whether the household remains above poverty or falls into poverty is required. 
However, while these two concepts of housing expenditure-related poverty indicate the 
likelihood of poverty caused by income problems for living, different norms of poverty are 
used to measure ‗shelter poverty‘ and ‗housing-induced poverty‘. Whilst Stone (2006a) 
used the aggregation of non-housing necessities of family budget (excluding personal 
taxes), Kutty (2005) applied two-thirds of the official poverty line income in the US. As 
Kutty (2005) pointed out, the non-housing consumption standard of housing-induced 
poverty is lower than that of shelter poverty. Therefore the same income problems after 
housing cost expenditures can be estimated differently.  
 
The effect of housing cost expenditures on the living condition of the poor is of concern in 
social policy studies as well as housing policy studies. Undoubtedly, the housing cost 
expenditure is likely to worsen poor households‘ finances due to the significance of 
housing costs‘ share of their living costs. Moreover, if national support for housing costs is 
less, there could be a stronger link between housing and poverty (Dewilde & De 
Keulenaer, 2003). In this respect, the social security system needs to consider the effects of 
housing costs on low-income households and the financial support for housing costs. This 
financial assistance for housing cost expenditures is linked to the changes in income 
maintenance after housing cost payments. As Griggs and Kemp (2012) and Heylen and 
Haffner (2012) observed, the housing allowance decreases households‘ budget share 
assigned to housing payments and ensures that low-income families maintain their living 
standard after housing cost payments. Therefore, an analysis of after-housing costs poverty 
is useful to determine who needs an income-related housing allowance (Heylen & Haffner, 
2012).   
 
In terms of social policy, this effect is measured by comparing households‘ incomes before 
and after housing cost payments (Alcock, 2006), i.e. the change in poverty rate before and 
after housing cost expenditures. Moreover, the effectiveness of the housing allowance for 
reducing the poverty of the poor households could be measured by comparing the poverty 
rates before and after housing allowance provision, just as the change in poverty is used to 
examine the effectiveness of social policy.  
 
In evaluating the effectiveness of social policy for reducing poverty, it is essential to gain 
an understanding of two key concepts: the meaning of poverty and the measurement of 
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poverty (Bradshaw, 1999). First, the meaning of poverty is defined in two ways: absolute 
poverty and relative poverty. In absolute terms, poverty means a lack of funds available for 
living. In other words, the concept of absolute poverty is associated with subsistence and 
the meaning of absolute poverty differs depending on the way in which subsistence is 
defined. Absolute poverty can be measured by using one standard, e.g. the $2 per day 
defined by the World Bank (Pisu, 2012), or the cost of a basket of goods and services 
meeting the minimum standard of living could be used as a measure of absolute poverty in 
each country. On the other hand, the concept of relative poverty differs in time or space 
because the poverty or necessities of life may vary according to societal conditions at 
different times. For example, poverty in a developed country may not imply the same level 
of poverty as that experienced in a non-industrialised country. Thus, the concept of relative 
poverty is subject to the development stage of the society in which poverty is studied 
(Alcock, 2006). Over the last 20 years, absolute poverty has decreased, whereas relative 
poverty still is more of a concern in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) membership countries (Pisu, 2012). 
  
Regardless of the measurement of absolute or relative poverty, the issue is how to set the 
income threshold as a standard representing poverty. Various approaches to establishing 
this income threshold defining poverty have been developed over time. Among the 
different poverty measurements, the budget standard approach, which was initiated by 
Seebohm Rowntree‘s work in 1901, lists necessities for living (a basket of goods) and 
calculates the budget to buy all of them; this budget was applied as a poverty standard 
(Rowntree, 2000 [1901]). Another approach is to use the deprivation indicators introduced 
by Townsend (1979). This approach focuses on the strong relationship between poverty 
and deprivation in a number of life‘s dimensions. Poverty, i.e. lack of resources needed for 
participation in community activities, is a serious problem referring to social exclusion. 
With this technique, the extent of deprivation relating to multi-dimensions of the standard 
of living is measured by indicators to define poverty. For instance, Guio (2009) suggested 
deprivation indicators addressing the household‘s financial status (e.g. being unable to 
afford paying for housing costs), the affordability of consumer durable goods (e.g. being 
unable to afford a washing machine) and housing quality indicators (e.g. suffering from 
higher rent cost burden).  
 
More practically, relative poverty could be measured by comparing the poverty rates 
indicating the size of the population living in poverty and not living in poverty within a 
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society (Alcock, 2006). To compare poverty rates, it is essential to establish the poverty 
line that separates those who are in poverty from those who are not. Usually, 40%, 50% 
(e.g. OECD) or 60% (e.g. European Union) of the national median income is applied as the 
poverty standard. If a person or a household‘s income is at or below this standard, such 
individuals or households are considered to be in poverty. The choice of the higher (e.g. 
60%) or lower (40% or 50%) poverty line influences the examination of poverty (Pisu, 
2012; Behrendt, 2002; Bradshaw & Mayhew, 2010). To measure the more extreme poverty 
in society, the use of a lower poverty line is better than a higher poverty line. As the 
income threshold defining poverty is lower for the former, the population living at the 
lower end of the income spectrum, rather than households with middle or higher incomes, 
will be taken into account. When considering such obstacles, the mix of different poverty 
measures could be alternatives (Behrendt, 2000, 2002; Bradshaw & Mayhew, 2010). 
 
Dealing with income poverty, while these approaches focus on cash income, there is 
another approach focusing on non-cash income, e.g. income from housing or in-kind 
benefits (education, health care) and considering cash and non-cash income in the income 
distribution problem (Saunders & Siminski, 2005; Mullin et al., 2009; Saunders et al., 
2002). In most states, the government provides in-kind benefits. However, there is concern 
about measuring the effect of this non-cash income, in particular in-kind benefits, when 
this benefit is universal (Smeeding et al., 1993; Garfinkel et al., 2006; Paulus et al., 2010; 
Pisu, 2012). 
 
2.3.2 Housing Allowances and Work Incentives for the Working Poor  
 
In recent decades, the commonly observed, but remarkable change in the welfare system of 
most welfare states is a policy shift from conventional passive income benefit receipt 
towards an emphasis on the active labour participation of the low-income household. The 
changed welfare schemes, such as the UK‘s New Deal programme or the US‘s welfare-to-
work programme under the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act, are based on a ‗mutual obligation‘ that requires low-income people 
who are capable of working to accept a job or participate in job training programmes on 
the condition that they receive social security benefits (Feeny et al., 2012).  
 
Whilst labour and social policies are crossed in these welfare-to-work programmes, the 
benefit recipients still remain within the social security system. When a person who is 
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eligible for income support benefit and able to work participates in the welfare-to-work 
programme, this person receives income or other social benefits up to the benefit limit 
according to their income from earnings. As housing-related support for low-income 
households, both the income-related housing allowance and other housing programmes 
(e.g. social housing) also have a feature of this ‗in-work‘ benefit for the working poor.  
 
The literature has discussed the importance of housing cost support programmes as an in-
work benefit for the low-income household. First, as mentioned in Section 2.3.1, reduced 
financial burden for housing costs with a housing allowance or the below-market rent of 
social housing enables the low-income household to increase non-housing expenditures, 
including employment-related service or costs (Feeny et al., 2012; Verma & Hendra, 2003; 
Van Ryzin et al., 2003). Second, concerning the low-income households that are likely to 
live in a high-poverty or high-crime area, the increased choice of residence could reduce 
the ‗neighbourhood effect‘, which is regarded as a factor with a negative impact on 
employment outcome in the research (e.g. Fletcher et al., 2008). Third, a housing subsidy 
programme as in-work benefits is effective in overturning the low-income household‘s 
resistance to labour participation created by work disincentive because receipt of welfare 
benefits is conditional on accepting work (Feeny et al., 2012; Verma & Hendra, 2003). 
 
Housing Support Programme and Employment Outcome 
For the low-income household receiving housing support (housing allowance and/or public 
housing residency) as in-work benefits, the housing support is associated with employment 
outcome and this outcome again affects residential stability. As the housing-related cost 
subsidy is decreased by the increased income, this income change also creates changes to 
the eligibility for housing support programmes (Owens & Baum, 2009). In this respect, 
following the policy shift towards welfare-to-work in welfare policy, growing numbers of 
studies have addressed the relationship between receiving housing support and 
employment outcome, e.g. employment rate, working hours, duration of employment. 
Most of these studies have focused on (1) whether the beneficiaries face high or low work 
incentive and how this affects the employment outcome and (2) whether the receipt of 
housing support and the kinds of these programmes make the difference in employment 
outcome.  
 
Concerning the first research focus, two indicators, i.e. Income Replacement Ratio and 
Effective Marginal Tax Rate, are used to measure the work incentive. The Income 
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Replacement Ratio or Replacement Rate, i.e. the ratio of net income from welfare benefit 
to net income from work, represents the overall generosity level of the social welfare 
benefits. Accordingly, one can say that the higher the replacement ratio is, the greater the 
work disincentive to take on an employment role because the possibility of choosing 
unemployment arises when employment income is less than unemployment income given 
through social security benefits while recipients are unemployed. Therefore, the welfare 
beneficiaries do not see any incentive to work. Instead, becoming workless or remaining 
unemployed could be a more desirable option, i.e. being trapped in unemployment (Hulse 
& Randolph, 2004).  
 
The Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) relates to the net income reduction resulting 
from income tax and social insurance contribution payments. For the low-income 
household receiving housing assistance, the increase in gross income due to welfare-to-
work programme participation is subject to the application of both income tax and the 
national insurance system. For instance, after income tax and reduced welfare benefits, a 
worker‘s EMTR of 60% would mean that 60% of net income growth per every one extra 
income unit increase in gross income would be paid to income tax and social insurance 
contribution payments and the remaining 40% would be the worker‘s take-home pay. 
Therefore, a high EMTR indicates a low financial reward for increased participation in 
work (Hulse & Randolph, 2004; Wood et al., 2005). The financial advantage is necessary 
within the social security system to offset the income reduction, e.g. allowing recipients to 
retain their social security benefits until their incomes reach a certain level. However, one 
apparent problem emerges in the welfare system: The generous income supports may 
generate more work disincentives, discouraging the low-income household receiving social 
security benefits from actively finding a job (Kalb, 2003).  
 
The research shows that housing allowance recipients are placed in a situation in which 
they reap less financial reward for employment. When beneficiaries of a housing 
allowance prefer to work, they face high income replacement rates and effective marginal 
tax rates−that is, low work incentive−in the UK (Kalb, 2003) and Australia (Feeny et al., 
2012). Also Wood et al. (2009) projected that the high income replacement ratios of public 
housing tenants are related to their lower labour participation rate compared to other 
housing tenants. However, as each indicator represents one aspect of work disincentive 
problems, the application of only one work incentive indicator lacks the capacity to 
provide a clear picture (Giles et al., 1997). Moreover, as Bradshaw et al. (2005) observed, 
 37 
beneficiaries could choose different participation in labour force according to personal or 
family features when they face the same work disincentive. When there is a higher income 
replacement rate, both unmarried and married mothers‘ labour participation indicates that 
they would be less likely to work. However, when the marginal tax rate is high for both 
full-time and part-time work, whilst single mothers were more likely to remain 
unemployed, mothers in couples were more likely to opt for employment . 
 
In terms of the second research focus (the housing support and employment outcome of its 
beneficiaries) the research findings are divergent: The relationship between the receipt of 
housing cost assistance and the employment outcome is negligible, or negative or positive. 
Some researchers have suggested either negative or positive relationships between the 
housing assistance programme and its beneficiaries‘ employment outcome. Concerning the 
US housing programme, Verma and Hendra (2003) observed in their analysis of Los 
Angeles County‘s cases that post-welfare households receiving housing vouchers are likely 
to have higher earnings amongst all post-welfare households with and without housing 
support. Also, Nagle (2003) noted that households leaving the welfare system with housing 
cost assistance have a higher employment rate than those without housing cost assistance 
do, although the result for earnings is converse. However, other researchers‘ findings are 
inconsistent with these because they observed a negative effect of housing assistance 
programmes. In Olsen et al.‘s (2005) work at the national level in the US, the receipt of 
housing cost subsidy was related to having low earnings. Moreover, Jacob and Ludwig 
(2008) and Carlson et al. (2012) found a negative relationship between benefit receipt and 
earnings for housing voucher recipients in Chicago and Wisconsin respectively. Examining 
Australia‘s cases, Whelan (2004) noted that the likelihood of labour participation for both 
private and public tenants declines with the receipt of housing support programmes. 
 
Other results also indicate the neutral relationship between housing assistance provision 
and employment outcome of household receiving it. Examining the effects of federal 
housing assistance programmes in the US, i.e. Public Housing Assistance, Housing 
Voucher and Project-based Section 8 Assistance for private or non-profit organisations, 
Van Ryzin et al. (2003) observed that public housing programmes have little effect on 
encouraging or discouraging residents to move from welfare to work in New York City. 
Corcoran and Heflin (2003) research on women living in Michigan County also obtained 
similar results: Receiving housing assistance is unlikely to relate to better employment 
outcome in terms of employment provability, weekly earnings, working hours and duration 
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of employment. In Newman et al.‘s (2009) work on households with female household 
head, the receipt of housing assistance was not associated with a reduction in the 
employment rate or the level of earnings across public and private housing renters.  
 
Also, comparing the housing programme‘s effects on the employment outcome of 
households exiting welfare systems with and without housing assistance, Owens and Baum 
(2009) found little relationship between housing assistance programme receipt and 
employment outcome in the US. In other countries, Stephens (2005) suggested that there 
are limitations in proving significant effects of social assistance benefit changes on the 
employment participation in the UK‘s housing benefit system. Also, Feeny et al. (2012) 
compared economic outcomes of housing assistance recipients and non-recipients and 
found that the Australian housing support programmes
3
 have little impact on employment 
outcome of people receiving this support.  
 
Moreover, the research presents that the element inspiring such individuals to move to 
work is not restricted to financial reward (Wood et al., 2009; Ford et al., 1995) and various 
factors are frequently linked with the choice of employment or unemployment. First, 
family characteristics contribute to different responses to welfare-to-work transition. For 
example, as Blundell et al. (2000) indicated, households‘ responses to in-work benefits 
differ according to family features. Moreover, Chen (2006) observed that the recipient‘s 
demographic characteristics, educational background and labour market status play a 
crucial role in determining the duration of receiving the housing allowance in Sweden. 
Also Hulse and Saugeres (2008) found that a low financial reward from a job or training 
for unstable and short-term employment is not effective in encouraging mothers to accept 
work because they have to consider the additional cost for childcare service when they 
leave the welfare system. And Wood et al. (2009) observed that single mothers living in 
public housing are unlikely to move from welfare to work.  
 
Second, the varied arrangements of housing programmes based on tenure are associated 
with the different employment outcomes. As seen in the works of Hulse and Randolph 
(2004), Wood et al. (2005), Wood et al. (2009) and Feeny et al. (2010), differences exist in 
the effect of a housing allowance system on employment outcome between private tenants 
                                                 
3
 In Australia, there are two housing allowance schemes depending on tenant tenure: private tenants receive 
‗Commonwealth Rent Assistance‘ and public tenants receive rent rebates. With regards to the rent rebate 
system, rents for public housing are set at between 20% and 25% of household income and the difference 
between the public housing rents and the market rents are covered by rent rebates (Feeny et al., 2012). 
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and public tenants in Australia. While housing allowance (Commonwealth Rent 
Assistance) applicants receive their subsidies when they meet eligibility requirements, 
public housing applicants have a lengthy waiting period, which hinders active job seeking. 
This difference in the housing cost support programmes is likely to affect the employment 
outcome of their beneficiaries.  
 
In addition, the extent of work incentive itself or the changes in work incentive based on 
housing allowance provision could be affected by the features of the housing allowance 
system, such as the level of earning disregards and the taper application (Giles et al., 
1997). Moreover, different circumstances between public and private tenants may result in 
variations in the effects of work disincentives. Hulse and Randolph (2004) and Wood et al. 
(2005) suggested that the rent pricing system in public rental housing is related to the 
factor affecting choice to participate in employment. Although both private and public 
tenants with low-income bear the financial burden for rent payment, labour market 
participation is lower for public tenants with lower rent burdens than private tenants paying 
higher rent in Australia (Wood et al., 2009).  
 
Last, some studies has emphasised beneficiaries‘ residential location-related issues. 
‗Neighbourhood effects‘ (e.g. public housings in declining inner city or distant from 
workplace) deter the low-income household from accepting employment or keeping their 
jobs (Atkinson & Kintrea, 2001; Bania et al., 2003; Dietz, 2002; Ellen & Turner, 1997; 
Galster, 2011; Musterd & Andersson, 2006; Sari, 2012; Van Ham & Manley, 2010).  
 
 
Summary 
This review intends to understand the various aspects of housing and income-related issues 
in welfare states for establishing the theoretical framework for this research. In particular, 
the review focused on issues of housing-related income poverty, housing affordability and 
work incentives, which are the main subjects of the analysis of housing allowance effects 
in this study. The next chapter will explain the research method, indicators and variables 
that will be used to examine the effectiveness of housing allowance for achieving the 
different policy objectives.  
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Chapter 3. Research Method and Framework 
 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this study is to examine the effectiveness of housing allowance for achieving 
social and housing policy objectives in order to improve income and housing problems of 
low-income households in welfare states. In order to analyse varied housing allowance‘s 
effects in solving income and housing problems in different countries, this research 
compares the changes in the measurement of indicators in relation to income maintenance, 
housing affordability and work incentives, i.e. policy objectives, by the provision of 
housing allowance in the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and S. Korea. Moreover, this 
research investigates the different institutional features of housing allowance system, 
affecting the effectiveness of housing allowance in the four countries. Therefore, the 
analytical framework should be established in order to make the examination of housing 
allowance‘s institutional features and its effects in each country and the subsequent 
comparative analysis work properly. In this chapter, I will explain the analytical approach 
and framework and address the main indicators and variables for the analysis of housing 
allowance effectiveness.  
 
Figure 3.1 Research Framework  
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3.1 Comparative and Quantitative Approach  
 
 
The Overview of Comparative Research based on the Analysis of Housing Allowance 
Design  
This research analyses the effectiveness of housing allowance in welfare states with 
different housing and welfare regimes. However, this research differs from the previous 
comparative housing and social studies that examine the effects of housing allowances 
according to housing or welfare regime. This study does not intend to find the differences 
or similarities in housing allowance‘s effects on low-income households in countries 
according to their regimes. Instead, this study focuses on the different features of housing 
allowance design according to countries and expects that certain characteristics of housing 
allowance design contribute to the different results in solving income and housing cost-
related problem, regardless of regimes. Therefore, it is important to understand clearly the 
feature of housing allowance design in the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and S. Korea.    
 
As these countries have different welfare and housing regimes, it is necessary to consider 
the associations of the design of housing allowances and their effectiveness with the 
features of regimes. This study recognises the lack of fitness between housing allowances 
and welfare regimes in countries. While the characteristics of housing allowance system fit 
those of welfare regime in some countries, it does not fit in other countries. Moreover, for 
the latter, housing allowance effects would not fit the result of income support scheme. For 
example, in the UK‘s welfare system representing liberal welfare regime, Housing Benefit 
subsidises relatively higher housing costs than other countries. In contrast, the Dutch and 
Swedish welfare systems have comprehensive social insurance and complementary social 
benefits. The arrangements of their housing allowances are more complicated and their 
housing costs subsidies are more restricted compared to those in the UK. Therefore, the 
housing allowances have a greater potential to solve income and housing costs-related 
problems in the UK with its residual welfare system than in the Netherlands and Sweden. 
 
Therefore, we expect that the effectiveness of the housing allowance relates less to the 
feature of welfare or housing regime and more to the allowance system itself. The results 
might show no or little difference in the improvement of income and housing cost 
problems of the low-income household according to the features of welfare regime or 
housing regimes. Hence, this research draws a compositional feature of housing allowance 
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design that can be used to solve the income and housing cost problems of low-income 
families in welfare states regardless of welfare or housing regime. For this reason, we 
included the housing allowance of S. Korea in the comparative study. Several studies 
compared housing, social policy or welfare regime between European and Asian countries 
(see Chapter 2). In these studies, East Asian countries‘ welfare regimes varied from 
Western welfare regimes. As the application of design feature of housing allowance in this 
study is not restricted to any welfare or housing regime, this research makes 
recommendation for the improvement of S. Korea‘s housing allowance system.    
 
Although this study analyses the benefits for housing cost rather than the entire welfare 
system, the overall analysis focuses on the role of housing allowances as part of the 
national welfare and housing system. As the housing allowance system operates in the 
context of national social and housing policy, the housing allowance should serve the aims 
of social and housing policy. This study examines housing allowance in terms of social and 
housing policy instruments and investigates its effectiveness in solving income and 
housing problem for low-income households. Therefore, this analysis should examine the 
effects of housing allowance on the improvement of income maintenance and housing 
affordability, the issues that social and housing studies have discussed as policy aims. If 
the results of the analysis of housing allowance show an improvement in income and 
reduction of housing costs for low-income households, this research would complement 
other studies on the effectiveness of housing allowances in welfare states.    
 
In addition, this study examines the effectiveness of housing allowance in terms of 
welfare-to-work policy designed for the recipients who are working-age and able to work. 
However, the change in labour force participation of housing allowance recipients of in-
work welfare benefit as a result of change in the work incentive is beyond the scope of this 
research. Assuming that the provision of housing allowance increases household income, 
the income increase by housing allowance provision for the working poor is expected to be 
related to the decrease in work incentive for housing allowance recipients. This research is 
limited to the comparison of changes in work incentives caused by the housing allowance. 
However, this research could guide future studies on the effects of housing allowance 
reform on welfare-to-work transition for the working poor.    
 
As the main analysis, the effects of housing allowance on achieving social, housing and 
welfare-to-work policy aims will be investigated using different indicators (see Figure 3.1). 
 43 
Regarding the social and housing policy objectives, the provision of housing allowance 
should improve income maintenance and housing affordability for low-income households. 
However, the provision of housing allowance contributes to the income increase among the 
working poor, regardless of earnings increase. This would make the provision of work 
incentive and the result of two related indicators worse, as both are affected by increased 
earnings and decreased social security benefits. Therefore, this research recognises these 
possible adverse effects of housing allowance on different policy aims. 
 
Housing Allowance for Low-Income Households 
Welfare states have been providing the housing allowance to low-income households with 
income and housing problems. However, whilst both tenant and homeowner households 
with low income are eligible for housing allowance in some countries, only low-income 
tenant households are eligible in other countries. Generally, each housing allowance for 
tenants and homeowners subsidises different kinds of housing cost expenditures. The 
housing allowance for low-income tenant households subsidises mainly rent expenditures 
and the housing allowance for homeowners subsidises mortgage interest payment or other 
housing-related loan‘s interest payment. This study focuses on the national housing 
allowance scheme for low-income tenant households. They are likely to be worse off 
compared to owner-occupier households; thus, the proportion of housing costs to 
household‘s budget and the effectiveness of housing allowance might be more significant 
for tenant households compared to homeowner households. For these reasons, this study 
investigates the effectiveness of housing allowance for low-income tenant households. 
 
Comparative Analysis    
This research adopts comparative and quantitative approaches to analyse the effectiveness 
of housing allowance. The comparative analysis is used to compare the results between the 
four welfare states and the quantitative method is applied to measure variables and 
indicators. By comparing the effectiveness of housing allowance in different countries, the 
research intends to examine the effectiveness of housing allowance for the low-income 
tenants‘ poor living conditions and identify the features of housing allowance design that 
contribute the most to the improvement of the low-income tenants‘ income and housing 
problems. In order to address these themes, the research should be able to explain the 
various relationships between the housing allowance provision and its outcomes in 
different counties. In this respect, the comparative analysis will allow us to identify 
findings that are consistent with the hypothesised causal relationship between the receipt of 
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housing allowance and the improvement in income and housing problems of low-income 
households and explain differences observed from the results (Pickvance, 2001).    
 
Although housing allowance systems in welfare states present similar aims of supporting 
low-income households‘ housing cost expenditures, the design of housing allowance 
system varies across countries. Housing allowance systems in the four countries have been 
found to have the different eligibility for housing allowance claim, dissimilar definitions of 
eligible housing costs and different housing cost subsidisation rates. Moreover, the benefit 
arrangement could benefit certain households whilst hindering others. In addition, these 
compositional features of housing allowance could relate differently or similarly to various 
housing allowance effects on the low-income households. However, the effect of housing 
allowance on its beneficiaries‘ income and housing situation could be similar or different 
within and between countries according to the different characters of household, social and 
housing system and other national contexts. Regarding this issue, comparative research is 
applied to explain the way in which the difference (or similarity) of housing allowance 
system makes changes in the consequences in the dissimilar (or similar) way (Pickvance, 
2001).  
 
Furthermore, the current comparative housing studies emphasise the overall consideration 
of both the target of analysis and the policy system and its national context because the 
housing programme, e.g. housing cost assistance or housing provision, is ‗embedded‘ in 
the policy system and the wide social-economic structure (Kemeny, 2001; Pickvance, 2001; 
Stephens, 2011). Therefore, this research premises the understanding of social and housing 
policy systems in the four countries and analyses the effects of housing allowance in their 
nation contexts.  
 
Quantitative Approach with Policy Design Analysis  
This research also employs quantitative approach to explain the relationship between the 
effects of housing allowance and household features and assess the differences in the 
change of the low-income household‘s living condition in the UK, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and S. Korea. In comparative research, the quantitative method is useful to test 
hypothesis, observe a phenomenon and explain similar or different results from the 
interrelationship between variables in several countries (Horsewood, 2011). This type of 
quantitative research is categorised as ‗high-level‘ comparative study, as it is based on the 
explicit theory, empirical analysis and cross-cultural comparisons (Oxely, 2001). However, 
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there is a limitation in the generalisation of quantitative research results and in seeking 
policy transfer without understanding the institutional feature of policy system and 
structure in which the system operates (Pickvance, 2001). Therefore, this research takes 
quantitative approach with policy design analysis. The housing allowance scheme in each 
county has developed within the national housing and social security system, which affect 
each other. Moreover, the effectiveness of housing allowance could vary according to its 
role as a policy instrument in the wide social security or housing system. Moreover, 
welfare states have different housing allowance systems, e.g. varied benefit caps, housing 
cost subsidisation rules and eligibility conditions; thus, a country‘s system might favour a 
certain type of family that another country might not. The compositional feature of housing 
allowance design could lead to different housing allowance effects or the same results in 
different countries.  
 
Moreover, this research will make recommendations for the improvement of S. Korea‘s 
housing allowance system. It is necessary to compare the institutional features of housing 
allowances as well as the housing and social systems and their effectiveness in order to 
consider the policy transferability (Rose, 1991). Regarding the success of policy transfer, 
the concern is the ‗policy complexity‘ as barrier to policy transfer (Hudson & Lowe, 2009). 
Compared to the Korean housing allowance system, the institutional arrangements of other 
countries‘ housing allowance are more complicated and more tightly related to their 
housing and welfare system. However, without sufficient knowledge of the target 
programme or policy and adequate attention to the different national contexts as well as the 
essence of the original policy or programme and social structure, seeking policy transfer 
will not be successful (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Therefore, comparing other countries‘ 
outcomes with sufficient knowledge of the housing allowance programme, housing and 
welfare policy in terms of the national institutional structure should not be overlooked.  
 
Country Selection  
For the comparative analysis, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and S. Korea were selected. 
This research assumes that the effectiveness of housing allowance is associated with 
different housing and social policy as well as the wide social-economic structure in welfare 
states. Therefore, countries with different housing and welfare regimes that determine 
distinctive systems (Kemeny, 2001) need to be chosen. Moreover, in order to make 
recommendations for the improvement of housing allowance system in S. Korea, this study 
includes countries with welfare and housing regimes different from S. Korea. Therefore, 
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this research applied the welfare regime typology of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) and 
the housing regime typology of Kemeny (1995) to select the three Western countries with 
different welfare and housing regimes from S. For practical reason, the accessibility of 
resource is also considered. The features of selected countries are as follows: the UK 
(liberal welfare and dualist housing regime), Sweden (social democratic welfare and 
unitary housing regime), the Netherlands (corporatist or a hybrid welfare regime of 
corporatist and social-democratic and unitary housing regime) and S. Korea (East Asian 
welfare and dualist housing regime).      
 
Here, it is necessary to understand the importance of housing allowance as a policy 
instrument in the national context. Each country places different importance on the role of 
housing allowance as the form of nation‘s support for housing costs and as the social 
protection system. Therefore, the size of housing allowance provision is likely to vary 
across countries. As Table 3.1 presents, the social protection share of GDP is higher for 
Sweden compared to the other three countries, suggesting that the welfare regime in 
Sweden is more universal compared to the other three countries. Compared to Sweden, the 
social protection share of GDP is lower in the UK and the Netherlands. In S. Korea, it did 
not even reach half of the social protection share of GDP of other countries. It also 
indicates that the welfare system in S. Korea is residual, although the social protection 
share has increased in recent years.  
 
Table 3.1 Social Protection and Rent Allowance Shares of GDP (%) 
Share of GDP Average UK The Netherlands Sweden S. Korea 
Social protection* OECD     
2000 18.9 18.6 19.8 28.4 4.8 
2001 19.2 19.3 19.7 28.7 5.2 
2002 19.7 19.4 20.5 29.4 5.1 
2003 20.1 19.8 21.2 30.1 5.4 
2004 19.9 20.5 21.1 29.5 6.0 
2005 19.8 20.6 20.7 29.1 6.4 
2006 19.5 20.4 20.3 28.4 7.3 
2007 19.3 20.5 20.1 27.3 7.5 
Rent allowance** EU     
2000 0.51 1.44 0.35 0.62  
2001 0.50 1.43 0.34 0.61  
2002 0.51 1.47 0.37 0.58  
2003 0.49 1.40 0.34 0.57   
2004 0.50 1.42 0.34 0.55   
2005 0.55 1.44 0.33 0.53  *** 
2006 0.55 1.45 0.38 0.51 0.04 
2007 0.49 1.15 0.38 0.47 0.03 
2008 0.48 1.21 0.36 0.46 0.07 
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Source: *Social Expenditure: Aggregated data, OECD Social Expenditure Statistics; ** 
Eurostat Statistics Database; ***MOHW (2007a, 2008a, 2009, 2010). 
 
However, rent allowance (i.e. housing allowance for tenants) share of GDP is different 
from social protection share of GDP. This is because the housing policy and the housing 
market state in the country, e.g. the rental housing structure (see Table 3.2), influence the 
national support for housing costs. The rent allowance share of GDP is higher in the UK 
with the ‗dualist‘ rental housing structure compared to Sweden and the Netherlands with 
the ‗unitary‘ rental housing structure. The housing allowance is included in the social 
assistance provided for the lowest-income households in S. Korea. However, this benefit 
does not consider the actual housing costs of the claimant and provides minimal benefits, 
with fixed amount adjusted just for family size (see Chapter 7). For this reason, its share is 
significantly smaller compared to other countries.  
 
Table 3.2 Dwelling Stocks and Population by Tenure Types in the Four Countries (%) 
 the UK the Netherlands Sweden S. Korea***** 
Dwelling stocks (Total=100%)     
Year 2009* 2010** 2008*** 2010 
Owner-occupied 69.5 55 44 - 
Co-operative  - - 18 - 
Rental 30.5 45 38 (100.0) 
    (Private rental: 33.9) 
    (Public rental: 66.1) 
   
Population or Household 
(Total=100%) 
Population**** Household 
Year   2011 2010 
Homeowner 67.9 67.1 69.7 54.3 
Tenant  32.1 32.9 30.3 45.7 
(Rent at market price) (13.3) (32.4) (30.0) - 
(Rent at reduced price or free) (18.8) (0.5) (0.3) - 
Source:*Wilcox, S. (2009) Table 17d, p.109; **Statistics Netherlands (2011); ***Ministry 
of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (2010) Table 3.5, p. 64; ****Eurostat EU-SILC 
database [ilc_lvho02]; ***** MLTM (2011) Table 5-1, p. 357 and Table 11-3, p. 410.  
 
 
3.2 Research Indicators  
 
 
In terms of social policy, housing policy and welfare-to-work transition objectives, the 
effects of the housing allowance on the low-income tenant will be examined by measuring 
the extent to which income maintenance, housing affordability and work incentive 
indicators change according to the provision of housing allowance. First, the effects of 
housing allowance on income maintenance are measured with two indicators. The first 
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indicator measures the change in residual income after housing cost payment by housing 
allowance provision. The second indicator measures the change in poverty rate by housing 
allowance provision. Second, the effects of housing allowance provision on housing 
affordability is measured using the change in rent-to-income ratio (RIR), i.e. the shift in the 
financial burden for housing costs expenditures of the low-income tenant. Third, the 
effectiveness of housing allowance provision is measured as the change in two work 
incentive indicators, i.e. Income Replacement Ratio (IRR) and Effective Marginal Tax 
Rate (EMTR) by the take-up of housing allowance. These two indicators consider the 
possibility of the changes in welfare beneficiaries‘ intentions to participate in labour 
market. Therefore, the high work disincentives would appear to be related to increased 
possibility of less active labour force participation 
 
Table 3.3 Research Indicators  
Policy Objective Indicator 
Social policy   Improving  
income maintenance 
1. Residual income after housing cost expenditure  
 
  2. Poverty rate  
(poverty line: 60% of the national median income)  
 
Housing policy  
 
 
Reducing housing 
affordability problem  
 
Rent to Income Ratio (RIR)  
Welfare-to-work 
transition  
 
Providing  
work incentive  
 
1.Income Replacement Ratio (IRR)  = 
Household net income when unemployed 
Household net income when employed 
 
 
  2. Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) = 
1  - 
Change in household net income 
Change in household gross income by 1 income unit 
  
 
 
3.2.1 The Operational Definition of Household Income and Housing Cost  
 
In this study, the household information produced in different contexts will be used for 
comparative analysis because the analysis will utilise the national datasets collected in 
different countries. Therefore, it is necessary to standardise the main two concepts, 
household income and housing cost and apply them to the measurement of the housing 
allowance effects on each indicator.   
 
In addressing indicators, the study focuses on the income change by the receipt of housing 
allowance. Here, the unit of the analysis is a household and incomes of adult family 
members are summed to form a household income. This household income refers to the 
concept of net income, i.e. income after tax, after social insurance contributions and before 
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housing cost expenditure. In this study, household income is equivalised for household size 
and composition by using the modified OECD equivalence income scale. A given income 
of a household does not mean an equal amount of resources provided to households with 
different sizes and needs. However, the equivalence scale assumes that there are the higher 
economies of scale for the larger household (Pisu, 2012). And the equivalised income 
makes it possible to compare incomes across varied household types (Heylen & Haffner, 
2012). Therefore, the equivalence scales have been used to adjust household income 
according to the size and composition of the household in income and poverty research.  
 
There are several equivalence scales that apply different weights to income according to 
the household composition. The original OECD equivalence scale applies a weight of 1.0 
to the household head, 0.7 to additional adults and 0.5 to children younger than 18 years of 
age. The modified OECD equivalence scale employs a weight of 1.0 to the household 
head, 0.5 to additional adults and 0.3 to children younger than 18 years of age. Unlike 
these OECD income equivalence scales, other types of income equivalence scales apply 
the same weight (the square root of the household members) to all household members 
(Behrendt, 2002; Bradshaw & Mayhew, 2010; Chanfreau & Burchardt, 2008). When 
comparing the equivalent scales, the adjusted income for the large household is smaller 
when using square root scale (Chanfreau & Burchardt, 2008). Therefore, it should be noted 
that the choice of equivalence scales could make difference in the level of household 
income and poverty. Concerning the OECD equivalence scales, the modified OECD scale 
indicates higher cost of living for families with more adults compared to the original 
OECD equivalence scale.  
 
Concerning the definition of housing cost, this research adopts the definition of the eligible 
rent for the housing allowance entitlement in each country. As the concept of housing cost 
varies across countries, it is one of the most difficult elements to measure in cross-national 
research. Although the definition of housing cost in this study is narrow, the purpose of 
this study is to evaluate the effect of housing allowance on tenant recipients whose main 
burden is rent payment. Moreover, housing allowance subsidises different kinds of housing 
costs in each country. Whilst it is possible to include other housing costs, such as heating 
costs, housing repair, or housing maintenance costs in the housing allowance payment in 
some countries, it is not the case in other countries. In addition, the data collection will 
consider the concept of eligible rent for the housing allowance recipients. For example, 
separate questions about various housing costs are found in the Korean dataset because the 
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Korean housing allowance subsidises mainly rent payments and some expenditures for 
housing maintenance and repair service charges. Therefore, it would be reasonable to 
examine the extent to which the housing allowance system subsidises the eligible housing 
cost in each country. In some sections, this study will present the general income and 
housing cost-related problems of both housing allowance recipients and non-recipients. In 
this case, the gross housing cost could be applied to the housing allowance recipients. 
Otherwise, the housing cost means the eligible housing cost for the housing allowance 
entitlement in each country of the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and S. Korea. 
 
3.2.2 Income Maintenance Indicator 1: Residual Income after Housing Cost    
 
The first indicator of income maintenance relates to the extent to which the provision of 
housing allowance improves the low-income tenant‘s finance. The residual income after 
housing costs payment indicates the possibility of non-housing consumption opportunity 
for low-income households. In this respect, two different residual household incomes after 
housing costs are compared, one is residual household income after housing costs when 
housing allowance is provided while another is residual household income after housing 
costs when housing allowance is not provided. If the residual household income after 
housing cost expenditure increased by the provision of housing allowance, it would 
indicate that the housing allowance is likely to be effective in improving the poor tenants‘ 
income problems.  
 
Table 3.4 Measurement of Residual Income after Housing Cost 
 Household situation 
 Housing allowance provision Housing cost expenditure 
Residual income after rents expenditure 1   No after  
Residual income after rents expenditure 2   Yes after 
 
3.2.3 Income Maintenance Indicator 2: Poverty Rate 
 
If the residual household income after housing cost expenditures increases due to the 
receipt of housing allowance, it would likely have an effect on the low-income tenant‘s 
poverty state. Therefore, this study will examine the changes in poverty rate by housing 
allowance. In this study, the measurement of poverty will be based on the household net 
income. When comparing the results of four countries, the poverty threshold is set at 60% 
of national median income. This standard has been used widely in European Union and 
OECD countries as a poverty threshold (Bradshaw & Mayhew, 2010). Moreover, in terms 
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of the Korean dataset used for analysis (Korea Welfare Panel Study), households living in 
poverty and not living in poverty are sampled using this poverty threshold, although the 
60% of national median income is not an official poverty line in S. Korea. In addition, 
poverty rates using 40% and 50% of the national median income thresholds are measured 
(see Tables A.3 through A.6 in Appendices).   
 
Table 3.5 Comparison of Different Poverty Thresholds for Couple with Two Children  
 the UK the Netherlands Sweden S. Korea 
60% of median income 29,583 33,640 24,859 23,297 
(US$ at PPPs in 2005)     
     
In national Currency  GBP EUR SEK KRW(000s) 
60% of median income 16,890 27,562 215,598 18,763 
50% of median income 14,075 22,968 179,665 15,636 
40% of median income 11,260 18,374 143,732 12,509 
     
Purchasing Power Parties*  0.636 0.896 9.38 789 
(national currency per US$ in 2005)    
Source: OECD (2008a) Table 5.A1.1, p. 152; *OECD Aggregate National Accounts: PPPs 
and Exchange Rates, OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).  
 
Concerning the poverty rate approach, if household income is below a given poverty 
standard, the household is regarded as being in poverty. Here, we compare three different 
poverty rates according to a household‘s housing cost expenditure and housing allowance 
receipt behaviours. The study will measure the poverty rate when the households do not 
spend their income on housing cost expenditures (PR1). And it will measure two poverty 
rates based on the households‘ income after rent payment when the low-income tenants do 
not receive housing allowance (PR2) and they do (PR3). By comparing PR1 and PR2, the 
research examines the extent to which the housing cost expenditure has negative effect on 
the low-income households‘ original income problem. Moreover, by comparing PR2 and 
PR3, the research examines the effects of housing allowance in improving poverty state of 
its beneficiaries. 
 
Table 3.6 Measurement of Poverty Rate  
 Household‘ situation 
Poverty rate  Housing allowance receipt  Housing cost expenditure 
PR1 No Before 
PR2 No After 
PR3 Yes After 
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3.2.4 Housing Affordability Indicator: Rent to Income Ratio  
 
This research employs this conventional ratio measure, i.e. Rents to Income Ratio (RIR) as 
an indicator of housing affordability problem of the low-income tenant households. 
Although this research adopts the measurement of the residual income after housing costs 
as the income maintenance indicator, housing research has often used this indicator to 
measure housing affordability problem. It is noted that the residual income after housing 
costs payment is a more proper indicator showing the relationship between housing costs 
and income problems. However, when it comes to the low- or the lowest-income 
households, even the low ratio of housing costs to income have a significant effect on 
household finances because of the absolute lack of financial resources. Therefore, as this 
research concerns the effectiveness of housing allowance for the low-income tenant 
households, the ratio of housing cost to income should not be ignored when discussing 
housing affordability problem.  
  
In order to evaluate the effects of housing allowance on relieving the financial burden 
arising from expenditure on housing cost, this study compares different RIRs. One is RIR1 
when housing allowance is not provided and another is RIR2 when the housing allowance 
is provided to the low-income tenant. Concerning the former, housing cost expenditures 
place a high financial burden on the low-income tenants because they have to pay their 
housing costs from their own income without subsidisation from housing allowance. 
Therefore, when these households receive housing allowance, the RIR is expected to 
decline. The decrease in RIR indicates the effects of housing allowance provision in 
improving financial affordability for housing cost expenditures. As defined above, the 
housing cost refers to the eligible housing cost for housing allowance claim in each 
country, not the gross housing costs.    
 
However, using a single RIR ratio is unlikely to determine whether a household has a 
housing affordability problem. Moreover, countries employ different housing affordability 
ratios for judgment. For example, in Canada, households that pay more than 30 % of 
before-tax household income for housing are regarded as having housing affordability 
problem. This 30% standard of housing affordability is used in the US Housing Voucher 
programme (Kutty, 2005). In the Australian housing allowance system (for public renters), 
rents for public housing are set at 20 to 25 % of the households‘ income and these ratios 
are considered as the housing affordability standard (Wood et al., 2005). However, in some 
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countries, e.g. the UK, the governments do not state clearly the proportion of housing costs 
to household‘s income as a standard for housing affordability in the housing allowance 
system.  
 
In order to account for this problem, this research adopts three RIR standards to define the 
extent of housing affordability problem. If a household‘s RIR is below 20%, this 
household does not have a housing affordability problem. If a household‘s RIR is between 
20 and 30%, this household has a housing affordability problem. If a household‘s RIR is 
over 30%, this household has a severe housing affordability problem. Whether the low-
income tenant has a housing affordability problem could be determined by looking at the 
RIRs. However, these standard ratios are benchmarks for the judgment of housing 
affordability in this study and they are open to be contested.  
 
Table 3.7 Measurement of Rent to Income Ratio  
 RIR1 RIR2 
Housing allowance receipt 
 
No Yes 
Housing affordability Problem   
don‘t have Below 20(%) Below 20(%) 
do have 20-30 (%) 20-30 (%) 
do have severe problems Above 30(%) Above 30 (%) 
 
3.2.5 Work Incentive Indicator  
 
The target of the welfare-to-work transition analysis is limited to the working-aged 
household. Whilst indicators of income maintenance and housing affordability relate to the 
positive effects of housing allowance provision, the indicator of work incentives relates to 
the possible negative effects of housing allowance−namely, the discouragement of welfare-
to-work transition. The changes in work incentive are linked to the different choices for 
employment or unemployment. However, while this research addresses the changes in wok 
incentive by the provision of housing allowance, the possible behavioural changes of the 
working poor are not within the scope of this research. Therefore, the analysis will employ 
two indicators of work incentives and compare the changes in these work incentives by the 
provision of housing allowance.      
 
Work Disincentive Indicator 1: Income Replacement Ratio 
If the working poor had similar or a slightly decreased income during unemployment, it 
would reduce the incentive to maintain their employment position in labour market and 
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encourage them to become jobless, i.e. facilitating being trapped in unemployment (the 
unemployment trap). This is because their current income could be replaced with the 
increased social security benefit to a certain degree. Therefore, the Income Replacement 
Ratio (IRR) presents the possibility of being out-of-work. Work disincentive grows with 
probability that the current working income will be more replaced with income while 
unemployed.  
 
 Income Replacement Ratio = 
Household net income when a worker will be unemployed 
Household net income when currently employed 
 
Concerning the effects of housing allowance on the working poor, the problem is that the 
provision of housing allowance could increase the IRR. In this case, the housing allowance 
has a negative effect on the welfare-to-work transition of the working poor by increasing 
the possibility of work disincentive. Therefore, this research compares two IRRs. IRR1 is 
based on the situation when the working-poor households do not receive housing 
allowance while IRR2 is based on the situation when they receive housing allowance. If 
there were differences between two IRRs, the housing allowance provision would increase 
work disincentive (i.e. the possibility that currently working-poor households receiving 
housing allowance would choose the unemployment).  
 
Table 3.8 Measurement of Income Replacement Ratio 
 Housing allowance provision 
IRR Currently in work Hypothetically out-of-work 
IRR1 No No 
IRR2 Yes Yes 
 
When examining IRRs, it is necessary to impute two different household incomes, i.e. the 
current household income when adult members work and the simulated income when the 
main earner becomes unemployed. However, ‗household income‘ for the purpose of IRR 
analysis is different from household income used for the above-stated indicators. Here, the 
income includes adult family members‘ net earnings, unemployment insurance or 
unemployment assistance, social assistance, housing allowance and child benefits while it 
excludes other incomes, such as capital incomes. Moreover, although there could be one or 
two adult-workers in a household, this research assumes that only one worker, i.e. the main 
earner in a family, will be unemployed. The imputation of households‘ incomes from the 
present employment position and hypothetical unemployment situation are related to the 
households‘ income tax and social insurance contribution system in each country. 
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Therefore, this study utilises parameter values and equations for income tax, tax credits 
and national social insurance contributions of each country from OECD Taxing Wages 
books (OECD, 2007, 2008b) as well as the country-specific (the UK, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and S. Korea) information on the social security benefit and income tax system of 
the OECD Benefits and Wages.
4
   
 
Work Disincentive Indicator 2: Effective Marginal Tax Rate 
The Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) indicates the extent to which the income tax and 
the national social insurance contribution payment decrease the net income growth. The 
income tax and social security system in a country affect how much income can the 
working-poor households take home after tax payment and national insurance contribution 
while maintaining their social security benefits when their incomes increase. If a household 
could maintain a considerable amount of their increased income, it would be a work 
incentive to make them participate in labour market more actively. On the contrary, if a 
household has a little amount of increased net income per extra gross income growth, there 
would be a high possibility of work disincentive. 
  
EMTR = 1 − 
Change in household net income 
Change in household gross income by 1 income unit 
 
Concerning the low-income households, such as the recipients of social assistance, they 
would be more likely to remain in poverty even when increasing their labour participation. 
This is because whilst the low-income household might have less amount of increased 
income owing to the newly imposed income tax and national insurance contribution, their 
social security benefits would be reduced due to having new or extra earnings. In work 
incentive studies, this is explained as the possibility of the poverty trap for the low-income 
household measured by EMTR. Households with high EMTR could preserve less portions 
of increased net income by additional labour participation. Therefore, this would reduce 
the incentive to increase the labour participation for working-poor households and the 
incentive to get a job for out-of-work households because they would have fewer financial 
rewards when increasing their labour participation.   
 
                                                 
4
 For detail, see OECD Social Policies and Data, Benefits and Wages: Country Specific Information internet 
site (http://www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/benefitsandwagescountryspecificinformation.htm).  
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Similar to the IRR analysis, this research compares two EMTRs: EMTR1 is calculated by 
considering household income without housing allowance provision and EMTR2 is 
calculated by considering household income with housing allowance provision. If EMTR2 
is higher than EMTR1, the housing allowance provision relates to the reduction in the take-
home portion of the net income growth, i.e. increased work disincentive, although the 
housing allowance itself could improve the income and housing problems for low-income 
households.  
 
Table 3.9 Measurement of Effective Marginal Tax Rate 
 Housing allowance provision 
EMTR Current situation: in work or out-of-work  Hypothetically increase in labour participation  
EMTR1 No No 
EMTR2 Yes Yes 
 
The household income category would be the same when calculating EMTR and IRR. 
Similar to analysing IRR, the imputation of income change by income tax, national social 
insurance contribution and social security benefit entitlement is based on the parameters 
and benefit equations of each country from OECD‘s (2007, 2008b) Taxing Wages and 
OECD Benefits and Wages internet site
5
. It is assumed that the gross income of each 
household‘s main earner increases by 1% of his or her gross income for working 
households. However, while the IRR analysis is limited to working households, both 
working and workless households are subject to the EMTR analysis. Therefore, 1% of 
annual average gross earning of single adult without children in each country is assigned to 
calculate the change in gross income for out-of-work households. Here, the measurement 
of EMTR is average across household‘s employment state regardless of employment type 
(e.g. full-time or part time jobs, different working hours).  
 
Table 3.10 Income Tax, Social Security Contribution and Average Gross Earning of Single 
Adult (2011) 
 the UK the Netherlands Sweden S. Korea 
Income tax (per annum)* 15.6 16.0 17.8 4.3 
Social security contribution* 9.5 15.4 7.0 8.1 
Gross earnings (US$ at current PPPs) 52,013 55,165 42,118 43,943 
Source: OECD Taxing Wages: Comparative Tables, OECD Tax Statistics (database).  
Note: *As a percentage of gross wage earnings. The average gross earnings of 2006 (at 
national currency) were used for analysis. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 For detail, see OECD Social Policies and Data, Benefits and Wages: Country Specific Information internet 
site (http://www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/benefitsandwagescountryspecificinformation.htm). 
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3.3 Independent Variables: Household Characteristics   
 
 
The effect of housing allowances may vary not just across different countries, but also 
across different household groups within each country. Whilst the housing allowance is 
provided to the low-income households, these households have different characteristics, 
such as different income levels, household size and composition, private housing or social 
housing tenants and working households or out-of-work households. The benefit 
arrangement of housing allowance system considers these family-related features as the 
benefit eligibility. In this research, we examine the changes in household‘s income and 
housing problems by the provision of housing allowance according to these various family-
related features, i.e. household income level, household composition, tenant type and adult 
household member‘s employment status and explain the differences of effects of housing 
allowance in its results.  
 
Table 3.11 Independent Variables by Household Characteristics 
 
In comparative analysis, the conceptual equivalence of variables is important as it 
guarantees the ‗commensurability‘ of the objects to be compared. However, the national 
context can affect housing-related terms used in a certain county (Pickvance, 2001). 
Among independent variables used in this research, while the identical standard of 
categorisation is applied for categorising household income, household composition and 
Household characteristics Category 
 <Among low-income tenants receiving housing allowance> 
1. Income quintiles  1
st
 quintile: the lowest-income household  
   To 
 5
th
 quintile: the highest-income household  
  
2. Household composition Working-aged family without children  
 Working-aged family with children  
 Pensioner 
  
3. Tenant tenure The UK 
  : public rental/ housing association rental/ private rental   
The Netherlands 
  : public rental housing/ co-operative or housing association/  
   private rental housing  
Sweden 
  : co-operative housing/ housing association or private rental  
S. Korea 
  : Permanent Public Rental Housing/  
   other public rental or private rental housing 
  
4. Employment status 
(household‘s adult member) 
the Employed (some of adults in work and all of adults in work) 
the Unemployed (adults who are able to work and unable to work)     
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employment status variables in the four counties, it is not the case of tenant tenure variable. 
Moreover, there are differences in the meaning of tenant tenure used in national data 
collection and its categorisation. Furthermore, the meanings of tenant tenure concept differ 
according to the housing system and housing policy in the national context. As Table 3.11 
presents, the sub-categories of tenant tenure indicate the conceptual differences between 
countries because of its limited commensurability. This conceptual difference has to be 
kept in mind in the comparative analysis.    
 
It should be noted that different groups of households will be included in the analysis 
evaluating each indicator. Whilst all low-income tenants receiving housing allowance are 
subject to the income maintenance and housing affordability analysis, only working-aged 
households among them are subject to the analysis of welfare-to-work indicator. Moreover, 
whilst both working-aged employed and unemployed tenants receiving housing allowance 
are subject to the EMTR analysis, only employed households among all working-aged 
low-income tenants in receipt of housing allowance are subject to the IRR analysis. 
Furthermore, although some households are described as households with highest or higher 
income, all households receiving housing allowance belong to lower income groups among 
the whole population: Even when it comes to the highest-income group (5th income 
quintile), households have incomes low enough to qualify for means-tested benefit. The 
results of this study should be understood in this context.   
 
Figure 3.2 Target of Analysis according to Indicators  
 
Policy 
Aim 
 
Income Maintenance  
Housing 
Affordability 
 Work Incentive 
           
Indicator  Residual 
Income after 
Rent 
 
Poverty 
Rate 
 
Rent to 
Income ratio 
 
Effective 
Marginal Tax 
Rate 
 
Income 
Replacement 
Ratio 
  |  |  |  |  | 
Tenant 
receiving 
housing 
allowance 
_ 
Working-aged Employed 
 |  |  |  |   
_ 
Working-aged Unemployed   
 |  |  |     
_ Over working-aged     
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3.4 The Use of Data 
 
 
Concerning the quantitative analysis, a single year‘s data collected in the UK, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and S. Korea will be analysed. This research addresses the 
significance of income poverty and housing affordability problems and the effectiveness of 
housing allowance at one time point. Therefore the changes in income maintenance, 
housing affordability and the effects of housing allowance provision over the beneficiaries‘ 
life cycle are not within the scope of this research. Hence, there are clear limitations in 
discussing the results.   
 
Moreover, it should be noted that the rule of current institutional arrangements and the rule 
(e.g. maximum benefit rate) used for the quantitative analysis with national dataset are 
different. While the current rules are explained in order to understand the feature of 
housing allowance system, the rules used in the quantitative analysis are those of the 
reference year of data collection or survey. For instance, Section 4.2 of Chapter 4 (the 
UK‘s housing allowance) explains the design and rule of 2012-13 Housing Benefit and 
Local Housing Allowance. However the pre-2008 benefit rules are used the analysis model 
in section 4.3. This is because the information of dataset is obtained before 2008 reform. 
Moreover, the income imputation for EMTR and IRR is based on the income tax and social 
insurance contribution rule of 2006/07. This is the same in other three countries; in 
particular, the understanding of the changed rule of the Korean housing allowance system 
before and after 2008 is required. Therefore, this research has a limitation to present the 
current income and housing situations of the housing allowance recipients.    
 
This study will use national datasets of each country to analyse the effectiveness of 
housing allowance in the four welfare states. Using a harmonised data to conduct the cross-
national research could make the manipulation of data and comparative analysis easier than 
using different datasets. However, using national datasets in a cross-national study could 
provide more detailed information about the national context (Glover, 1996). Moreover, as 
the different housing costs are eligible for housing allowance in each country, it would be 
convenient to use the national dataset.  
 
The national datasets used in the study are as follows: Family Resources Survey 2006/07 in 
the UK, Housing Research in the Netherlands (WoOn) 2006, Household Finances (HEK) 
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2006 in Sweden and 2008 Korea Welfare Panel Study (3
rd
 wave) in S. Korea (see Table 
A.1 in Appendices). 
 
Family Resources Survey in the UK 
Family Resources Survey (FRS) was introduced in 1992 by the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) to get more reliable information on society for the ministry‘s policy 
development and monitoring. As FRS was conducted to meet the information needs of 
DWP, with an aim to collect households‘ information needed to monitor social security 
programme, to model national insurance contribution and social security benefit changes 
and to forecast benefit expenditure. Therefore, the main research topics of FRS are related 
to individual households‘ characteristics, income and work states, housing costs, income 
and benefit receipts, work and wages, tax payments, national insurance contributions, 
savings and assets. FRS is carried out every year in the Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(from 2002). The households were sampled by the Royal Mail‘s small users‘ PostCode 
Address file in Great Britain and by the Valuation and Land Agency property database in 
Northern Ireland. Around 43,000 households were interviewed for 2006-07 FRS (DWP 
FRS internet site
6
). 
 
Housing Research in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands has a long tradition of large-scale national housing research. Former the 
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM), i.e. now the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, has been responsible for housing surveys since 
the 1960s (Van Schie, 2006). VROM combined two existing main national housing 
surveys, the Housing Demand Survey (WBO) and the Dutch Housing Quality Survey 
(KWR) and launched the new housing survey, Housing Research in the Netherlands 
(WoON) in 2005 (VROM internet site
7
). WoON has regular samples of 40,000 
respondents and it is carried out every three years. This survey consists of seven modules 
that have different survey cycles: housing market module, energy and safety, consumer 
behaviour and affordability, housing and care, liveability, living surroundings survey, 
structural survey, home improvement and maintenance (VROM internet website).   
 
 
                                                 
6
 http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/frs/index.php?page=index. 
 
7
 The information of VROM internet site (www.vrom.nl) is accessible at Government of Netherlands 
internet site (www.rijksoverheid.nl).  
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Household Finances in Sweden  
The Statistics Sweden conducts Household Finances (HEK) survey every year. For 
sampling for survey, Total Population Register is used coordinating with Statistics 
Sweden's Longitudinal Individuals Database to obtain correct information of households. 
The coordinated sampling makes it possible to follow sample persons and their households 
over several years. Household Finances survey focuses on the income distribution, income 
structure, the living situation and living expenses according to household types (Statistics 
Sweden HEK internet site
8
). 
 
Korea Welfare Panel Study in S. Korea  
Korea Welfare Panel Study (KOWEPS) launched in 2006 as a result of the collaboration of 
Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs and the Social Welfare Research Centre of 
Seoul National University with the support of Ministry for Health and Welfare. The three 
existing panel surveys conducted with economically disadvantaged people, i.e. the Near 
Poor and the Poor Panel, Self-Support Panel and Korea Welfare Panel, were merged into 
and unified as Korea Welfare Panel Study. KOWEPS has the sample size of over 7,000 
households, which is the biggest sample size among panel surveys for individual 
households‘ welfare commissioned by the government. The sample consists of 3,500 
households with income below 60% of the national median income and 3,500 households 
with income over 60% of the national median income. This panel is the only one panel that 
contains household samples from all official administration regions of S. Korea. KOWEPS 
provides information on household characteristic, household economic status, housing 
conditions and welfare needs (KOWEPS internet site
9
).  
 
 
In Chapters 4 through 7, I will analyse the effectiveness of housing allowance for 
achieving policy objectives−improving income maintenance, housing affordability and 
work incentives−in the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and S. Korea. Each chapter consists 
of three sections: the development of the national support for housing costs, including 
housing allowance; the design of housing allowance; and the analysis of the effects of 
housing allowance provision on the low-income tenants. Subsequently, I will compare the 
results of four countries in Chapter 8.  
                                                 
8
 http://www.scb.se/Pages/Product____7274.aspx. 
 
9
 http://koweps.re.kr. 
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Chapter 4. The Effectiveness of Housing Allowance for Tenants in the 
United Kingdom 
 
 
Introduction  
For decades the UK government has provided housing allowances to low-income 
households, known as the Housing Benefit (HB). HB is one of the major features of 
national housing costs subsidies in the UK (Diacon et al., 2010) and both low-income 
tenants and homeowners are eligible for it. In this chapter, I will look at the way in which 
the national support for housing costs, including HB, has been developed in the UK 
(Section 4.1). I will then explain the compositional features of the HB design in Section 
4.2. Finally, I will analyse the effect of the HB on income maintenance, housing 
affordability and work incentives of the low-income tenant household in Section 4.3.  
 
 
4.1. The Development of National Support for Housing Costs in the UK 
 
 
The initial forms of national support for housing have been developed over the course of 
40 years in the UK. During the first half of the 20
th
 century, the supply-side housing 
subsidy to local authorities as well as the rent regulation and the encouragement of home-
ownership shaped the early housing policy and the features of the housing market tenure. 
Before World War One (WWI), around 90% of households lived in privately rented 
dwellings. However, the rents in the private sector increased considerably after the 
outbreak of WWI and, consequently, the government introduced rent control and restricted 
the interest rate. The government also encouraged homeownership by providing financial 
advantages to households (e.g. tax relief on mortgage interest). For a number of reasons, 
homeownership rapidly increased from about 10% in 1914 to 34% in 1939, especially in 
light of the development of affordable mortgage finance (Lund, 2006). The government 
also provided more grants to local authorities for council housing construction through a 
series of housing-related legislation.  
 
The initial introduction of housing allowances was associated with tenants in the newly 
constructed council housing. As low-income tenants from slum areas or people living in 
overcrowded housing could not afford the new council housing (Kemp, 2007b), the supply 
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of housing with affordable rent costs for low-income tenants was required. Local 
authorities were given the discretion of providing rent rebates or income-related rent 
schemes under the 1930 Housing Act. In addition, after WWII, the government increased 
supply-side subsidies for local governments to deal with the serious housing shortage 
problem as the significant number of homes destroyed during the war (Kemp, 2007b). This 
supply-side of national subsidies was the main policy instrument in housing policy until 
the 1970s. 
 
Demand-side housing cost support, known as ‗housing additions‘, was introduced into the 
social security system in 1943, being added to the means-tested social assistance benefit 
rates. This demand-side allowance primarily subsidised the rents of tenant beneficiaries, 
mortgage interest payments, repairs and insurance loan interest payments of homeowner 
beneficiaries (George, 1968). This allowance remained as part of the new national social 
assistance benefits under the 1948 National Assistance Act. This new scheme was 
designed to make up the difference between a household‘s assessed income and three 
‗requirements‘. The first requirement was a basic level of benefit intended to subsidise 
day-to-day living expenses for items such as food, heating and lighting. The second 
requirement subsidised regular weekly additional costs and the third housing requirement 
subsidised the recipient‘s actual housing costs (Kemp, 1986). This housing cost support 
scheme was successful during the 1950s and 1960s and remained the fundamental 
component of the Supplementary Benefit when it replaced the National Assistance Benefit 
in 1966.  
 
The New Housing Allowance Scheme in the 1970s 
In the 1970s the social and housing policy developed separately under the Conservative 
government‘s policy. The Conservative government noted that the severe lack of housing 
building in England and Wales had been relieved as a whole, and thus set up new policy 
objectives (Whitehead et al., 2005). In relation to the housing policy, the government 
introduced a ‗fair rent‘ charge in all rental sectors and fair rents for housing associations. In 
addition, the government established the national HB scheme, known as Rent Rebate (for 
council tenants) and Rent Allowance (for private and housing association tenants), which 
applied to all tenants under the 1972 Housing Finance Act (ibid).  
 
Therefore, adding to the means-tested Family Income Supplement started in 1966 for 
working families with dependent children, the new housing allowance paid to these 
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households. Until the 1980 HB reform, low-income households received housing 
allowances from the separate national systems, which had different means tests, structures 
and levels of assistances. In calculating the amount of HB, a household‘s gross income was 
compared with a ‗needs allowance‘ designed to reflect the basic costs of households living 
with a de facto equivalence scale in place. If their incomes were equal to the needs 
allowance, 60% of the rent was awarded. The allowance increased by 25 pence for every 
£1 by which income was below the needs allowance, while the amount decreased by 17 
pence for every £1 by which income exceeded the needs allowance (Kemp, 1986). 
Although the next Labour government disposed of the fair rent system in the local 
authority sector, the national HB scheme remained in the social policy and was given 
attention as ‗in-work‘ benefit for poor working households.  
 
The Beginning of the Unified HB System: The 1980s  
Throughout the 1980s, the housing policy experienced various transformations reflecting 
housing market features and public expenditure controls under the Conservative 
government (Mullins & Murie, 2004). Under the 1980 Housing Act, the government 
introduced the ‗Right to Buy‘ scheme, which enabled council tenants to purchase their 
homes at a discounted market value. In addition, the deregulation of housing finance and 
competition between building societies and banks in the mortgage market increased the 
opportunity to obtain a mortgage and become a homeowner. As a result, homeownership 
increased from 58% of the total housing stock in 1981 to about 70% in 2004 (Hills, 2007). 
Furthermore, ‗bricks and mortar‘ subsidies to local authorities and housing associations 
were significantly reduced. Consequently, housing associations had to obtain private loans 
following the 1988 Act. To facilitate the growth in the private and housing association 
sector, the government introduced the deregulation of rent in these sectors. Accordingly, 
the rent deregulation increased rent costs. The HB scheme played an essential role because 
this benefit enabled the lowest-income households to afford the increased rents. In 
addition, the HB scheme became important for property owners, as this allowance ensured 
incomes for mortgage interest payments during the recession period of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  
 
During the 1980s, two major HB reforms in 1982 and 1986 were implemented to keep 
pace with policy shifts under the Conservative government. Because of these reforms, the 
existing HB scheme administered by the housing ministry was merged into the national 
social security system, after which the current HB forms were established. The 1982 HB 
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reform related primarily to shifts in the administrative system. At the central government 
level, the responsibility for HB was handed over from the housing ministry to the social 
security ministry. At the local level, the administration of the housing component of the 
existing social assistance benefit was handed over to councils. Therefore, all housing 
allowances were provided within the social assistance benefits by local authorities and 
were financed primarily by the social security ministry (Kemp, 1986).  
 
The government subsequently set up the new HB scheme, subsidising low-income 
households irrespective of their eligibility for social assistance. Under this new scheme, the 
housing component of Supplementary Benefit was renamed the ‗certificated HB‘ and the 
existing HB scheme was also renamed the ‗standard HB‘. However, as the two different 
systems use different means tests and varied benefit rules coexisted within one benefit 
scheme, the new HB was criticised for its complex administration and potential for fraud 
(ibid). Therefore, the government reformed the HB in line with the wider social security 
system reform under the 1986 Social Security Act. The government strengthened the 
income supplement through the social security system, i.e. Income Support (IS), Family 
Credit and Support for Mortgage Interest (SMI); the same means test rules were applied for 
all means-tested benefits of the social security system, including the HB. The two HB 
benefits were also unified into a single HB scheme. The single taper, which was 65%, was 
applied when net income exceeded social assistance rates. As a result of the 1980s reform, 
the HB scheme reflected the feature of wider social security policy and represented a more 
focused objective as part of the social safety net intended to prevent the recipient‘s income 
after rent from falling below the social assistance benefit level.  
 
The HB Reforms for the 1990s through the 2000s 
Since the late 1980s, the government‘s budget expenditure on HB substantially increased 
in relation with the deregulation of the private rental sector, the transformation in housing 
finance and the economic downturn. Therefore, the Conservative government introduced 
new restrictions on HB for private tenants in 1996/1997, aiming at reducing the maximum 
amount of eligible rent for private tenant recipients. The government applied rent ceilings 
known as the Local Reference Rent to private tenants and the Single Room Rent rate to 
single tenants under 25 years of age. The government also imposed restrictions on the SMI 
in 1995, highlighting the responsibility of households. This change reflected the rapid 
growth of SMI costs resulting from the economic recession and the increasing emphasis on 
mortgage debt.  
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In addition, the Conservative government‘s public expenditure cuts shifted social security 
benefits, targeting the unemployed and emphasising the increase in their work 
participations. The Unemployment Benefit (social insurance) and the Income Support for 
unemployed people (means-tested benefit) were replaced by the Contribution-based 
Jobseeker‘s Allowance (JSA) and the Income-based Jobseeker‘s Allowance, respectively, 
in 1996. These allowances were conditional on the claimant accepting responsibility for 
seeking a job and/or accepting work. The period of benefit awarded was also reduced from 
12 to six months (DSS, 1998). Moreover, the New Labour government accelerated the 
reform of the social security system starting in 1997. The government primarily focused on 
the importance of work and redefined the relationship between welfare benefits and work. 
The shift in policy direction could be identified by the government‘s slogan−‗work for 
those who can, security for those who cannot‘−in DSS‘s (1998) ‗New Ambitions for Our 
Country‘ paper. Consequently, the social safety net function of the social security system 
operated primarily for the more focused target groups, such as people who are unable to 
work. The social security system was transformed to encourage people who able to work 
and the unemployed to participate in labour force and welfare-to-work programmes, such 
as New Deals, on the condition of the social security benefit payment.  
 
The New Labour government‘s emphasis on the more targeted social assistance was also 
related to the shift in housing subsidies, because the New Labour‘s housing policy could be 
characterised less by subsidies and more by taxation and HB (Malpass, 2005). The shift 
from ‗bricks and mortar‘ subsidies to personal subsidies mirrored this notion throughout 
the 1990s. As stated in the Housing Green Paper „Quality and Choice: A Decent Home for 
All‟, the government‘s position toward housing policy can be summed up as follows: 
transforming the role of local authorities into an enabling (i.e. rather than being a direct 
provider of housing) role reflecting local circumstances; supporting homeownership; 
securing affordable housing for homeless families and tenants; reorganising local social 
housing and the private market; and improving HB (DETR & DSS, 2000). Concerning HB, 
the paper identified a detailed range of problems of the HB scheme, including the 
complicated and slow process of benefit administration, complex benefit rule and less 
acknowledgment of the benefit provision, the concern for the late benefit arrival, high costs 
of administration fraud and error, the increased work disincentive, tenants‘ reduced 
responsibility for paying rents and finding low-cost renting and the possible abuse of 
system for rent increases by landlords (ibid). In order to improve the HB system, the 
government announced proposals for a radical reform of HB in 2002. This reform focused 
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primarily on the improvement of the HB administration and the new HB scheme. The 
reform aimed to improve the HB‘s effect on the claimant‘s participation in labour market. 
Consequently, the new housing allowance for private tenants, Local Housing Allowance 
(LHA) was introduced following pilot programmes that were carried out since 2003 
(DWP, 2005). Although the government intended to implement LHA for both private and 
social housing tenants, only private housing tenants became eligible for LHA in the HB 
system. Also, unlike the HB for tenants of public and housing association housing, the 
LHA uses the local rent rate as its benefit cap (DWP, 2007a). 
 
From the 2008 HB Reform to the current the Coalition government‘s welfare reform for 
the inefficiency of the current benefit system and work disincentive, the HB system has 
faced severe changes in benefit arrangement in order to reduce costs and make the welfare-
to-work transition successful as the welfare reform of the welfare system intends (Murie, 
2012). The clear message of this HB reform is the restriction on HB paid to individuals 
and, in due course, the emphasis on personal responsibility. The continuing increase in 
non-dependant reduction of HB arrangement rules is in line with this benefit reform.  
 
Major changes have made in HB for private tenants. The LHA benefit rate was lowered 
from the 50
th
 percentile of local market rent for each locality to the 30
th
 percentile of the 
local market rent price. In addition, although the rent of the local rental market is a 
standard for the LHA, the single maximum LHA rate is applied regardless of the regions. 
The LHA benefit per week has been capped at £250 for a one-bedroom property, £290 for 
a two-bedroom property, £340 for a three-bedroom property and £400 for a four-bedroom 
property since 2011 (DWP, 2011a). Starting in 2013, recipients of both HB and LHA will 
face more benefit cuts. In April 2013, the LHA benefit rate will only be increased with 
reference to the Consumer Price Index instead of the Retail Price Index; this change is 
expected to contribute to the reduction of the rate growth of benefits (Murie, 2012). The 
HB for working-aged households living in local authority (LA) housing and registered 
social landlord (RSL) housing will also be restricted for under-occupied residences starting 
in April 2013. The eligible rent will be deducted by 14% and 25% for one extra bedroom 
and two or more extra bedrooms respectively.  
 
Moreover, the HB receipt will be reduced according to the other benefit or tax credit 
receipt as a whole. In terms of welfare reform for the working-aged households, the 
government introduces a ‗benefit cap‘ at the level of the average earnings of working 
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households for the total amount of benefits and tax credits, starting in April 2013. The HB 
is included in this benefit cap, which is set at £500 a week for couples and parents and 
£350 a week for a single person. Furthermore, as part of the larger welfare reform, in order 
to make the welfare system work more efficiently and reduce work disincentive, the 
Universal Credit (UC) will replace most means-tested benefits from October 2013. 
Accordingly, the HB will be incorporated into the UC with IS, JSA, ESA, Child Tax Credit 
and Working Tax Credit (Clarke et al., 2012; DWP, 2010a, 2012, 2013). 
 
Currently, all low-income households can claim HB in the UK. Among them the recipients 
of IS, Income-based (IB) JSA, Income-related (IR) Employment and Support Allowance 
(ESA) and Pension Credit (PC) can receive their maximum HB assessed by their 
conditions and other low-income households will receive the reduced HB from their 
maximum HB. Although households in receipt of IS, JSA (IB), ESA (IR) and PC account 
for almost 70% of total HB recipients, the remaining 30% of the total HB recipients do not 
receive these benefits. In terms of tenure, social housing tenants comprise the majority of 
HB recipients among tenants in the UK, as 70% of HB recipients are tenants in the social 
rented sector and 30% of HB recipients are tenants in the private sector housing. 
Considering that most HB recipients are economically vulnerable and live in social 
housing, it could be said that the HB scheme provides a more targeted social assistance 
benefit for low-income people and acts as a social safety net (Kemp, 2007b). 
 
Table 4.1 HB Recipients by Tenant Tenure and Means-tested Benefit Entitlement in the 
UK 
 All HB 
Recipients 
Tenure types  
(person,000s) 
IS/PC/JSA(IB)/ESA(IB)  
(person,000s) 
Year (person,000s) 
Social Rented 
Sector 
Private Rented 
Sector Receiving Not receiving 
2002 3,812.6    3,093.8       718.8  2,636.9 1,175.7 
2003 3,796.4    3,081.7       714.7  2,679.4 1,117.0 
2004 3,879.4    3,135.5       744.0  2,819.2 1,060.3 
2005 3,956.8    3,165.9       791.0  2,871.3 1,085.5 
2006 3,990.0    3,152.2       837.7  2,901.7 1,088.3 
2007 4,039.6    3,154.4       885.2  2,927.6 1,111.9 
2008 4,200.1 3,114.5 1,081.2 2,929.7 1,267.6 
2009 4,610.7 3,243.6 1,363.9 3,201.8 1,404.6 
2010 4,817.1 3,303.7 1,510.8 3,230.0 1,583.3 
2011 4,952.2 3,349.1 1,600.0 3,243.6 1,705.9 
2012 5,050.4 3,391.4 1,655.3 3,243.3 1,804.1 
Source: DWP (2007b) Table HB1.1 and Table HB1.2; DWP Statistics HB and the Council 
Tax Benefit Caseload internet site (http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=hbctb). 
 
 69 
The UK‘s HB does not always subsidise the full amount of rent for the claimant. The 
eligible housing cost for HB and the amount of HB vary according to the claimant‘s 
condition, such as whether they receive social assistance, the composition of the household 
and the household‘s special needs. Table 4.2 illustrates the differences between the average 
weekly amount of HB paid to the recipients and eligible rents. The difference between the 
eligible rent and the amount of benefit paid to households who were not receiving social 
assistance benefits is larger than that of social assistance benefit recipients. Their HB 
receipt was £18.26 less than their eligible rents. This result mirrors the feature of HB: 
social assistance beneficiaries can receive their maximum HB whereas the rule of benefit 
reduction is applied for non-social assistance beneficiaries. 
 
Table 4.2 Average Weekly HB and Eligible Rents for HB in the UK (£) 
 Eligible rents for HB (A) Benefits provision (B) (A) - (B) 
Year 
All HB 
Recipients 
 
 
With 
IS/PC 
JSA(IB) 
ESA(IR) 
Without 
IS/PC 
JSA(IB) 
ESA(IR) 
All HB 
Recipients 
 
 
With 
IS/PC 
JSA(IB) 
ESA(IR) 
Without 
IS/PC 
JSA(IB) 
ESA(IR) 
All HB 
Recipients 
 
 
With 
IS/PC 
JSA(IB) 
ESA(IR) 
Without 
IS/PC 
JSA(IB) 
ESA(IR) 
2002 59.54 60.13 58.22 54.66 59.32 44.21 4.88 0.81 14.01 
2003 59.90 60.11 59.39 55.78 59.28 47.37 4.12 0.83 12.02 
2004 63.37 63.36 63.39 59.70 63.00 50.94 3.67 0.36 12.45 
2005 68.09 67.71 69.10 63.30 66.88 53.84 4.79 0.83 15.26 
2006 72.00 71.11 74.37 66.70 70.20 57.37 5.30 0.91 17.00 
2007 76.13 75.54 77.67 70.16 74.24 59.41 5.97 1.30 18.26 
Source: DWP (2007b) Table HB1.3 and Table HB1.5.  
 
As the welfare reform proceeds, the Coalition government projected that the HB reform 
from 2010/11 would reduce the HB expenditures through the national spending cuts 
(Budget Statement, 2010). In the UK, the national budget expenditure on HB has 
significantly increased for the last 10 years, from £11 billion in 2000/01 to £21 billion in 
2010/11 (DWP, 2011b). The Coalition government forecasts that the total expenditure 
would increase to £25 billion by 2015/16. With LHA reform, the government expects to 
save around £1 billion by 2015/16. And further HB reform, the saving is estimated £1.1 
billion in 2015/16, which are total 9% reduction in the total 2015/16 expenditure (DWP 
Impact of Changes to Local Housing Allowance from 2011 internet site
10
).  
 
  
                                                 
10
 http://www.dwp.gov.uk/local-authority-staff/housing-benefit/claims-processing/local-housing-
allowance/impact-of-changes.shtml.   
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Figure 4.1 Housing Benefit Expenditure, with and without Reforms (in cash terms) 
 
 
Source: DWP Impact of Changes to Local Housing Allowance from 2011 internet site. 
(http://www.dwp.gov.uk/local-authority-staff/housing-benefit/claims-processing/local-
housing-allowance/impact-of-changes.shtml).   
Note: See also Table A.2 in Appendices. 
 
 
4.2 The Design of Housing Allowance for Tenants in the UK 
 
 
The UK housing allowance system provides a rent subsidy to low-income tenants living in 
the private rental housing and the social rental housing owned by LA and RSL. The low-
income homeowner can claim SMI for mortgage interest payments.
11
 
  
                                                 
11
 Under the UK housing allowance system, homeowners receiving IS, JAS (IB), ESA (IR) or PC can claim 
the support as part of their benefits for mortgage interest payments and interest payments of loans for repairs 
and improvements of a residential property, known as Support for Mortgage Interest (SMI). In calculating the 
SMI, the amount of a loan that qualifies for the SMI is not more than £100,000 (£200,000 for the new 
working-age customers from 2009). The social assistance benefits (i.e. IS, JAS (IB), ESA (IR), or PC) 
subsidise only the interest payments of a home mortgage. The qualified amount of a loan is multiplied by the 
standard interest rate of the Bank of England Base Rate plus 1.58% and divided by 52 to calculate a weekly 
amount. Therefore, there is always a difference between interest payments for the mortgage provided by IS, 
JAS (IB), or PC and the claimants‘ payments as a different rate of interest is used instead of the interest rate 
that the claimant pays (Clarke et al., 2012; OECD Benefits and Wages: Country Specific Information internet 
site, http://www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/benefitsandwagescountryspecificinformation.htm).  
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Table 4.3 Housing Cost Subsidies by Tenure Types in the UK 
 
The UK housing allowance system applies the same rule to all tenants. The entitlement of 
social assistance benefit (i.e. IS, JSA (IB), ESA (IR), and PC), known as the ‗passport for 
the maximum rate‘, determines the benefit calculation applied to the claimant as follows:  
  
(a) HB for social assistance beneficiaries = eligible rent for HB = maximum HB  
(b) HB for non-beneficiaries = eligible rent   
   – 0.65*(assessed income – social assistance benefit rates)  
 
The difference in the benefit formula between social assistance beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries indicates the reduction in the HB.  
 
For the HB entitlement, the eligible rent for the HB claimant is calculated as the 
contractual rent minus the ineligible charges, such as fuel and meal charges. If there are 
other members of a household who are not the claimant, the partner or dependent children, 
The deduction for each of these ‗non-dependants‘ is made from the eligible rent, thereby 
decreasing the size of the HB paid to the household. As part of HB reform, this non-
dependant deduction increased due to its effect on the reduction of HB. The total amount 
of HB could be lower compared to the actual rent payment due to the deductions of 
ineligible charges included in their rent payment and the non-dependant deductions. 
However, as the other social benefit does not make allowances for rent payments in the 
UK, the awarded HB subsidises considerable portions of the rent payment (Stephens et al., 
2010).  
 
  
 Tenure 
Tenant Homeowner 
LA RSL Private 
Paid to recipients of IS, 
JAS (IB), ESA(IB),PC 
 
Housing Benefit 
 
LHA (in HB) 
Support for 
Mortgage Interest 
Paid to non-recipients NA 
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Table 4.4 Deduction for HB in the UK (2012-2013)  
Deductions for ineligible charges of housing costs £ per week 
Fuel charges   
more than one room Heating      22.50 
Hot water  2.95 
Lighting   2.05 
Cooking  2.95 
one room only Heating and/or hot water and/or lighting  15.25 
 Cooking  2.95 
Service charges   
At least 3 meals or more a 
day 
For each adult or family member 16 or over 25.30 
For each child under 16 12.80 
Breakfast only  Regardless of ages 3.10 
All other cases Regardless of ages 16.85 
Deductions for non-dependants  
Under 18 years old   NIL 
Full-time students (except during summer vacation)  NIL 
In receipt of PC  NIL 
Under 25 years old and on IS, JSA (Income-based) ESA (income-related)   NIL 
Aged 18 or over and in full-
time paid work with a 
weekly gross income of  
£394 or more 73.85 
£316.00 to £393.99 67.25 
£238.00 to £315.99 59.05 
£183.00 to £237.99 36.10 
£124.00 to £182.99   26.25 
All others   11.45 
Source: Clarke et al. (2012).  
 
If the assessed eligible rents after the non-dependant deduction were the same for 
households that receive as well as do not receive IS, JSA (IB), ESA (IB) and PC, the size 
of the HB would be larger for social assistance beneficiaries than for non-social assistance 
beneficiaries. As formula (b) presents, the maximum HB for households that do not receive 
IS, JSA (IB), ESA (IB) and PC is reduced from the eligible rent after a deduction of 65% 
of the difference between their ‗assessed income‘ and the ‗applicable amount‘.  
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Table 4.5 Applicable Amounts for HB in the UK (2012-2013)  
Personal allowances  £ per week 
Single claimant Aged under 25 56.25 
 Aged under 25 (on main phase ESA) 71.00 
 25 over  71.00 
Lone parent 
 
Aged under 18 56.25 
Aged under 18 (on main phase ESA) 71.00 
18 over  71.00 
Couple   Both aged under 18 84.95 
 Both aged under 18 (claimant on main phase 
ESA) 
111.45 
 One or both aged 18 or over  111.45 
Dependent children Under 20 64.99 
Over qualifying age for 
Pension Credit 
Single under 65 142.70 
Single 65 or over 161.25 
Couple both under 65 217.90 
Couple one or both 65 or over 241.65 
Component              
Work-related activity  28.15 
Support   34.05 
Premiums               
Carer  32.60 
Disability  Single 30.35 
Couple 43.25 
Disabled child  56.63 
Enhanced disability Single 14.80 
 Couple 21.30 
 Child 22.89 
Severe disability One qualifies 58.20 
 Two qualify 116.40 
Family Ordinary rate 17.40 
 Some lone parents 22.20 
Source: Clarke et al. (2012).  
 
Provided that different claimants have the same assessed income, the characteristics of 
each family affect the varied size of the reduction in HB because the applicable amount is 
more generous to families with children or special needs (e.g. disability) or pensioners; as a 
result, the income minus the applicable amount is smaller for these families than for others. 
The decrease in the HB is also smaller for them than for others. After this process, the HB 
amount is finalised. If the assessed income is less than or equal to the claimant‘s applicable 
amount, the amount of HB is equal to the maximum HB. If the assessed income is greater 
than the applicable income, the amount of HB is a reduced amount—that is, the maximum 
HB minus 65% (taper) of the difference between the assessed income and applicable 
amount. Therefore, it is noted that the UK HB system respects different family features 
within their benefit rates.  
 
Since the introduction of the LHA, the clear difference in the benefit calculation between 
the housing allowance for social housing and private housing tenants is the maximum rate 
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of benefits and the benefit cap. The LHA arrangement has been decided based on the local 
rent rate (30
th
 percentile of the local market rent) for a given household size since the 
public spending cuts announced in 2010. The LHA benefit is capped at the maximum rate 
for a four-bedroom property (£400 per week). Therefore, when the private tenant claims an 
LHA, the corresponding LHA local rent rate and benefit cap are applied. Moreover, the 
HB rules for benefit calculation are becoming stricter as a whole in order to correspond to 
the welfare reform. The HB receipt will be restricted due to the total welfare benefit and 
tax credit benefit cap. In addition, social housing tenants will face benefit reductions as a 
penalty for their under-occupying choice, which will affect their benefit receipt.  
 
 
4.3 The Analysis of Housing Allowance Effects on Tenants in the UK  
 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will analyse the effect of the UK housing allowance 
system in achieving the previously described policy objects−improving income 
maintenance, housing affordability and work incentives for low-income tenant households 
using five indicators as presented in Table 4.6.  
 
Table 4.6 Indictors of Housing Allowance Effectiveness in Section 4.3       
Section Indicator Definition 
4.3.1 Income maintenance  
  4.3.1.1 1.Residual income after housing cost 
expenditures  
Residual Y1: Paying rent without HA 
Residual Y2: Paying rent with HA 
   
  4.3.1.2 2. Poverty Rate (PR)  
(poverty line: 60% of the national median 
income)  
PR1: Before paying rent & receiving HA  
PR2: After paying rent without HA 
PR3: After paying rent with HA 
   
4.3.2 Housing affordability  
 Rent to Income Ratio (RIR)  RIR1 : Paying rent without HA  
RIR2 : Paying rent with HA  
   
4.3.3 Work incentive   
  4.3.3.1 1.Income Replacement Ratio (IRR)= 
Household net income when unemployed 
Household net income when employed 
 
IRR1: Income excluding HA 
IRR2: Income including HA  
   
  4.3.3.2 2. Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) = EMTR1: Income excluding HA 
 
1  - 
Change in household net income 
Change in household gross income  
by 1 income unit 
 
EMTR2: Income including HA 
 
Note: Y and HA stand for household net income and housing allowance respectively. 
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Although the UK‘s HB system subsidises both the low-income tenant and homeowner 
households, this study will examine the effectiveness of the housing allowance for tenant 
households whose residential stability is directly affected by the rent subsidy programme. 
Therefore, the scope of the analysis is limited to tenant households receiving the HB 
(size=3,376). For this analysis, data from the Family Resources Survey 2006-07 were used. 
It should be noted that the analysis does not apply the current HB rules explained in 
Section 4.2, but the pre-LHA HB rules established in the reference year of Family 
Resources Survey 2006-07. Therefore, the pre-2008 HB rule is used as a standard for the 
analysis and the explanation of results in the UK‘s case. Moreover, even the highest-
income group stated in this section is more likely to have incomes low enough to qualify 
for means-tested benefits. The results of this chapter and the following three chapters 
should be understood in this context. As Table 4.7 illustrates, the UK households receiving 
a housing allowance have an average household income of £13,481, including their 
housing allowances and spend £3,504 on rents payment.  
 
Table 4.7 Income, Rents, Housing Allowance of Tenant Recipients in the UK (£, 2006-07 
price)  
Total tenant with HA Annual HH income  Annual HA Annual rents HA÷rents (%) 
Mean  %(N) 13,481.80 2,561.90 3,504.60 77.5 
Total  100.0(3,376)     
Income Quintiles     
1st Q (low Y) 20.0(675) 6,612.90 2,455.60 3,080.40 81.8 
2nd Q 20.0(675) 8,735.70 2,691.40 3,468.90 80.6 
3rd Q 20.0(676) 10,453.30 2,594.30 3,665.60 76.4 
4th Q 20.1(678) 13,553.90 2,696.90 3,893.20 75.6 
5th Q (high Y) 19.9(672) 28,122.50 2,369.70 3,412.40 73.1 
 (F) (2,193.393***) (5.834***) (26.110***) (7.692***) 
Household Composition     
No children 26.4(891) 13,893.39 2,494.60 3,211.60 80.4 
With children 34.4(1,162) 11,070.00 2,786.90 4,154.00 73.8 
Pensioner 39.2(1,323) 15,322.96 2,409.60 3,131.50 78.8 
 (F) (73.429***) (24.145***) (168.792***) (11.333***) 
Tenant Tenure     
Public housing  51.6(1,742) 13,678.40 2,541.60 2,948.30 86.6 
Housing 
association  
33.0(1,113) 13,213.80 2,686.70 3,500.10 77.0 
Private  15.4(521) 13,397.00 2,362.90 5,374.20 48.2 
 (F) (0.933) (9.902***) (675.792***) (304.758***) 
Employment Status     
Unemployed 89.7(3,029) 13,637.33 2,592.20 3,393.40 79.8 
Employed  10.3(347) 12,124.39 2,297.30 4,475.10 57.2 
 (t) (3.595***) (2.902**) (-8.697***) (10.714***) 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2006-07, author calculations.  
Note: HH, HA and Y stand for household, housing allowance and household net income 
respectively. *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001  
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In the UK, housing allowance recipients are likely to be more economically vulnerable 
compared to households not receiving a housing allowance. As seen in Table 4.8, housing 
allowance recipients have more severe income problems compared to others: The poverty 
rates were much higher for tenant households receiving housing allowance compared to 
other types of households.  
 
Table 4.8 Poverty Rate before and after Housing Cost Expenditures in the UK (%)  
Poverty lines Total household 
(owner+tenant) 
Household without HA 
(owner+tenant) 
Household with HA 
(owner+tenant) 
 (N=14,389) (N=11,011) (N=3,378) 
 before HC after HC before HC after HC bf.HA&HC bf.HAaf.HC 
40% of median   9.9 19.5 8.0 14.5 15.9 58.7 
50% of median  16.4 27.2 11.5 20.0 32.6 68.1 
60% of median  24.0 35.4 16.7 27.0 47.9 75.1 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2006-07, author calculations.  
Note: HA and HC stand for housing allowance and housing cost respectively.    
 
Moreover, the financial burdens arising from expenditure on housing costs for housing 
allowance recipients are quite high. As Table 4.9 presents, the tenant households receiving 
housing allowance spend 45% of their household income on housing costs, whereas tenant 
households without a housing allowance entitlement spend 28.6% of their incomes on 
housing costs.  
 
Table 4.9 Financial Burdens for Housing Cost Expenditures in the UK (%) 
Housing affordability 
measures 
Total households 
 
Household  
without HA 
Household  
with HA 
t 
 (N=14,389) (N=11,011) (N=3,378)  
Gross HC over Y 41.6 39.6 48.6 -5.176*** 
 Total tenants Tenant without HA Tenant with HA  
 (N=4,601) (N=1,225) (N=3,376)  
Rent over Y 40.8 28.6 45.2 -20.389*** 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2006-07, author calculations.  
Note: HC, HA and Y stand for housing cost, housing allowance and household net income 
respectively.*p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
4.3.1 Social Policy Object: Income Maintenance Improvement 
 
In dealing with the effectiveness of the UK housing allowance for achieving social policy 
objects (i.e. improving income maintenance), this research focuses on the changes in 
income poverty after housing cost expenditures for the low-income tenants. When it comes 
to low- or the lowest-income households, the housing cost expenditures would make the 
poor household reserve less income which they could not live for the adequate non-
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housing consumption. Households receiving a housing allowance belong to a lower-
income group of the entire population because the housing allowance is a means-tested 
benefit. Therefore, the effect of housing cost subsidisation in income maintenance is more 
of a concern. This research examines the changes in income maintenance using the residual 
income measure and poverty rates (see Table 4.6).  
 
4.3.1.1 Residual Income after Rents  
 
Firstly, we can acknowledge the effect of the housing allowance on the household‘s 
income maintenance through the change in the household‘s residual income after housing 
costs with and without the housing allowance receipt: In the UK, the household‘s annual 
residual income after housing costs relatively increased by 61%, from £7,886 without 
housing allowance to £9,977 with the housing allowance receipt.  
 
Table 4.10 Changes in Residual Income after Rents by Housing Allowance in the UK (£, 
2006-07 price) 
Total tenant with HA Residual income after rents Absolute change Relative change 
 without HA with HA (£) (%) 
Mean  %(N) 7,886.40 9,977.20 2,090.90 61.0 
Total  100.0(3,376)     
Income Quintiles     
1st Q (low Y) 20.0(675) 1,708.00 3,532.50 1,824.50 110.7 
2nd Q 20.0(675) 3,238.70 5,266.80 2,028.10 92.1 
3rd Q 20.0(676) 4,607.90 6,787.70 2,179.80 53.9 
4th Q 20.1(678) 7,312.70 9,660.70 2,348.00 36.1 
5th Q (high Y) 19.9(672) 22,637.60 24,710.10 2,072.50 12.2 
 (F) (1,702.361***) (1,888.415***) (18.243***) (48.111***) 
Household Composition     
No children 26.4(891) 5,202.10 6,916.00 1,713.90 66.0 
With children 34.4(1,162) 8,343.80 10,681.80 2,338.00 76.5 
Pensioner 39.2(1,323) 9,935.90 12,191.40 2,255.50 46.2 
 (F) (86.252***) (113.226***) (95.499***) (11.143***) 
Tenant Tenure      
Public  51.6(1,742) 8,609.80 10,730.20 2,120.40 61.9 
Housing 
association  
33.0(1,113) 7,534.10 9,713.70 2,179.60 74.2 
Private  15.4(521) 6,220.40 8,022.80 1,802.40 30.1 
 (F) (14.633***) (18.390***) (19.201***) (14.507***) 
Employment Status     
Unemployed 89.7(3,029) 8,090.50 10,243.90 2,153.50 63.1 
Employed  10.3(347) 6,105.00 7,649.20 1,544.20 42.9 
 (t) (4.600***) (6.108***) (9.158***) (2.297*) 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2006-07, author calculations.  
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income respectively.  
*p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001  
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Household Income Level 
In terms of different household incomes, a greater improvement in residual income was 
noted for households with lower incomes compared to households with higher incomes. 
Although the residual income of the bottom income group has increased by 110%, the 
relative changes in income for the households with the highest income were just 12%. 
Households with higher incomes have paid higher rents compared to those with lower 
incomes, yet the housing allowance subsidised a smaller portion of rent payment for the 
higher-income households compared to the lower-income households (see Table 4.7). In 
addition, the UK housing allowance system applies different benefit rules according to the 
claimants‘ incomes. It is more generous towards the poorest households receiving the 
social assistance benefit compared to others. Therefore, the different benefit rates of the 
housing allowance system and, as a result, the higher subsidisation rates could make more 
economically vulnerable households have better results in residual income after rents 
payment than others.  
 
Household Composition  
With regard to family composition, the results indicated that housing allowance was more 
likely to improve the residual income after rent expenditures (the relative increase in 
residual income after rent) for non-pensioners (66.0% and 76.5% for families without and 
with children, respectively) compared to pensioners (46.2%). The pensioner households 
have higher income than others, they pay lower rent and receive lower housing allowances 
than others. This feature might be related to the relatively small change in residual income 
after rents payment for pensioner households. Moreover, in the UK housing allowance 
system, the basic benefit calculation rule is the same for pensioner households and non-
pensioner households receiving means-tested social benefits. Therefore, the changes in 
residual income after rent by household types is less likely to relate to the housing 
allowance design.  
 
Tenant Tenure  
As seen in Table 4.7, whereas private housing tenants have paid higher rents compared to 
other types of tenants, their rent payment has been subsidised less by the housing 
allowance (48.2%) compared to the public and housing association housing tenants (86.6% 
and 77.0%, respectively). This outcome might be a result of the pre-LHA UK housing 
allowance system applying the same rule to the claimant, regardless of tenant type. 
However, under the dualist rental housing system, this benefit rule is less likely to be 
 79 
effective for the private housing tenants than for the social housing tenants. In practice, the 
effect of the housing allowance in improving the residual income after rent payment was 
less for private renters compared to non-private renters as the residual income of private 
renters increased by 30.1% after the HB, which was as small as half the other tenure types‘ 
relative changes (61.9% and 74.2%, respectively).  
 
Employment Status  
The employment status of the adult family member is related to the households‘ earned 
income as well as the social assistance entitlement. Therefore, even for unemployed 
households, their total household incomes could be larger compared to those of employed 
households (i.e. the working poor). In terms of the housing allowance rule of pre-LHA, the 
maximum housing allowance rate is applied to the households receiving the social 
assistance benefit. Therefore, the unemployed receiving means-tested benefit could have a 
greater financial benefit in terms of the higher housing allowance rate compared to the 
employed. In practice, as the results illustrate, the housing allowance produced better 
absolute and relative changes in residual income after rent for the unemployed households 
compared to the employed households. Although, the UK housing allowance contributes to 
solving income problems more for the lowest-income household receiving means-tested 
benefits, we also need to consider that this result could relate to the discouragement of the 
welfare-to-work transition of the housing allowance recipients who are able to work. 
 
4.3.1.2 Poverty Rate    
 
This section will address the housing allowance effect on the poverty alleviation among 
housing allowance recipients. The housing allowance recipients are low-income 
households with financial burdens for housing cost expenditures. If the poverty rate 
changes due to the receipt of housing allowance, it could be concluded that the housing 
allowance contributes to the relief of recipients‘ housing cost-related poverty. Here, I will 
use a poverty line defined as 60% of the national median income to evaluate the poverty 
rates based on the household income with and without the housing allowance provision as 
well as before and after rent payments. As housing cost payments reduce household 
income and could make the deprivation more serious for low-income households, the 
provision of housing allowance is associated with the changes in income poverty after rent 
payment. As Table 4.11 demonstrates, there is a difference in poverty rates due to the 
housing allowance receipt in the UK. The poverty rate after making a rent payment with 
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the housing allowance (PR3) tends to be lower compared to the poverty rate after making a 
rent payment without the housing allowance (PR2). However, whilst the receipt of housing 
allowance accounted for 61% of the relative change in the residual income after rent 
payment, the poverty rates of the low-income tenants relatively reduced by 15% on 
average through the housing allowance provision. 
 
Table 4.11 Changes in Poverty Rates by Housing Allowance in the UK (%) 
Poverty lines   60% of median income Absolute  
change (%p) 
PR2–PR3 
Relative 
change (%) 
PR2–PR3 
Total tenant with HA  PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HA af.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
Mean  (%) 47.9 72.3 61.6 10.7 14.7 
Total 100.0       
Income Quintiles      
1st Q (low Y) 20.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
2nd Q 20.0 86.4 99.9 99.7 0.1 0.1 
3rd Q 20.0 47.3 98.4 86.4 12.0 12.2 
4th Q 20.1 5.6 59.0 21.2 37.8 64.0 
5th Q(high Y) 19.9 0.3 4.0 0.7 3.3 81.5 
       
Household Composition      
No children 26.4 53.8 71.9 60.9 11.0 15.3 
With children 34.4 59.6 83.3 79.3 4.0 4.8 
Pensioner 39.2 33.8 62.9 46.6 16.3 26.0 
      
Tenant Tenure      
Public  51.6 50.1 70.1 58.6 11.5 16.4 
Housing association 33.0 49.1 72.6 61.6 11.0 15.1 
Private  15.4 38.2 78.9 71.8 7.1 9.0 
      
Employment Status      
Unemployed 89.7 48.5 71.3 60.3 11.0 15.4 
Employed  10.3 43.2 81.0 73.2 7.8 9.6 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2006-07, author calculations.   
Note: HC, HA and Y stand for housing cost, housing allowance and household net income 
respectively. For Poverty rates based on 40% and 50% of medina income, see Table A.3 in 
Appendices.  
PR1: poverty rate when housing allowance is not provided and before housing costs 
payment.  
PR2: poverty rate when housing allowance is not provided and after housing costs payment. 
PR3: poverty rate when housing allowance is provided and after housing costs payment.   
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Household Income Level  
Before the receipt of housing allowance, the rent payment intensifies the income problems 
of low-income tenants in the UK. Therefore, the possibility of housing cost-related poverty 
for these households is noted. The poverty problem is more significant for households with 
lower incomes than the highest-income group because the former depend more on the 
housing allowance for their rent payment (see their higher HA-to-rent ratio presented in 
Table 4.7). However, the changes in poverty rates by housing allowance receipt are smaller 
for lower-income households living in more serious poverty compared to higher-income 
households. Although the provision of housing allowance can alleviate poverty after rent 
payment, it is not effective for solving poverty problem among lower-income households 
due to their severe poverty states. Poverty is less severe for higher-income households than 
lower-income households; thus, it is much easier for higher-income households to escape 
poverty, leaving them more income for non-housing good consumption.  
 
Household Composition  
Among the different family types, non-pensioner families have been more impoverished 
compared to pensioner families, regardless of rent payments and housing allowance 
receipts. Moreover, the receipt of housing allowance is more likely to reduce the poverty 
rate for pensioner households than for non-pensioner households. Among non-pensioner 
households, the housing allowance provision is more helpful for reducing income poverty 
for families without children compared to families with children. As seen in Section 
4.3.1.1, although pensioner households experience less improvement in residual income 
after rent payment from the housing allowance compared to other families, their poverty 
problems are less severe than those of other families. Therefore, these pensioner 
households could reach the poverty line more easily through the provision of housing 
allowance and the greater income could be used for their living expenses after rent 
payments. Yet housing allowance receipt has little effects on families with 
children−namely, households having more needs for non-housing consumption. 
  
Tenant Tenure  
Across all tenure types, the payment of housing costs reduces the low-income tenants‘ 
residual income after rent costs and increases their poverty rates. The poverty rate is higher 
for the private housing tenant than for the public and housing association housing tenants. 
In addition, private renters tend to experience a greater poverty rate increases without 
housing allowance (PR1- PR2) compared to other types of renters. However, the housing 
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allowance provision is less likely to decrease the poverty rate for private tenants (7.1%) 
compared to other types of tenants (around 11%). This might relate to their more severe 
poverty and smaller improvements in residual income after rent payment through the 
housing allowance due to their higher rent costs. Therefore, the housing allowance 
provision is more likely to reduce the poverty rate for social housing tenants with income 
problems that are less serious compared to those of private tenants.  
 
Employment Status   
Concerning housing allowance recipients, no big differences in poverty rates emerge 
between working households and workless households before the receipt of housing 
allowance. However, when they pay for rent costs without a housing allowance, the 
poverty rate increases more for working households compared to workless households as 
the rent share of the household income is higher for the former than the latter. On the 
contrary, the poverty rate reduction by the housing allowance is larger for the unemployed 
(11.0%p) compared to the employed (7.8%p). This might be because working households 
experience greater poverty problems compared to out-of-work households and the 
improvement in the residual income after rents by housing allowance provision is also 
worse for the working household than for the workless household. Therefore, the housing 
allowance is more likely to be effective for the unemployed household whose poverty is 
not too severe compared to the employed household.   
 
Summary: Income Maintenance Improvement  
In the UK, the results indicate the high possibility of housing cost-related poverty after rent 
payment for low-income tenant households. As income support for these households, the 
UK housing allowance contributes to the improvement of income poverty arising from 
housing cost expenditures. However, although the changes in residual income after 
housing costs relate to the household‘s income, rents payment and the extent to which 
housing costs is to be subsidised, the changes in poverty rate by housing allowance 
provision are connected more to the extent of the original income state compared to other 
features of each family. Clearly, the receipt of housing allowance reduces the poverty rate 
for the higher-income tenant more effectively. 
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4.3.2 Housing Policy Object: Housing Affordability Improvement  
 
As seen in Section 4.3.1, the UK housing allowance recipients experience significant 
income problem after rent payment if the housing cost is not subsidised. Moreover, the UK 
households receiving a housing allowance have severe financial burdens for housing cost 
expenditures as their rent payment accounts for 30% of their income. In terms of the 
households that are worse off, the Rent to Income Ratio (RIR) is more important compared 
to households that are better off because the absolute amount of their income is small and 
the non-housing consumption is also seriously reduced. In this respect, the effect of the 
housing allowance in improving financial burden for housing cost payments needs to be 
addressed. If the RIR declines as a result of the housing allowance receipt, we could say 
that the housing allowance improves housing affordability. Overall, the provision of 
housing allowance improves the housing costs burden of the poor tenants (77.5%, 
relatively) in the UK.  
 
Table 4.12 Changes in Rent to Income Ratio by Housing Allowance in the UK (%)  
Total tenant with HA Rent to Income Ratio Absolute change Relative change 
 without HA with HA (%p) (%) 
Mean  %(N) 45.2 33.3 35.6 77.5 
Total 100.0(3,376)     
Income Quintiles     
1st Q (low Y) 20.0(675) 74.3 12.9 61.4 81.8 
2nd Q 20.0(675) 53.4 9.8 43.6 80.6 
3rd Q 20.0(676) 45.3 11.4 33.9 76.4 
4th Q 20.1(678) 36.9 10.0 26.9 75.6 
5th Q (high Y) 19.9(672) 16.2 4.3 11.9 73.1 
 (F) (261.678***) (16.945***) (232.575***) (7.692***) 
Household Composition     
No children 26.4(891) 48.7 8.3 40.4 80.4 
With children 34.4(1,162) 57.6 14.9 42.7 73.8 
Pensioner 39.2(1,323) 32.0 6.1 25.9 78.8 
 (F) (148.421***) (61.671***) (84.067***) (11.333***) 
Tenant Tenure     
Public housing  51.6(1,742) 39.4 4.5 35.0 86.6 
Housing 
association  
33.0(1,113) 44.9 8.1 36.8 77.0 
Private  15.4(521) 65.3 30.5 34.8 48.2 
 (F) (91.978***) (405.106***) (1.028) (16.414***) 
Employment Status     
Unemployed 89.7(3,029) 43.8 8.1 35.7 79.8 
Employed  10.3(347) 57.8 23.5 34.3 57.2 
 (t) (-4.407***) (-10.287***) (0.497) (10.714***) 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2006-07, author calculations.  
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income respectively. RIR 
less than 20: A household does not have a housing affordability problem. RIR between 20 
and 30: A household has a housing affordability problem. RIR over 30: A household has a 
severe housing affordability problem. *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 
 84 
Household Income Level  
As Table 4.12 indicates, the housing allowance recipients with the highest income do not 
have any household affordability problem (RIR less than 30), while the housing cost places 
a severe financial burden on other recipients with a lower income, regardless of the 
housing allowance receipt. However, housing allowance plays a role in reducing the 
financial burden for the rent payment for these groups. Both the absolute and relative RIR 
reductions by the housing allowance receipt were the greatest for the lowest-income 
households but smallest for the highest-income households among the beneficiaries. This is 
because the former‘s rent payment was subsidised more by housing allowances than the 
latter‘s rent payment (see Table 4.7). This result could relate to the feature of the UK HB 
arrangement that varies according to the claimant‘s means-tested benefit entitlement.  
Accordingly, it is noted that a generous housing cost subsidisation ratio is important in the 
improvement of the RIR for low-income households.  
 
Household Composition  
Among the different family types, pensioner households pay smaller rent costs and 
experience smaller financial burdens for housing costs compared to non-pensioner 
households. Regardless, all families have housing affordability problems (RIR over 30), 
with families with children experiencing the most severe problems (RIR over 50). When 
low-income households receive a housing allowance, they are able to escape from the 
housing affordability problem. However, the absolute changes in RIR are remarkably 
higher for non-pensioner households compared to pensioner households, whilst the relative 
changes are not. This is because dependency on the housing allowance for rent payment is 
similar, while the RIR before the housing allowance varies across these households.  
 
Tenant Tenure  
Like the changes in income maintenance by housing allowance, there seems to be 
differences between the RIR reduction of private housing tenants and non-private housing 
tenants in the UK. The private renter households face a more severe housing cost burden 
compared to non-private renters before the housing allowance receipt. Even when they 
receive the benefit, the private tenants experience housing affordability problems for the 
rent payment. However, whilst the private housing tenants pay greater rent but rely less on 
the housing allowance for rent payments, the social housing tenants pay smaller rents but 
depend more on the housing allowance for their rent payment. Moreover, the receipt of 
housing allowance further relieves the financial burden of non-private housing tenants 
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compared to private housing tenants. Concerning this situation, the extent to which the 
housing allowance subsidises the rent payment affects the RIR reduction.  
 
Employment Status  
Before the housing allowance receipt, both employed and unemployed households 
experience significant financial burdens arising from their rent payments due to the rent 
cost accounting for about half of their income. However, if they receive housing 
allowances, both are able to improve their housing affordability problems. In particular, the 
RIR of the unemployed household falls below 10%. Although the absolute changes in RIR 
are similar between the two groups, the relative change in RIR is better for the out-of-work 
household compared to the working household because the former‘s rent payment is more 
subsidised by the housing allowance, whilst their RIR is smaller compared to that of the 
latter.  
 
As these results indicate, housing allowances subsidise the housing costs to a certain 
degree for low-income households and contribute to the relief of the severe housing 
affordability problem for low-income tenants in the UK. These results also indicate the 
increased opportunity of non-housing consumption after rent payment. Therefore, it seems 
that the outcome of the UK housing allowance provision is closely related to the reduction 
of the financial burdens for housing costs payment.  
  
Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 addressed the positive aspect of housing allowance in the 
improvement of the low-income household‘s income and housing problems. The next 
section examines the possible negative effect of housing allowance relating to the work 
incentive reduction due to the income supplement function of the housing allowance 
provision.  
 
4.3.3. Housing Allowance as Work Incentive or Disincentive Booster 
 
Concerning the working poor receiving in-work benefits, the housing allowance is a source 
of their income as long as they comply with the labour participation requirement and their 
incomes are lower than the means test threshold for the social security benefit. The 
provision housing allowance could make a difference in beneficiaries‘ income. The 
financial benefits from welfare as well as earnings are very important work incentives for 
the working poor. In this respect, this section focuses on work incentive changes by the 
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provision of housing allowance and compares the different outcomes in each indicator of 
work incentives (see Table 4.6).   
 
The first indicator, Income Replacement Ratio (IRR), indicates the extent to which social 
security benefits while unemployed could replace a worker‘s income while employed. The 
higher IRR means that the currently working household could have income at a certain 
level even without labour, i.e. less work incentive and a high possibility of the 
unemployment trap. To examine the effect of housing allowance on work incentive 
changes, I will compare two IRRs. IRR1 is calculated when the household does not receive 
their household allowance both while employed and unemployed. IRR2 refers to receiving 
allowance both while employed and unemployed. Therefore, by comparing IRR1 and 
IRR2, we could assess the effect of housing allowances provision on IRR changes. The 
second indicator, Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR), refers to additional earnings that a 
worker can take home after taxes and social security contributions. A higher EMTR 
indicates taking less increased net income home when a household increases the labour 
force participation. This result would decrease work incentive, i.e. the increased 
prospective of remaining in poverty (the poverty trap). In this study, we will examine the 
effectiveness of the housing allowance on the changes in the possibility of the poverty trap 
by looking at the difference in the EMTR before and after the housing allowance. The 
changes in IRR and EMTR possibly affect the choice of unemployment by housing 
allowance beneficiaries. However, the projection of the working behaviour choice 
according to work incentive changes is not within the scope of this research. 
 
As this section is about the welfare-to-work transition of those who are able to work, only 
working-aged households are the target of analysis. Among them, both working and out-
of-work households are included in the EMTR analysis whereas only working households 
are chosen from for the IRR analysis (see Figure 3.2). This is because the measurement of 
IRR assumes that an adult member of a household is employed. The parameter values and 
equations for income tax, tax credits and national insurance contributions of the UK 
chapters of OECD Taxing Wages (OECD, 2007, 2008b) and the UK country information 
files of the OECD Benefits and Wages
12
 were used for the IRR and EMTR analysis.  
 
                                                 
12
 For detail, see OECD Social Policies and Data, Benefits and Wages: Country Specific Information internet 
site (http://www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/benefitsandwagescountryspecificinformation.htm).  
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Before analysing the effects of housing allowance provision on work incentive, it might be 
useful to compare IRRs and EMTRs between households. Overall, the IRR of the total 
population is 51%; in other words, when a working household head enters unemployment, 
the household‘s net income would be half of what it was before (when the household head 
worked). However, whilst the IRR for the housing allowance recipients is around 90%, the 
IRR for the non-housing allowance recipients is closer to the average; this difference is 
statistically significant (t=-90.221, p<0.001). The housing allowance recipients would 
retain 90% of their former income when a household head is unemployed whereas 
households not receiving a housing allowance (i.e. households not in a low-income 
bracket) would maintain their former income at a level of 50% when the household head is 
unemployed. This indicates that the households receiving a housing allowance (i.e. the 
more vulnerable families) are more likely to experience the high possibility of the 
unemployment trap than households without a housing allowance. Moreover, the EMTR of 
the entire population is 42.1%, meaning they could increase their net income by about 60% 
of their gross income growth per 1 income unit through increased labour participation. 
However, the EMTR of households not receiving a housing allowance is lower (38.5%) 
than the EMTR of housing allowance recipients (54.5%); this difference is statistically 
significant (t=-13.300, p<0.001). Therefore, the former could preserve a greater portion of 
their increased net income compared to the latter—that is, there might be a greater 
possibility of being trapped in poverty for the housing allowance recipients.  
 
Table 4.13 Work Disincentives of Housing Allowance Recipients and Non-Recipients in 
the UK (%)  
 Total household 
(working-aged) 
Household  
without HA 
Household  
with HA 
 
Mean (N=8,321) (N=6,435) (N=1,886) t 
EMTR 42.1 38.5 54.5 -13.300*** 
 Total household  
(working-aged & Employed) 
Household  
without HA 
Household  
with HA 
 
 (N=5,402) (N=5,063) (N=339)  
IRR 51.0 48.4 90.1 -90.221*** 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2006-07, author calculations.  
Note: HA stands for housing allowance. *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001  
 
4.3.3.1 Income Replacement Ratio: Unemployment Trap 
 
In the UK, when the low-income working households receiving housing allowances 
become unemployed, their incomes could be maintained to a high degree of the current 
income, as indicated by the high IRR in Tables 4.13 and 4.14. Therefore, these working-
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poor households receiving housing allowances are less likely to face work incentives 
encouraging them to remain in their current employment. Moreover, the receipt of housing 
allowance contributes to the increase in these IRRs. Therefore, the housing allowance 
plays a role in reducing work incentives for the working poor and boosting the possibility 
of falling into the unemployment trap. However, the effects of housing allowance 
provision on the work incentive are different for various family groups. 
 
Table 4.14 Changes in Income Replacement Ratio by Housing Allowance in the UK (%) 
Total tenant with HA 
(Working-aged & Employed) 
IRR1 
(without HA) 
IRR2 
(with HA) 
Absolute change 
IRR1-IRR2 (%p) 
Relative change 
IRR1-IRR2 (%) 
Mean  %(N) 69.3 90.1 20.8 39.2 
Total  100.0(339)     
Income Quintiles      
1stQ (low Y) 20.1(68) 60.0 86.8 26.8 56.4 
2ndQ 20.1(68) 73.2 91.7 18.5 32.0 
3rdQ 19.8(67) 74.8 91.7 16.8 30.3 
4thQ 20.4(69) 71.7 91.1 19.4 33.9 
5thQ (high Y) 19.8(67) 66.9 89.5 22.6 43.5 
 (F) (7.307***) (7.182***) (6.997***) (6.358) 
Household  Composition 
No children 23.9(81) 55.6 85.1 29.5 67.2 
With children 76.1(258) 73.6 91.7 18.1 30.4 
 (t) (-8.185***) (-8.648***) (7.657***) (6.523***) 
Tenant Tenure      
Public housing  26.8(91) 79.0 93.1 14.1 21.6 
Housing association 26.0(88) 71.0 90.4 19.4 36.6 
Private  47.2(160) 62.9 88.3 25.4 50.6 
 (F) (24.384***) (16.466***) (27.636***) (20.590***) 
Employment Status     
All in work 67.6(229) 68.5 90.0 21.5 41.9 
Some in work  32.4(110) 71.0 90.5 19.4 33.6 
 (t)  (-1.213) (-0.636) (1.478) (2.196*) 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2006-07, author calculations.  
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income respectively.  
*p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001  
 
Household Income Level  
Among the various income groups of the working poor receiving housing allowances, the 
possibility of the unemployment trap is higher for the middle income quintile groups 
compared to other income groups, as indicated by their higher IRR. However, the receipt 
of housing allowance increases IRRs of these middle-income groups less than those of 
other income groups, although the provision of housing allowance increases IRR across all 
working households receiving housing allowances. Therefore, the provision of housing 
allowances has less negative effects on increasing work disincentives for the middle-
income groups compared to the lowest- or higher-income groups among the working poor 
receiving housing allowances. Concerning the middle-income households, the housing 
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allowance provision helps them maintain their income and is less likely to disturb their 
welfare-to-work transition compared to other income groups. However, whilst the potential 
of choosing unemployment is limited for the lowest- and the highest-income households, 
the housing allowance has greater negative effects on the increase in work disincentives 
because the housing allowance supplements the income better if they give their earnings 
up. Therefore, although the housing allowance is implemented as part of in-work benefits, 
the recipients‘ situations regarding work incentives could vary according to their income 
level.  
 
Household Composition  
The working-poor families with children obtain fewer financial incentives to retain their 
employment position compared to the working-poor families without children. When both 
households are unemployed, families with children can maintain their income at 73.6% of 
the current employed status whereas families without children can maintain their income at 
55.6% of the current income. This is because the IRR is related to the feature of the social 
security system that provides different kinds of benefits or varied benefit rates across 
family types. However, the housing allowance contributes to greater changes in absolute 
and relative IRR of households without children compared to households with children. 
Thus, the housing allowance is associated with greater negative effects on the incentive for 
being employed for households with fewer financial advantages from the benefits system 
(e.g. single adults rather than families with children). Therefore, due to the increased 
possibility of choosing unemployment for families without children, the importance of 
housing allowance programme might be placed on the income supplement function rather 
than financial rewards encouraging households‘ welfare-to-work transition for these 
families.  
 
Tenant Tenure  
Among different tenancy groups, the incentive to keep employed is larger for the private 
tenants than non-private tenants. Although working private tenants could maintain 63% or 
88% of their current income while unemployed, other tenants could maintain a greater 
portion of their income. Therefore, the incentive for the working poor to maintain their 
jobs is greater for private housing tenants than for social housing tenants. However, the 
changes in the IRRs by housing allowance are bigger for the private tenants (25.4%p) than 
for other types of tenants (14.1%p and 19.4%p, respectively). These results indicate that 
the receipt of housing allowance is more related to increased work incentives for the 
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private tenants than for others. If the working poor were unemployed, a housing allowance 
would be of greater importance to the private tenants compared to the other tenant types in 
the dualist rental structure such as the UK.  
 
Employment Status  
Although there are differences in the employment types and the number of workers in a 
family, all working households experience a similar possibility of being trapped in the 
unemployment trap (i.e. similar IRRs), regardless of the receipt of housing allowance. The 
housing allowance contributes to the increase in IRRs due to its income support function. 
However, no differences exist in IRRs or absolute changes in IRRs between the two 
different working groups, even though the relative changes are bigger for households 
where all adults work than for households where only some of the adults work. Therefore, 
the extent to which the housing allowance increases the possibility of the unemployment 
trap is not different for households with varied employment states.  
 
The housing allowance provision is related to the reduction of financial incentive to work 
for the working poor, although it works well as an income supplement for housing cost 
expenditures in the UK. In addition, the changes in IRR by housing allowance are more 
severe for the households with lower IRR compared to other types of households. 
Although the households facing lower work disincentive are more likely to move out of the 
welfare dependency, the provision of housing allowance as in-work benefit could be a 
negative factor in their welfare-to-work transition. In this respect, the result indicates that 
the positive (income maintenance) and negative (the relationship with IRR increase) 
aspects of housing allowance have to be considered together within the welfare-to-work 
system.  
 
4.3.3.2 Effective Marginal Tax Rate: Poverty Trap     
 
As Table 4.15 demonstrates, the housing allowance provision is related to the increase in 
the EMTR, i.e. the more possibility of being trapped in poverty for the working poor or the 
unemployed even when they increase their labour participation. The extent to which they 
could take the financial benefit from increased income could decrease. Therefore, the 
receipt of housing allowance is likely to negatively relate to the work incentive for the 
welfare-to-work transition or the independence from welfare. Moreover, there are 
differences across the characteristics of families in the UK in work incentives when low-
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income households receiving housing allowance participate more actively in the labour 
market.  
 
Table 4.15 Changes in Effective Marginal Tax Rate by Housing Allowance in the UK (%) 
Total tenant with HA  
(Working-aged)  
EMTR1 
(without HA) 
EMTR2 
(with HA) 
Absolute change  
EMTR1-EMTR2 
(%p) 
Relative change  
EMTR1-EMTR2 
(%) 
Mean  %(N) 47.1 54.5 7.4 24.8 
Total 100.0(1,886)     
Income Quintiles     
1stQ (low Y) 20.0(377) 7.7 8.4 0.7 3.2 
2ndQ 20.0(378) 38.9 43.6 4.7 19.0 
3rdQ 20.0(377) 57.7 64.5 6.8 25.1 
4thQ 20.0(377) 66.0 76.1 10.1 33.3 
5thQ (high Y) 20.0(377) 65.1 80.0 14.9 43.4 
 (F) (156.667***) (250.038***) (45.390***) (24.628***) 
Household Composition     
No children 34.8(657) 23.5 30.8 7.3 25.2 
With children 65.2(1,229) 59.7 67.2 7.5 24.6 
 (t) (-20.680***) (-19.240***) (-0.148) (0.182) 
Tenant Tenure     
Public housing  40.1(756) 47.9 52.4 4.6 17.1 
Housing 
association  
30.3(572) 47.4 53.3 5.9 20.6 
Private  29.6(558) 45.7 58.5 12.8 39.5 
 (F) (0.400) (3.285*) (46.819***) (24.473***) 
Employment Status     
Unemployed 67.4(1,271) 48.8 49.7 0.9 3.2 
Employed  32.6(615) 43.5 64.4 20.9 69.4 
 (t) (2.699**) (-7.430***) (-22.715***) (-19.119***) 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2006-07, author calculations.  
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income respectively. 
*p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001  
 
Household Income Level   
Among the working-poor tenants with different incomes, the possibility of remaining in 
poverty after increasing labour participation is relatively low for the lowest-income groups, 
although they experience more severe poverty problems compared to other types of 
tenants. This is because the lowest-income households could have a higher take-home pay 
compared to other higher-income groups, as indicated by the lowest EMTR for the lowest-
income households. Therefore, although they might experience greater income problems 
compared to higher-income groups, the incentive to work in order to escape from poverty 
could be stronger for the lowest-income household than others. Yet although the higher-
income households receiving housing allowances have relatively fewer poverty problems 
compared to the lowest-income households, the incentive to increase the labour 
participation of other higher-income groups is lower. Moreover, the housing allowance 
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provision contributes more to the increase in the EMTR for the higher-income than the 
lowest-income beneficiaries. Therefore, concerning households intending to increase their 
labour participation with different incomes, the provision of housing allowance could 
result in different results among households; in particular, it could be better for the worse-
off households.  
 
Household Composition  
Regardless of the housing allowance receipt, the work incentive is smaller for families with 
children than for childless families. As the EMTR is higher for families with children 
compared to other families, the low-income families with children could take a relatively 
smaller portion of their increased income home compared to families without children. 
Therefore, if they increase their works or get a new job in the labour market, the possibility 
of remaining in poverty is likely to be higher for households with children than for 
households without children. However, the potential effect of the housing allowance 
receipt on the work incentive change might be similar for a family with and without 
children as both the absolute and relative changes in EMTR are similar across families. 
Therefore, when the welfare policy intends to expand the welfare-to-work transition for all 
families, the provision of housing allowance itself could be less effective in achieving this 
goal for a family with children than a family without children.  
 
Tenant Tenure   
Although the EMTRs are similar for the three tenant groups before housing allowance 
receipt, the EMTR after the housing allowance receipt is higher for private housing tenants 
compared to others. Therefore, the housing allowance provision could change the work 
disincentive to various degrees across tenure types in the UK. As such the private housing 
tenants are likely to take relatively fewer shares of their increased income obtained by the 
additional labour participation compared to other tenants. On the contrary, the housing 
allowance is less likely to influence the movement from the current employment or 
unemployment to the more active participation in the labour market for the social housing 
tenants compared to private housing tenants. Therefore, the provision of housing allowance 
could be differentiated by considering this difference in order to increase the effectiveness 
of the in-work benefit for income maintenance as well as welfare-to-work participation for 
all tenancy groups.  
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Employment Status   
Markedly, both working and workless households experience different possibilities of the 
poverty trap according to the receipt of housing allowance. If the housing allowance is not 
provided, the unemployed who newly entered the labour market are likely to take more 
earnings home compared to the employed recipients who increase their work participation. 
However, when both households receive housing allowances, there are reductions in work 
incentives for the working households due to the greatest absolute changes in EMTR 
(20.9%, see Table 4.15). On the contrary, the provision of housing allowance might not 
have an impact on work disincentive changes for the unemployed recipients when they 
enter the labour market. Concerning the working household, this is the undesirable result 
because the growth in labour participation increases the potential of being (still) in poverty. 
However, considering the workless households who intend to enter the labour market, the 
receipt of housing allowance could help ease their income poverty, but it also has a few 
negative effects on work incentives. Therefore, it is helpful to consider this varying 
importance of the housing allowance on work incentives in the welfare system.  
 
Although the housing allowance system aims to improve income maintenance through the 
housing cost support to the low-income household, it also has a negative effect on 
encouraging the work incentive for the poor family‘s welfare-to-work transition. However, 
the effect of the housing allowance provision on the extent to which the work incentive 
declines or the work disincentive inclines differs for various family groups receiving the 
housing allowance. In this respect the various housing allowance effects, particularly the 
negative effects that decrease work incentives, need to be considered in order to enhance 
the effectiveness of the entire welfare-to-work system in the UK.   
 
 
4.4 Summary 
 
 
In the UK, the effectiveness of the housing allowance has made positive progress for social 
and housing policy objectives. The effectiveness of housing allowances differs according 
to the households‘ original income and rent payment as well as the extent to which their 
rent payments are reduced by the receipt of housing allowance. Both original income and 
rent cost expenditures relate to the household‘s features while the reduced extent of the 
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housing cost burden concerns the way in which the housing allowance design considers the 
different features of the households.  
 
As seen in this chapter, the improvement in income maintenance and housing affordability 
provides a more financial reward to lower-income tenants, unemployed tenants and social 
housing tenants receiving the housing allowance. Considering their lower incomes, the 
social security benefit entitlement is more likely to affect the housing allowance provision 
at the maximum rate. Moreover, the UK HB makes an allowance for rent payments at a 
considerable level (the full award for eligible rent up to the benefit cap) for social security 
benefit recipients because there are no other social security benefits making allowances for 
rent payments. These factors could contribute to a greater reduction in their financial 
burden for rent payments. However, it is also noted that the housing allowance provision is 
less effective in reducing the poverty rate of households that face more severe poverty. 
Furthermore, the recent changes in the UK‘s HB rules as part of welfare reform would 
make the housing allowance less effective as income support for low-income tenants due 
to the restriction of the HB provision (e.g. lowering benefit rates and fixed benefit caps) in 
the current economic downturn. 
 
Apart from the improvement in the households‘ economic state after the rent payment, the 
provision of the housing allowance could cause problems related to the welfare-to-work 
transition by increasing the work disincentive. In particular, the household groups with 
more changes in their work disincentives are lower-income households and private housing 
tenants, which are likely to be more vulnerable households in the housing market. On the 
contrary, there are household groups for which the housing allowance has little or no effect 
on their work disincentives, e.g. middle-income households, families with children and 
non-private housing tenants; these households experience greater work disincentives 
compared to other types of households, regardless of the housing allowance receipt. As 
such the housing allowance provision is not likely to be an attractive option for all 
households that are able to work and encouraged to participate in the labour market by the 
social security programme.  
 
However, while the welfare beneficiaries face different work incentives, the same taper 
rate of 65% on income will be applied under the Universal Credit starting this year. In this 
case, the work incentive will be similar across all household types. However, non-financial 
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factors affecting the welfare-to-work transition of low-income households needs to be 
considered in the welfare system in order to facilitate this transition.   
 
Based on the analysis in this chapter, I conclude that the UK housing allowance for tenants 
can effectively improve income maintenance and housing affordability; its benefit rules 
relate to these changes. However, in terms of the welfare-to-work transition, the housing 
allowance could have a negative effect on certain beneficiaries, particularly those who 
have a more significant demand for housing allowance under a dualist housing system in 
the credit crunch, (i.e. private housing tenants). 
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Chapter 5. The Effectiveness of Housing Allowance for Tenants in the 
Netherlands 
 
 
Introduction 
As a housing policy instrument, the Dutch housing allowance is closely connected to the 
operation of the national rental housing policy since the 1970s. With this rent subsidy 
scheme, the Dutch government aims to improve housing affordability for low-income 
tenants. Yet the government also emphasises individual households‘ responsibility for 
housing cost payments. In this chapter, I will explore the formation of the current housing 
allowance system in the Netherlands. I will then address the compositional and operational 
features of the Dutch housing allowance. Finally, as the main analysis of the housing 
allowance effectiveness, I will examine the effects of housing allowance on income 
maintenance, housing affordability and work incentives for low-income tenants.          
 
 
5.1. The Development of National Support for Housing Costs in the 
Netherlands 
 
 
The development of this housing allowance is connected to changes in the national housing 
policy of the Netherlands. The Dutch government‘s housing policy has been concerned 
with supplying affordable housing for vulnerable households with low income and social 
needs (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, former VROM
13
). As McCrone and 
Stephens (1995) pointed out, the Netherlands‘ national characteristics— the small size of 
the country with the second highest population density in the OECD countries (OECD, 
2009)—are related to the government‘s continuous and assertive intervention in the 
national housing market. In the Netherlands, the housing allowance has played an 
important role in improving the low-income household‘s affordability for new or good-
quality housing. Moreover, it also contributed to protecting poor families from living 
separately due to their lower housing affordability compared to their housing needs arising 
from household size (Priemus & Elsinga, 2007). However, the Dutch housing policy 
                                                 
13
 In 2010, the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM) was merged with the 
Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management to become the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
the Environment.  
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focused primarily on the shortage of housing and the rent subsidy programme was 
introduced later compared to the start of other housing policy instruments.  
 
Like other countries, the Dutch government focused on solving its housing shortage 
problem after WWII and intervened in the housing market with a strong rent price control 
system. However, the government‘s price control in housing market discouraged new 
housing construction. Therefore, the Dutch government started to provide subsidies for 
housing building construction. As a result, housing subsidies for building construction 
were the main instrument of the housing policy and the social rental housing were supplied 
at a large scale after WWII (Priemus & Elsinga, 2007; Haffner & Boumeester, 2010). 
Social rental housing still plays an important role in the Dutch housing system for low-
income households, constituting 33% of the total housing stock and 75% of the total rental 
housing stock in 2010 (Statistics Netherlands, 2011).       
 
However, in the 1960s, the government‘s housing policy faced criticism concerning the 
excessive public spending on housing-related expenditures and its negative effect on the 
housing market formation. Therefore, the Dutch government reformed the national housing 
policy toward liberalisation (Priemus & Elsinga, 2007; Haffner & Boumeester, 2010). 
Through the housing policy reform, the equalised government housing construction 
subsidies were provided to both social and private rental housing sectors. The strong 
national regulation of the rent price was relieved in 1967, which resulted in rent cost 
increases. As a result, a discussion of the new form of housing subsidy—that is, rent 
allowance, which is provided to individual households with needs for housing according to 
their income level—was introduced in politics (Priemus & Elsinga, 2007).    
 
With the positive response to this new housing subsidy, the government‘ housing costs 
support has gradually shifted from ‗bricks and mortar‘ subsidies to demand-side housing 
subsidies. The initial housing allowance scheme was introduced in 1970 to enhance the 
housing affordability of lower-income households suffering from the increase in rent cost 
following the liberalisation of the housing policy (Haffner & Boumeester, 2010). Initially, 
this rent subsidy was regarded as a supplementary measure in the housing policy, which 
was designed to fill the gap between the low-income renters‘ affordability and their rent 
payments. This housing allowance for tenants was soon developed into a entitlement 
benefit in 1975 (Priemus, 2004).  
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Following the shift towards liberalisation in the 1970s, the Dutch government introduced 
its ‗housing valuation system‘ in order to determine a reasonable rent level for an 
independent dwelling.
14
 This system is also called a ‗rent point system‘ because the value 
points are used to rate the rent price while considering different quality aspects of a 
dwelling.
15
 For example, a dwelling in the Netherlands of 131 points corresponds to a 
monthly rent of about €570 in 2006 (VROM). Generally, the level of maximum rent 
calculated with the value point of this system is likely to be different from the actual rent 
price in the market. However, this results in a rent cap, which the property owners can 
charge to their tenants. According to the rules of this system, dwellings with more than a 
certain value points and higher rents exceeding a limit (€615.01 in 2006) could be 
‗liberalised‘, thereby no longer being subject to the government‘s rent regulation. In 2006, 
dwellings with monthly rents up to €615.01, accounting for 95% of total rental stock, were 
regulated by the central government while the remaining 5% of total rental stock for which 
rent prices exceeded this ‗liberalisation limit‘ were considered as liberalised (VROM). In 
2011, the maximum rent for social housing was €652.52 monthly16; however, housing 
costs in the private sector were higher (Government of the Netherlands
17
).  
 
Throughout the 1980s, the economic recession and the government‘s budget cuts resulted 
in the ‗retrenchment‘ of the housing allowance scheme (Priemus & Elsinga, 2007). Until 
the mid 1980s, the scheme was calculated based on the ratio of the fixed standard rent to 
different levels of households‘ taxable income. However, this rule was criticised for its 
lack of flexibility in terms of government budget spending; therefore, the government 
replaced the benefit calculation rule with a new benefit rule calculated with the household 
income after deducting the net housing expenditures in order to reflect the household‘s 
actual housing affordability, which reduced the expansion of housing expenditures by the 
government (Priemus & Elsinga, 2007). 
                                                 
14
 An independent dwelling is a dwelling with its own main entrance that can be occupied without being 
dependent on substantial amenities outside the dwelling (VROM). 
 
15
 The aspects of the dwelling concerned are as follows: (1) surface of the rooms (including bathrooms and 
kitchens), (2) size of other spaces (including attics, back-kitchens, garages), (3) central heating, (4) 
insulation, (5) size of kitchen sink, (6) sanitary facilities, (7) facilities for physical handicaps, (8) private 
external spaces, (9) type of dwelling; (10) locational aspects of the dwelling (including vicinity of public 
green spaces, play facilities, parking facilities, schools, shops, etc.), (11) inconvenient circumstances (such as 
noise hindrance, serious dereliction of the neighbourhood; soil and air pollution) and (12) services offered in 
the dwelling (such as alarm installation, provision of meals by the landlord, use of recreational rooms) 
(VROM).  
 
16
 This limit was also used as the eligible maximum rent payment for housing allowance entitlement in 2011.   
 
17
 www.rijksoverheid.nl. 
 99 
In the 1990s, although the central government still administered the rent regulation, it 
allowed social housing providers, such as housing associations, to differentiate the annual 
rent charges. Moreover, the politicians intended to raise the rents to the level of market 
rents. However, as the gap between the rent price and the lack of the low-income 
households‘ housing affordability could be filled with the housing allowance, the Dutch 
housing allowance scheme played a more important role within the country‘s housing 
policy, (Priemus & Elsinga, 2007; Haffner & Boumeester, 2010; Priemus, 2004; Priemus 
et al., 2005). Furthermore, the new Housing Allowance Act introduced the reduction of 
households‘ own contribution to housing cost payments from 55% to 25% of total housing 
costs when tenants move to a more expensive, better quality dwelling than their current 
home (Priemus, 1998, 2002).  
 
Currently, the same benefit scheme is applied to all low-income tenant households, 
regardless of their tenancy types (Priemus & Elsinga, 2007; Haffner & Boumeester, 2010). 
The household‘s income and family composition are importantly considered because the 
extent to which the housing allowance subsidises the housing cost is determined according 
to these two features of a household. In 2008, the number of tenant households receiving 
housing allowance was around one million, accounting for 30% of all tenant households in 
the Netherlands. Most allowance recipients were single-adult households: The shares of the 
single-adult (55%) and single-parent (26%) households were much higher compared to 
couple-adult households. Regarding the social security benefit entitlement of the Dutch 
housing allowance recipients, 70% of tenant households received income support, 
unemployment or disability benefits and 45% of tenant pensioners received housing 
allowances. The housing allowance expenditure and the average housing allowance (€159 
per month) were higher for pensioners than for households receiving other social security 
benefits. The average provision of housing allowance in 2008 was €145 per month 
(Statistics Netherlands, 2010).  
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Figure 5.1 Housing Allowance Recipients in the Netherlands (2008) 
 
(a) by household type (b) by social security benefit entitlement 
 
Source: Statistics Netherlands (2010).   
 
 
5.2 The Design of Housing Allowance for Tenants in the Netherlands  
 
 
The Dutch housing allowance scheme adopts a ‗gap‘ approach for the housing allowance 
provision, meaning the system requires its beneficiaries to contribute to their rent payment 
with their income to a certain degree (Ditch et al., 2001; Kemp, 2000a). The remaining of 
the actual housing cost is then subsidised by housing allowance at a level above the self-
contribution standard up to the maximum cost limit. The subsidisation rates and maximum 
limits of housing costs vary according to family features. The range of housing cost limits 
differs according to the number of family member and household composition.  
 
First, the self-contribution standard known as ‗standard rent‘, which is the part of housing 
costs for which the low-income household itself must pay, is calculated. Although the 
standard rent table released by the government was used prior to 2008 to calculate the 
required contribution of the beneficiaries to their rent, the standard rent has been calculated 
by considering individual households‘ income since 2008. As Table 5.1 indicates, the pre-
2008 standard rent was set at a lower level for households with smaller incomes than for 
higher-income households, irrespective of household types. Moreover, the income standard 
and standard rent level were more generous for households aged 65 years old or more than 
working-aged households. Therefore, these households are likely to have lower self-
contributions to rent payments than others.  
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Table 5.1 Standard Rent Table by Household Type and Income in the Netherlands (€, 2007) 
 Minimum Maximum 
Household Type Income Standard rent 
(monthly) 
Income Standard rent 
(monthly) 
Single aged <65 up to 14,425.00 202.95 20,076.00 - 20,300.00 382.82 
Two or more people aged <65 up to 18,500.00 202.95 27,451.00 - 27,575.00 423.93 
Single aged >=65 up to 14,225.00 201.13 17,826.00 - 18,250.00 358.80 
Two or more people aged >=65 up to 18,375.00 199.32 24,076.00 - 24,275.00 384.08 
Source: OECD Benefits and Wages: Country Specific Information internet site, the 
Netherlands country chapter (2007).  
(http://www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/benefitsandwagescountryspecificinformatio
n.htm). 
 
Since 2008, the amount of standard rent (i.e. the household‘s self-contributions to rent 
payments) has been calculated based on the household‘s income and household 
composition using the following formula:  
 
Standard rent = a*Y*Y + b*Y    (Y = household taxable income)   
 
The different coefficients a and b are applied according to household types as indicated in 
Table 5.2. With this rule, lower-income and elderly households benefit because their lower 
incomes and the smaller coefficients of the standard rent formula will result in a smaller 
standard rent (i.e. a lower self-contribution for housing costs). The minimum standard rent 
in 2010 was €205.74 for households with two or more persons aged 65 or older, €207.55 
for single households aged 65 or older and €209.37 for single or more person households 
aged below 65.
18
  
 
Table 5.2 Standard Rent Formula Coefficients by Household Type in the Netherlands 
(2008) 
Household Type a b 
Single aged <65 0.000000811353 0.000891346453 
Two or more people aged <65 0.000000468962 0.001198428415 
Single aged >65 0.000001377834 -0.006924833530 
Two or more people aged >65 0.000000799752 -0.005006518373 
Source: OECD Benefits and Wages: Country Specific Information internet site, the 
Netherlands country chapter (2008), p.12. 
(http://www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/benefitsandwagescountryspecificinformatio
n.htm). 
 
The rent payment above this ‗standard rent‘ is regarded as the eligible rent for housing 
allowance and the eligible rent is subsidised up to the maximum subsidisation limit with 
                                                 
18
 For the table of standard rent before 2008 and the standard rent formula after 2008, see OECD Benefits 
and Wages: Country Specific Information internet site, the Netherlands country chapter of different years. 
(http://www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/benefitsandwagescountryspecificinformation.htm). 
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different subsidisation rates: The rent above the standard rent is to be subsidised at 100%, 
75% and 50% of each housing cost range below the different highest limits according to 
family composition, as shown in Figure 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.2 Housing Cost Subsidisation Rates by Household Type in the Netherlands (2010)  
 
Up to € 647.53 
Max. rent for HA 
(cap for single or 
special need) 
 
 
50%  0%  
0% 
 50% Up to € 548.18 
 
 
 
 
75% 
Up to € 511.50 
(cap for general 
household) 
 
 
 
75%  75%   75% 
 Up to € 357.37 
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limit 
 
 
 
100%  100%  100%  100% 
Up to Standard rent  
of each household 
 
 
0% 
self-contribution 
 
0% 
self-contribution 
 
0% 
self-contribution 
 
0% 
self-contribution 
 
     Eligible 
     housing cost limit 
 
Single-person 
household  
Two-person 
household  
3+person 
household  
Household with 
the elderly or 
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Note: The figure replicates Figure 1 in Priemus (1998) p.325. For the subsidisation rates and 
eligible cost limits of the Dutch housing allowance, see OECD Benefits and Wages: 
Country Specific Information internet site, the Netherlands country chapter in 2010.  
(http://www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/benefitsandwagescountryspecificinformatio
n.htm). 
 
The first subsidisation range starts from the standard rent up to ‗quality allowance limit‘ 
fixed at € 357.37 per month in 2010. The difference between the standard rent of each 
household and quality allowance limit is paid completely (100%) by the housing allowance. 
The next subsidisation range is from the quality allowance limit up to the benefit cap. For 
this range, the housing costs are subsidised at 75%. The upper limit of this range is 
€511.50 for one- or two-person households and €548.18 for households with three people 
or more per month. However, although no additional subsidisation for housing costs exists 
above this range limit for households with two people or households without the elderly or 
the disabled, single-adult households or households with the elderly or disabled could 
receive additional subsidisation for housing costs above this range. The housing costs 
above this range up to the maximum rent for housing allowance (€647.53 per month) is to 
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be paid at 50% (OECD Benefits and Wages Country Specific Information internet site
19
; 
Priemus, 1998; Haffner & Boumeester, 2010).    
  
Therefore, the feature of the Dutch housing allowance for the low-income tenants could be 
summarised as having a ‗gap‘ structure and reflecting various household incomes and 
family characteristics for the institutional arrangements of housing allowance system. For 
this feature, the rule of the Dutch housing allowance system differentiates individual 
households‘ financial contribution to housing costs by household income and composition. 
Therefore, it can provide greater income supplement for socially vulnerable households 
(e.g. low-income, the elderly or the disabled). Moreover, due to the higher subsidisation 
rates for the lower housing costs, it can provide a more shopping incentive for low-rent 
housing.  
 
 
5.3 The Analysis of Housing Allowance Effects on Tenants in the 
Netherlands 
 
 
In this section, I examine the effectiveness of the Dutch housing allowance for income 
maintenance, housing affordability and work incentives for low-income tenant households. 
As in Chapter 4, the effects of housing allowances will be evaluated based on the 
consideration of households‘ features using various indicators.  
 
  
                                                 
19
 http://www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/benefitsandwagescountryspecificinformation.htm. 
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Table 5.3 Indictors of Housing Allowance Effectiveness in Section 5.3       
Section Indicator Definition 
5.3.1 Income maintenance  
  5.3.1.1 1.Residual income after housing cost 
expenditures  
Residual Y1: Paying rent without HA 
Residual Y2: Paying rent with HA 
   
  5.3.1.2 2. Poverty Rate (PR)  
(poverty line: 60% of the national median 
income)  
PR1: Before paying rent & receiving HA  
PR2: After paying rent without HA 
PR3: After paying rent with HA 
   
5.3.2 Housing affordability  
 Rent to Income Ratio (RIR)  RIR1 : Paying rent without HA  
RIR2 : Paying rent with HA  
   
5.3.3 Work incentive   
  5.3.3.1 1.Income Replacement Ratio (IRR)= 
Household net income when unemployed 
Household net income when employed 
 
IRR1: Income excluding HA 
IRR2: Income including HA  
   
  5.3.3.2 2. Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) = EMTR1: Income excluding HA 
 
1  - 
Change in household net income 
Change in household gross income  
by 1 income unit 
 
EMTR2: Income including HA 
 
Note: Y and HA stand for household net income and housing allowance respectively. 
 
The analysis of the Dutch housing allowance effect is limited to the tenant household. This 
research used households‘ information from ‗Housing Research in the Netherlands 
(WoON) 2006‘ for the analysis. In the Netherlands, tenant households are eligible for the 
housing allowance; thus, they are the target of the analysis (size=7,124). Moreover, as 
stated in Chapter 3, the rule applied for the analysis in Section 5.2 is not the current rule of 
the Dutch housing allowance system, but the benefit rule of the reference year of the 
WoOn 2006 survey. Therefore, for instance, the old ‗standard rent‘ table released by the 
government is used for the analysis. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Dutch housing 
allowance recipient used in this analysis are the lower-income households in the population, 
even some of them are described as the higher-income group in this section. 
 
On average, the Dutch housing allowance recipients who are all tenants receive €1,684 of 
the annual housing allowances, which subsidises 36% of their gross rent payments.  
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Table 5.4 Income, Rents and Housing Allowance of Tenant Recipients in the Netherlands 
(€, 2006 price) 
Total tenant with HA   Annual HH income Annual HA Annual rents HA÷rents (%) 
Mean  %(N) 12,247.52 1,684.43 4,638.75 36.0 
Total 100.0(7,124)     
Income Quintiles     
1st Q (low Y)  20.0(1,425)  9,215.04 1,525.19 4,280.10 34.3 
2nd Q  20.0(1,424)  11,062.55 1,639.21 4,379.79 36.9 
3rd Q  20.0(1,426)  12,202.17 1,762.43 4,624.48 37.9 
4th Q  20.0(1,425)  13,392.33 1,738.57 4,777.66 36.3 
5th Q(high Y)  20.0(1,424)  15,366.87 1,756.71 5,131.88 34.3 
 (F) (15,623.571***) (28.059***) (153.132***) (21.811***) 
Household Composition     
No Children 29.3(2,088) 11,840.72 1,399.13 4,213.15 32.8 
With Children 28.9(2,061) 11,281.11 1,910.47 4,893.16 38.9 
Pensioner 41.8(2,975) 13,202.53 1,728.06 4,761.20 36.2 
 (F) (604.405***) (282.377***) (257.707***) (117.189***) 
Tenant Tenure     
Public housing  0.4(32) 12,473.85 1,525.50 4,711.22 32.3 
Housing 
association  
or Co-op 
93.5(6,662) 12,207.16 1,681.26 4,626.60 36.0 
Private  6.0(430) 12,855.95 1,745.27 4,821.61 35.5 
 (F) (17.888***) (2.299) (6.722**) (1.554) 
Employment Status     
Unemployed 76.6(5,454) 12,226.41 1,707.78 4,630.44 36.5 
Employed  23.4(1,670) 12,316.46 1,608.18 4,665.89 34.1 
 (t) (-1.467) (4.667***) (-1.118) (6.534***) 
Source: Housing Research in the Netherlands (WoON) 2006, author calculations. 
Note: HH, HA and Y stand for household, housing allowance and household net income 
respectively. Co-op stands for co-operative housing. *p <0.05 **p <0.01 *** p <0.001  
 
Like other countries, the Dutch housing allowance recipients are more likely to live in 
poverty compared to households not receiving the housing allowance. Table 5.5 shows that 
the poverty rates were higher for housing allowance recipients than for housing allowance 
non-recipients, even when housing allowances were paid to the beneficiaries in order to 
subsidise their housing costs. 
 
Table 5.5 Poverty Rates before and after Housing Cost Expenditures in the Netherlands (%)  
Poverty lines Total household 
(owner+tenant) 
Household without HA 
(owner+tenant) 
Household with HA 
(tenant only) 
 (N=48,844) (N=41,720) (N=7,124) 
 before HC after HC before HC after HC bf.HA&HC bf.HAaf.HC 
40% of median  0.8 10.8 0.6 7.9 2.2 56.8 
50% of median  3.1 21.9 1.5 15.0 11.9 84.5 
60% of median  10.0 34.4 4.2 25.2 44.0 95.8 
Source: Housing Research in the Netherlands (WoON) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HC and HA stand for housing costs and housing allowance respectively.    
 
Overall, the Dutch households (both housing allowance recipients and non-recipients) have 
faced a high (40% or more) ratio of housing cost expenditures to household income. 
Moreover, housing allowance recipients experience greater burdens associated with 
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housing cost payments if their housing costs are not subsidised by the housing allowance. 
Therefore, the quality of living could be lower after housing cost expenditures, especially 
for low-income households compared to others, although the Dutch government controls 
the rent price in the housing market.  
 
Table 5.6 Financial Burden for Housing Cost Expenditures in the Netherlands (%) 
Housing affordability 
measures 
Total household Household  
without HA 
Household  
with HA 
t 
 (N=48,844) (N=41,720) (N=7,124)  
Gross HC over Y 43.4 42.5 48.3 -13.959*** 
 Total tenant Tenant without HA Tenant with HA  
 (N=20,929) (N=13,805) (N=7,124)  
Rent over Y 35.0 30.4 44.0 -69.68*** 
Source: Housing Research in the Netherlands (WoON) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HC, HA and Y stand for housing cost, housing allowance and household net income, 
respectively. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 
5.3.1 Social Policy Object: Income Maintenance Improvement  
 
Addressing the effects of the Dutch housing allowance on income maintenance, the extent 
to which household income after housing cost expenditures could be reserved by the 
receipt of housing allowance matters. We might expect that the housing allowance could 
help recipients maintain their household incomes to a certain degree, after rent payments. 
The improvement in income after housing cost payments could relieve low-income 
households‘ poverty. In this section, I will examine the effectiveness of housing allowance 
considering the changes in two indicators— residual income after rent and poverty rate—
resulting from the housing allowance for tenant households (see Table 5.3).  
 
5.3.1.1 Residual Income after Rents 
 
The changes in the residual household income after gross rent payments have been used as 
an evaluation tool for the income support function of the housing allowance provision. On 
average, the residual income after rent payments increased from €7,146 to €8,498, which 
accounts for 21% of the relative change. It appears that the Dutch housing allowance plays 
a role in maintaining the income of the poor household to a certain degree. However, the 
results showed differences in the effect of housing allowance provision as income support 
according to households‘ features.    
 
 107 
Table 5.7 Changes in Residual Income after Rents by Housing Allowance in the 
Netherlands (€, 2006 price) 
Total tenant with HA Residual income after rents Absolute change Relative change 
  without HA with HA (€) (%) 
Mean  %(N) 7,146.15 8,498.84 1,352.69 21.3 
Total 100.0(7,124)     
Income Quintiles     
1st Q (low Y)  20.0(1,425)  5,519.35 6,455.25 935.89 18.8 
2nd Q  20.0(1,424)  6,259.91 7,560.21 1,300.31 23.0 
3rd Q  20.0(1,426)  6,846.72 8,325.06 1,478.34 24.1 
4th Q  20.0(1,425)  7,820.46 9,317.18 1,496.72 21.7 
5th Q(high Y)  20.0(1,424)  9,285.41 10,837.59 1,552.18 18.7 
 (F) (1,394.692***) (3,250.758***) (247.249***)  (52.506***) 
Household Composition     
No children 29.3(2,088) 6,690.42 7,973.39 1,282.97 22.0 
With children 28.9(2,061) 7,174.96 8,331.92 1,156.96 18.1 
Pensioner 41.8(2,975) 7,446.05 8,983.25 1,537.21 22.9 
 (F) (92.610***) (202.542***) (245.378***)  (92.825***) 
Tenant Tenure      
Public housing  0.4(32) 7,597.18 8,763.67 1,166.49 16.3 
Housing 
association  
or Co-op 
93.5(6,662) 7,133.74 8,479.71 1,345.96 21.2 
Private  6.0(430) 7,304.83 8,775.50 1,470.66 22.6 
 (F) (2.359) (5.417**) (8.939***)  (4.770**) 
Employment Status     
Unemployed 76.6(5,454) 6,926.61 8,349.02 1,422.41 22.7 
Employed  23.4(1,670) 7,863.15 8,988.14 1,124.99 16.5 
 (t) (-14.975***) (-10.614***) (18.287***) (19.066***) 
Source: Housing Research in the Netherlands (WoON) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income respectively. Co-op 
stands for co-operative housing. *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 
 
Household Income Level 
Regardless of the benefit rule change in 2008 for the standard rent, the Dutch housing 
allowance system requires lower-income households to contribute smaller housing costs to 
their rents compared to higher-income households. However, among the Dutch housing 
allowance recipients, the absolute change in residual income after housing costs by the 
receipt of housing allowance is bigger for higher-income households compared to lower-
income households. In practice, higher-income households among the housing allowance 
recipients are likely to receive a greater housing allowance compared to lower-income 
households and their rents payment are larger compared to those of lower-income 
households, as Table 5.4 shows. However, the relative changes are better for the three 
middle-income groups (24.1%, 23% and 21.7%, respectively) compared to the highest- or 
the lowest-income groups. Yet the size of maximum housing allowance depends more on 
the household type than the level of income due to the different benefit caps according to 
family composition. 
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Household Composition 
Under the Dutch housing allowance calculation rule (both before and after 2008), single 
households and households with the elderly or disabled benefit from the higher eligible 
housing cost standard. In practice, both absolute and relative changes in residual income 
after rent payments are better for the smaller household and household with pensioners 
who experience less financial burden for housing costs than households with children (see 
Table 5.4). Although the size of housing allowance itself is larger for the household with 
children than other households, the financial burden for housing costs payment is also 
more severe for families with children compared to other families. Therefore, it seems that 
the higher housing allowance provision might contribute little to the improvement of 
income problems after housing expenditures for families with children. In this respect, it is 
necessary to consider households‘ original financial burden for housing costs payment as 
well as the amount of housing allowance receipt for the result of income maintenance by 
different household types.  
 
Tenant Tenure 
As the Dutch housing allowance adopts the same benefit rules for all tenant tenure, tenant 
households with similar financial burdens for housing costs would receive equal housing 
allowances, if other conditions are not considered. This might be related to the unitary 
rental housing system in the Netherlands. In practice, the housing cost subsidisation ratios 
are similar (around 35%) across all tenant groups (see Table 5.4). However, both the 
absolute and relative changes in residual income after housing costs payment by the 
housing allowance are smaller for public housing tenants compared to other tenant 
households. Just focusing on this result, the housing allowance provision is more positively 
related to the improvement of income maintenance after housing cost expenditures for 
public housing tenants compared to other tenancy households. However, this might be due 
to the other family features. When household net income or housing costs differ, the 
discriminated improvement in residual incomes according to tenure types might be 
expected because the amounts of gross rent payments, housing allowance and household 
income are considered as a whole for the benefit arrangement.  
  
Employment Status  
As the Dutch housing allowance system is a means-tested benefit, its beneficiaries are 
economically vulnerable households, regardless of whether they have any earned incomes. 
Among housing allowance recipients, whilst both working and out-of-work households 
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have similar household incomes and housing costs payments, the extent to which their 
housing costs are subsidised by housing allowance is larger for unemployed households 
compared to employed households. This might be because of their other family features, 
such as family composition. As a result, unemployed households experience more absolute 
and relative increases in their residual incomes after rent through the housing allowance 
provision compared to employed households.  
 
5.3.1.2 Poverty Rate     
 
The concern is not merely the increase in residual income after housing cost expenditures 
by housing allowance receipt. The housing allowance recipients are the poor or the poorest 
households living in poverty and largely dependent on the welfare benefit. Moreover, even 
when the housing allowance beneficiaries have larger residual incomes after housing costs 
than the income before housing allowance receipt, their non-housing consumption 
opportunity would be limited more than those of the better-off households. In practice, the 
housing cost expenditures bring housing cost-related poverty for low-income households: 
The poverty rate after housing costs is higher than the poverty rate before housing costs for 
low-income tenant households (see Table 5.8). However, this poverty state could be 
relieved by the receipt of housing allowance. Indeed, the housing allowance provision 
accounted for 21% of the relative change in the residual income after rent payment, 
resulting in a relative decrease of 10% in poverty rates. Differences in poverty rate changes 
by housing allowance emerged according to various household features in the Netherlands.  
  
  
 110 
Table 5.8 Changes in Poverty Rates by Housing Allowance in the Netherlands (%)  
Poverty lines   60% of median income Absolute  
change (%p) 
PR2–PR3 
Relative 
change (%) 
PR2–PR3 
Total tenant with HA 
 
PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HA af.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
Mean  (%) 44.0 93.8 85.0 8.8 9.4 
Total 100.0       
Income Quintiles      
1st Q (low Y)  20.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
2nd Q  20.0  84.5 100.0 99.9 0.1 0.1 
3rd Q  20.0  32.9 99.9 98.9 1.1 1.1 
4th Q  20.0  2.5 96.6 83.6 12.9 13.4 
5th Q(high Y)  20.0  0.0 72.3 42.3 30.1 41.6 
       
Household Composition      
No children 29.3 60.5 93.5 88.0 5.5 5.9 
With children 28.9 58.1 90.9 82.4 8.5 9.3 
Pensioner 41.8 22.6 96.0 84.6 11.4 11.8 
       
Tenant Tenure      
Public  0.4 34.4 90.6 87.5 3.1 3.4 
Housing association 
or Co-op 
93.5 44.5 93.9 85.1 8.8 9.3 
Private  6.0 36.3 92.3 82.1 10.2 11.1 
       
Employment Status      
Unemployed 76.6 44.8 96.7 88.6 8.1 8.3 
Employed  23.4 41.3 84.3 73.0 11.3 13.4 
Source: Housing Research in the Netherlands (WoON) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HA, HC and Y stand for housing allowance, housing cost and household net income 
respectively. Co-op stands for co-operative housing. For poverty rates based on 40% and 
50% of median income, see Table A.4 in Appendices. 
PR1: poverty rate when housing allowance is not provided and before housing cost 
payments.  
PR2: poverty rate when housing allowance is not provided and after housing cost payments. 
PR3: poverty rate when housing allowance is provided and after housing cost payments. 
 
Household Income Level   
Overall, lower-income tenants receiving the housing allowance experience more serious 
poverty problems compared to higher-income tenants receiving the housing allowance 
even when households do not pay for housing costs (PR1). In addition, housing cost-
related poverty seems to be severe for all tenants receiving the housing allowance; in 
particular, the poverty rate of the highest-income group increased sharply by more than 
70% after rent payments without housing allowance. However, the poverty rates of higher-
income groups have been reduced whereas the poverty rate of lower income-groups has 
changed little. This is because the improvement in residual income after housing cost was 
better for higher-income groups, whose income level is closer to the poverty threshold. 
Lower-income groups are at a disadvantage as their income poverty are more serious, but 
the changes in residual income after housing cost through housing allowance are less 
pronounced compared to higher-income groups. Therefore, the provision of the Dutch 
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housing allowance is more likely to help recipients with higher income escape from 
poverty and provide more resources for non-housing consumption after housing cost 
expenditures. 
  
Household Composition   
For all family types, the rent payment without housing allowance intensifies income 
problems, as the increase in poverty rates (from PR1 to PR2) indicates. Moreover, the rent 
cost expenditures without housing allowance triggers more severe housing cost-related 
poverty for the pensioner households compared to non-pensioner households. However, for 
both pensioner and non-pensioner households, the provision of housing allowance resulted 
in an increase in residual income after rents; this income increase is linked to the reduction 
in poverty rates. The poverty rate has decreased more for pensioners (11.4%p) than non-
pensioners (8.5%p for family with children and 5.5%p for family without children). This 
result relates to greater changes in residual income after rents through the housing 
allowance provision for pensioners. In addition, as pensioners have greater incomes 
compared to non-pensioners, it is much easier for the Dutch pensioner households to 
escape poverty and they would live with more non-housing good consumption to meet the 
standard of living.    
 
Tenant Tenure 
The housing cost payments are associated with living in poverty for all tenant households 
receiving the housing allowance because the poverty rate increases after housing cost 
expenditures. However, housing cost-related poverty is more serious for housing 
association or co-operative housing tenants than for public and private housing households. 
Moreover, the provision of housing allowance is less effective for reducing the poverty rate 
after the housing cost for housing association or co-operative housing tenants: The changes 
in poverty rates are smaller for them than for public and private housing households. Both 
the absolute and relative reductions in poverty rate are larger for private housing tenants 
who have experienced greater improvement in residual income after housing costs through 
housing allowance. However, private housing tenants receiving the housing allowance 
have greater incomes compared to other tenants receiving the housing allowance. 
Therefore, private tenant households benefit most in the Dutch rental housing market. With 
the housing cost subsidisation, these households are likely to experience more 
improvements in housing cost-related poverty and have more income for non-housing 
consumption than others.   
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Employment Status  
When the housing allowance is not provided to the tenants in a low-income household, the 
housing cost payments are likely to increase income problems for the unemployed because 
of their higher dependency on the housing allowance for housing cost payment (see Table 
5.4). Although the housing allowance improves their poverty, the poverty rate is still 
higher for unemployed households. These households are more likely to remain in the 
lower-income group compared to working households. On the contrary, both the absolute 
and relative reductions in poverty rates are larger for employed households that experience 
less improvement in residual income after rent through the provision of housing allowance. 
Therefore, even though they receive the financial support for housing costs, which 
contributes to their income problems, it is easier for working households with higher 
income to be relieved from the financial burden for housing cost payments and have more 
opportunity for non-housing good consumption related to the quality of living.  
 
Summary: Income Maintenance Improvement  
The Dutch housing allowance made contributions to income maintenance for low-income 
tenants. However, among the Dutch housing allowance beneficiaries, lower-income 
households are less likely to experience greater improvements in their residual income 
after rents as well as poverty rates than higher-income households. Although their self-
payment for rents might be lower than higher-income households, other factors (i.e. 
household type and actual rent costs) are also related to the results. Moreover, regardless of 
households‘ features, the receipt of the housing allowance is more effective for reducing 
poverty rates for households with higher income than households with lower income. Due 
to the significance of their original income poverty, it would not be easy to push their 
residual income after housing cost expenditures over the poverty line income even with 
financial subsidisation for housing costs.   
 
5.3.2 Housing Policy Object: Housing Affordability Improvement  
 
If the housing allowance system functions properly, the low-income household experiences 
a reduced financial burden for housing cost payments. In this respect, the result of income 
maintenance improvement in Section 5.3.1 indicates the effectiveness of the Dutch housing 
allowance as income support for housing costs. Another indicator presenting the financial 
burden on housing costs payment is the housing costs-to-income ratio (Rent to Income 
Ratio, RIR). As the housing allowance recipients are the poor or poorest households, their 
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financial resources for housing and non-housing consumption are more limited compared 
the better-off households. Therefore, the higher RIR also means more severe deprivation 
after housing cost payments for households living in poverty than for households not living 
in poverty. The Dutch housing allowance is likely to be effective for reducing housing 
affordability problems as the RIR of the housing allowance recipients fell from 44% to 
27.7% with the housing allowance provision. However, the housing affordability problem 
still exists for low-income households receiving the housing allowance in the Netherlands. 
 
Table 5.9 Changes in Rent to Income Ratio by Housing Allowance in the Netherlands (%) 
Total tenant with HA   Rent to Income Ratio Absolute change Relative change 
  without HA with HA (%p) (%) 
Mean  %(N) 44.0 27.7 16.3 36.0 
Total 100.0(7,124)     
Income Quintiles      
1st Q (low Y)  20.0(1,425)  53.2 33.9 19.3 34.3 
2nd Q  20.0(1,424)  45.2 28.1 17.1 36.9 
3rd Q  20.0(1,426)  43.4 26.7 16.8 37.9 
4th Q  20.0(1,425)  40.5 25.5 15.0 36.3 
5th Q(high Y)  20.0(1,424)  37.5 24.5 13.0 34.3 
 (F) (348.701***) (291.034***) (126.699***) (21.811***) 
Household Composition     
No children 29.3(2,088) 40.8 13.8 32.8 32.8 
With children 28.9(2,061) 51.0 20.2 38.9 38.9 
Pensioner 41.8(2,975) 41.3 15.2 36.2 36.2 
 (F) (468.641***) (188.313***) (395.763***) (117.189***) 
Tenant Tenure     
Public housing  0.4(32) 42.7 28.8 13.9 32.3 
Housing 
association  
or  Co-op 
93.5(6,662) 44.0 27.7 16.3 36.0 
Private  6.0(430) 43.5 27.5 15.9 35.5 
 (F) (0.509) (0.374) (1.711) (1.554) 
Employment Status     
Unemployed 76.6(5,454) 44.0 27.5 16.5 36.5 
Employed  23.4(1,670) 43.8 28.3 15.5 34.1 
 (t) (0.480) (-2.845**) (3.874***) (6.534***)  
Source: Housing Research in the Netherlands (WoON) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income respectively. Co-op 
stands for co-operative housing. RIR less than 20: A household does not have a housing 
affordability problem. RIR between 20 and 30: A household has a housing affordability 
problem. RIR over 30: A household has a severe housing affordability problem. *p <0.05 
**p <0.01 ***p <0.001 
 
Household Income Level  
The receipt of housing allowance reduced the low-income tenant households‘ financial 
burden for housing cost payments across all income groups. As Table 5.4 presented, the 
extent to which the housing allowance subsidises housing costs does not differ much 
across households. However, although the absolute reduction in RIR is greater for the 
lowest-income group, they still face more severe affordability problems associated with 
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housing costs (RIR over 30%) compared to others. In practice, the original RIR of the 
lowest-income group is higher than for other types of households. Concerning other 
income groups, the three middle-income groups have experienced greater relative 
reduction in RIR compared to the highest-income group as the extent to which housing 
allowance subsidises housing cost is better for these three groups than the higher-income 
group. Therefore, the housing allowance reduces the housing costs burden more effectively 
for the middle-income groups for whom housing costs are more subsidised by the housing 
allowance.  
 
Household Composition   
Without the housing allowance provision, the housing cost payment places a severe 
financial burden on both pensioner and non-pensioner households (RIR over 40%). Thus, 
the non-housing good consumption for living would be limited for them after housing cost 
expenditures. However, the receipt of the housing allowance decreases RIR for all 
households by more than half. Among the three family types, the effect of the housing 
allowance on RIR reduction is greater for families with children, for which both the 
absolute and relative decreases in RIR are higher. In terms of the income maintenance 
analysis (see Section 5.3.1), due to the higher financial burden for housing costs, the 
improvement in residual income after rents is lower for households with children compared 
to other households. However, when considering only the RIR change, the higher 
subsidisation of housing costs by housing allowance could reduce their RIR more than for 
childless households and pensioner households. Therefore, the Dutch housing allowance is 
likely to be more helpful and effective in improving the housing affordability of low-
income families with children rather than other families.  
 
Tenant Tenure  
Regardless of tenancy types and the housing allowance receipt, the housing cost 
expenditures place a similar financial burden on three tenant groups, as there are no 
statistically significant differences in RIRs. However, all tenant groups faced a housing 
affordability problem even after they received housing allowances (RIR around 27-29%). 
Moreover, the findings indicated no significant differences in either the absolute or relative 
changes of RIR by the provision of housing allowance. Indeed, although differences exist 
in rent payments and the size of housing allowance provision among tenant groups, their 
housing costs are relatively similarly subsidised due to the same benefit rules for all 
tenancy types if other conditions are not considered.  
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Employment Status  
The Dutch housing allowance contributes to the reduction of RIR for both the unemployed 
and the employed households, although both still have a housing affordability problem 
(RIR around 28%) when they receive housing allowances. The housing allowance is likely 
to reduce the financial burden for housing costs of workless rather than working 
households because the housing costs of the former is relatively more subsidised compared 
to the latter. Therefore, the improvement in RIR is better for out-of-work households than 
working households. Thus, the provision of housing allowance increases housing 
affordability more effectively for the unemployed than the employed among the low-
income tenants receiving the housing allowance. However, as Section 5.3.1 demonstrated, 
the housing allowance leads to a lower poverty rate but greater changes in poverty rates for 
working households compared to workless households. Therefore, although the housing 
allowance is more likely to reduce RIR of unemployed households, they do not benefit 
from preserving financial resources for non-housing goods consumption. This finding is 
captured from using both residual income and ratio measures in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the housing allowance.  
 
Based on these results one general point becomes clear: The Dutch housing allowances are 
likely to improve housing affordability problems by reducing financial burdens for housing 
costs. Moreover, the housing allowance is more effective for reducing this problem for 
households in which the housing cost subsidisation rate is higher. However, the Dutch 
housing allowance could not remove housing affordability problems from all households 
receiving the housing allowance. Some households still have problems affording their rents 
when the housing allowance subsidises their payments.  
 
5.3.3 Housing Allowance as a Work Incentive or Disincentive Booster  
 
The findings in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 indicate that the Dutch housing allowance focuses 
on solving low-income households‘ income and housing problems by subsidising housing 
costs. Regarding the working poor, housing allowance as in-work benefit allows them to 
manage their household budget, thereby reducing their resistance to participation in 
welfare-to-work programmes (Feeny et al., 2012; Verma & Hendra, 2003; Van Ryzin et 
al., 2003). However, as the income increase by the take-up of housing allowance 
supplements non-earned income, it decreases people‘s incentives to work. Moreover, as 
Kalb (2003) noted, the more generous income support benefit is related to the less work 
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incentives. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the extent to which the provision of 
housing allowances is associated with work incentive changes. Here, I examine two work 
disincentive indicators: the Income Replacement Ratio (IRR), which shows the potential of 
falling into the unemployment trap, and the Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR), which 
indicates the possibility of being in the poverty trap (see Table 5.3).  
 
These two indicators address different income and labour participation situations and the 
target of the analysis varies by each indicator. Among working-age households, only 
working households are included in the analysis of IRR while both working and workless 
households are included in the EMTR analysis (see Figure 3.2). Therefore, I will have 
more households (size=5,613) for the EMTR analysis than for the IRR analysis 
(size=1,846) of housing allowance recipients. The IRR and EMTR are calculated with the 
income changes based on the interaction between social security and tax contribution. The 
parameters and equations for income tax, tax credits and national insurance contributions 
of the Netherlands from OECD Taxing Wages Books (OECD, 2007, 2008b) and the 
Netherlands‘ country information files of the OECD Benefits and Wages20 are used for the 
IRR and EMTR analysis. Again, the tax and benefit rules used for the analysis are not the 
current ones, but those of the reference year of the WoOn 2006 survey.  
 
As Table 5.10 presents, the Dutch working-aged tenants—both recipients and non-
recipients of the housing allowance—could preserve 30% of their marginally increased 
earnings when they accept a new job or work extra hours. However, the EMTR has been 
higher for tenants with the housing allowance than for tenants without it. As explained in 
Chapter 3, a higher EMTR shows that the working household reaps smaller financial 
rewards for extra participation in work (Hulse & Randolph, 2004; Wood et al., 2005). 
Therefore, recipients of the housing allowance face fewer incentives to work due to a 
smaller financial reward when they increase their labour force participation. A higher IRR 
means that a larger share of household income has been replaced by the social security 
benefit when the main wage earner is unemployed, i.e. greater work disincentive. Unlike 
the EMTR results, the potential to stop working and accept unemployment is likely to be 
smaller for working tenants who are receiving the housing allowance. The IRR indicates 
the generosity of welfare benefits for the unemployed (Hulse & Randolph, 2004). The 
                                                 
20
 For detail, see OECD Social Policies and Data, Benefits and Wages: Country Specific Information internet 
site (http://www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/benefitsandwagescountryspecificinformation.htm).  
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disincentive to work is weaker for working tenants who are receiving the housing 
allowance (IRR is 68.7%) compared to those who are not (IRR is 79.7%). 
 
Table 5.10 Work Disincentives of Housing Allowance Recipients and Non-Recipients in 
the Netherlands (%) 
 Total tenant 
(Working-aged)  
Tenant without HA Tenant with HA 
t 
Mean (N=10,648) (N=5,035) (N=5,613)  
EMTR 68.0 48.9 85.1 -90.544*** 
 Total tenant 
(Working-aged & Employed)  
Tenant without HA Tenant with HA  
 (N=7,909) (N=6,063) (N=1,846)  
IRR 77.2 79.7 68.7 34.297*** 
Source: Housing Research in the Netherlands (WoON) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HA stands for housing allowance. *p <0.05 **p<0.01 ***p <0.001 
 
However, this research does not report on the changes in labour activity participation 
caused by the shift in work disincentive according to the take-up of housing allowance. 
Moreover, studies have pointed out that family‘s demographic characteristics or tenancy 
types influence the transition from welfare to work (Blundell et al., 2000; Chen, 2006; 
Hulse & Saugeres, 2008; Wood et al., 2009) in addition to the financial reward from the 
increase in earned income. Although some studies examined the positive relationship 
between housing cost subsidy programme and employment outcome (e.g. Nagle, 2003; 
Verma & Hendra, 2003), the effects of housing allowance on its beneficiaries‘ labour 
market participation is not within the scope of this research. Here, the analysis focuses on 
whether the housing allowance provision changes the incentive to work in different types 
of households.  
 
In the remainder of this section, I will address the change in work incentive by the 
provision of housing allowance for low-income recipients of the housing allowance.  
 
5.3.3.1 Income Replacement Ratio: Unemployment Trap  
 
The Income Replacement Ratio (IRR) concerns the income supplement by housing 
allowance for the working poor. The working poor are eligible for housing allowance take-
up until their incomes reach a level that brings them out of welfare dependency. In 
addition, when these households participate in a welfare-to-work programme, the housing 
allowance helps them maintain their household incomes at a certain level when they 
become unemployed. As pointed out in Chapter 2, the provision of housing allowance is 
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important for maintaining low-income households‘ non-housing consumption. The issue is 
the ratio of the possible income to be topped up with welfare benefits to employment 
income, i.e. IRR. A high IRR indicates a lower work incentive. Thus, generous welfare 
benefit system would have a negative effect on encouraging welfare-to-work transition 
(Hulse & Randolph, 2004). Therefore, from the beneficiaries‘ point of view, it would be 
better to receive this benefit constantly, regardless of their employment status. However, 
from the government‘s perspective, this benefit provision is likely to reduce work 
incentives due to increases in IRR by the housing allowance provision. As mentioned 
before, we cannot discuss the employment outcome according to the change in work 
incentive by housing allowance provision, although we can find the difference in IRR 
changes among different household types. 
 
Table 5.11 Changes in Income Replacement Ratio by Housing Allowance in the 
Netherlands (%) 
Total tenant with HA 
(Working-aged & Employed) 
IRR1 
(without HA) 
IRR2 
(with HA) 
Absolute change 
IRR1-IRR2 (%p) 
Relative change 
IRR1-IRR2 (%) 
Mean  %(N) 63.2 68.7 5.5 10.0 
Total 100.0(1,846)     
Income Quintiles      
1stQ(low Y) 20.0(369) 60.1 66.8 6.7 14.2 
2ndQ 23.6(436) 57.7 64.6 6.9 12.6 
3rdQ 17.1(315) 62.1 66.5 4.5 8.6 
4thQ 19.3(357) 67.7 71.7 4.1 6.4 
5thQ(high Y) 20.0(369) 69.6 74.4 4.8 7.3 
 (F) (58.019***) (38.627**) (58.456***) (48.865***) 
Household Composition     
No children 40.8(753) 61.0 68.3 7.3 13.8 
With children 59.2(1,093) 64.8 69.0 4.2 7.3 
 (t) (-5.707***) (-1.034)  (18.180***) (12.784***) 
Tenant Tenure      
Housing association 
or Co-op  
88.8(1,639) 62.9 68.2 5.3 9.9 
Private  11.2(207) 65.9 72.5 6.6 11.1 
 (t) (-3.147**) (-4.363***) (-4.042***) (-1.710) 
Employment Status      
All in work 68.2(1,259) 64.8 70.4 5.6 10.2 
Some in work  31.8(587) 59.9 65.1 5.2 9.6 
 (t) (7.380***) (8.385***) (2.992**) (1.590) 
Source: Housing Research in the Netherlands (WoON) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income respectively. Co-op 
stands for co-operative housing. *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 
 
Household Income Level  
As Table 5.11 presents, regardless of whether the low-income working tenant receives the 
housing allowance, the work incentive to maintain the current employment is smaller for 
higher-income households. As higher-income households have higher IRR1 and IRR2, 
they can maintain their incomes during unemployment at the rate of nearly 70% of their 
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employment income. However, it is more beneficial for lower-income households to 
receive the housing allowance for income maintenance compared to higher-income 
households. Whilst the IRR has increased by 14.2% for the lowest-income group after 
receiving the housing allowance, it has increased only by 7.3% for the highest-income 
group. Lower-income households need housing allowances to maintain their incomes at 
times of unemployment because of their lower IRRs. Therefore, the housing allowance as 
in-work benefit is negatively related to the work incentive improvement and is of a greater 
concern for lower-income households in the welfare-to-work programme.   
 
Household Composition  
The receipt of housing allowance is more likely to increase work disincentive for working 
households without children than for working households with children. Whilst the IRR is 
lower (i.e. less work disincentive) for childless families (61%) compared to families with 
children (64.8%) before housing allowance provision, IRRs of both groups are similar 
(around 69%) after housing allowance take-up. This indicates that the effects of the 
housing allowance on the absolute and relative work incentive changes are larger for 
working families without children than for working families with children. Accordingly, 
when members of a household are unemployed, the provision of housing allowance is 
more likely to improve households‘ income maintenance for families without children than 
for families with children. This might be linked to the tendency of the Dutch housing 
allowance scheme to favour the small or single-person households for their benefit rates.  
 
However, although the negative effect of housing allowance on work incentive is larger for 
families without children than for families with children, we cannot project a worse 
employment outcome only for families without children with this result. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, families with children that depend on the welfare benefit are less likely to enter 
the labour force compared to families without children, even when the work incentives are 
similar. They need to consider ‗opportunity cost‘ of increased earnings, (losing welfare 
benefit for childcare and finding childcare service while working). Moreover, as Owens 
and Baum (2009) noted, there is a risk of households earning too much to be eligible for 
the housing allowance. This risk would be most serious for families with children 
compared to other family types due to their higher housing costs. Therefore, drawing the 
comprehensive picture of employment outcome that is based only on the changes in work 
incentive in terms of the different effects of the housing allowance has its limitations. 
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Tenant Tenure  
Regardless of housing allowance provision, the private housing tenants among the working 
poor receiving the housing allowance face a smaller work incentive due to the higher IRR 
compared to other tenant households. However, the findings did not show statistically 
significant differences between tenant groups in the increase in work disincentive by 
housing allowance provision—approximately 10% for both tenure groups—although the 
absolute difference in the IRR changes between private and housing association housing 
tenants has been noted. The provision of a housing allowance is more likely to help private 
housing tenants with their income maintenance at the time of employment. However, the 
provision of housing allowance might not affect the income replacement of all tenant 
groups in the same way when they change their employment status.  
 
Therefore, there is little relationship between the receipt of the housing allowance and the 
decrease in work incentive by tenant tenure in the Netherlands. This result is similar to the 
result from Sweden (see Chapter 6). Sweden and the Netherlands have the unitary housing 
regime but the UK has a dualist one. Moreover, some studies found differences in 
employment outcome between private and public tenants receiving housing allowance in 
Australia due to the varied arrangements of housing subsidy programmes that are based on 
tenant tenure (Feeny et al., 2010; Hulse & Randolph, 2004; Wood et al., 2005; Wood et 
al., 2009). Although the discussion is limited to these countries, this different result is 
related to the features of the unitary rental housing system and the arrangement of housing 
allowance that does not discriminate tenant tenure for the benefit provision. It could 
therefore be said that the characteristic of housing allowance system based on tenant tenure 
changes the incentive to work.    
 
Employment Status  
Among the working poor receiving the housing allowance, households with two adult 
workers have smaller work incentive compared to households with one adult worker, 
regardless of housing allowance receipt. However, for both working groups, the housing 
allowance tends to increase their IRRs similarly (around 10%), as with different tenancy 
groups. In other words, the negative effect of housing allowance provision on the increase 
of work disincentive is similar for all working groups. The changes in IRR by housing 
allowance are also important for the working poor because the extent of income 
replacement is tied to the outcome of income maintenance without generating any earnings. 
In addition, the IRRs of both working household groups also increase by about 10%.  
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Therefore, it might be reasonable to conclude that the provision of the housing allowance 
is linked to the work incentive reduction (i.e. greater potential for falling into the 
unemployment trap) for beneficiaries of the Dutch housing allowance. Moreover, although 
work incentive and its changes by housing allowance take-up differ across family types, 
the results are similar for both private and public housing tenants. However, it should not 
be concluded that households with lower IRR or smaller change in IRR by housing 
allowance provision have better employment outcomes. While some households have 
stronger work incentives compared to others, their family characteristics could prevent 
them from working steadily. The increase in IRR indicates the reverse effect of income 
supplement by housing allowance take-up on the working poor. This is where the 
government‘s policy goals clash. The resolution of this clash will enhance the effectiveness 
of housing allowance as in-work benefit. 
 
5.3.3.2 Effective Marginal Tax Rate: Poverty Trap      
 
The second work incentive indicator is the Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR), which 
indicates the extent to which households can preserve their increased earnings after tax and 
benefit contribution. When households‘ earnings increase marginally (by 1 income unit) 
and recipients can take most of this money home, it might provide greater financial reward 
for participation in work, i.e. the lower the EMTR, the stronger the work incentive  
(Hulse & Randolph, 2004; Wood et al., 2005). When household income rises, the 
availability of housing allowance drops, thereby affecting the stability of the working 
poor‘s housing (Owens & Baum, 2009). Although the increased earned income would 
supplement their incomes, housing costs are the largest and most inflexible element of low-
income households‘ budget, as noted in Chapter 2. Therefore, from the point of view of 
benefit recipients, the provision of housing allowance is important for the working poor 
when their earnings reach a certain level. However, as explained in Chapter 3, the financial 
reward for labour force participation is the outcome of the interaction between social 
security benefit and tax contribution by income changes. Throughout this process, the take-
up or non-take-up of housing allowance could create differences in household income and 
therefore affect EMTR (Wood et al., 2005).  
 
If there are no changes in EMTR, the housing allowance has little effect on work 
incentives. In contrast, if the provision of the housing allowance changes the work 
incentive, the housing allowance should be considered in terms of the welfare-to-work 
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transition due to the change in possibility of the poverty trap for the working poor. As 
Table 5.12 presents, the findings indicate a greater potential for the poverty trap in the 
form of a lower work incentive when households receive their housing allowances, 
although the differences in EMTRs according to the housing allowance provision are quite 
limited. However, as mentioned in the analysis of IRR, this research does not project the 
labour activity changes of housing allowance recipients with the outcome of EMTR. The 
discussion has weaknesses when the employment outcome relates only to the work 
incentive. Instead, this study examines the variation in EMTR and the effect of housing 
allowance on the changes in EMTR by household types.   
 
Table 5.12 Changes in Effective Marginal Tax Rate by Housing Allowance in the 
Netherlands (%) 
Total tenant with HA 
(Working-aged) 
EMTR1 
(without HA) 
EMTR2 
(with HA) 
Absolute change  
EMTR1-EMTR2 
(%p) 
Relative change  
EMTR1-EMTR2 
(%) 
Mean  %(N) 83.7 85.1 1.4 3.4 
Total 100.0(5,613)     
Income Quintiles     
1stQ(low Y) 20.1(1,129) 84.7 84.9 0.2 0.4 
2ndQ 19.9(1,115) 86.6 86.9 0.4 0.9 
3rdQ 28.9(1,620) 93.9 94.5 0.6 1.6 
4thQ 11.2(630) 89.2 89.4 0.3 0.7 
5thQ(high Y) 19.9(1,119) 61.7 67.4 5.7 13.0 
 (F) (223.179***) (157.713***) (146.366***) (109.553***) 
Household Composition     
No children 55.2(3,099) 86.7 87.2 0.6 1.5 
With children 44.8(2,514) 79.9 82.4 2.5 5.7 
 (t) (8.054***) (5.980***) (-9.807***) (-8.317***) 
Tenant Tenure      
Housing Association 
or Co-op  
91.4(5,133) 84.0 85.5 1.5 3.4 
Private  8.6(480) 79.9 81.0 1.1 2.7 
 (t) (2.619**) (2.919**) (1.208) (0.930) 
Employment Status      
Unemployed 66.4(3,725) 92.0 92.0 0.0 0.0 
Employed 33.6(1,888) 67.2 71.4 4.3 10.1 
 (t)  (28.114***) (23.761***) (-16.203***) (-14.701***) 
Source: Housing Research in the Netherlands (WoON) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income respectively. Co-op 
stands for co-operative housing. *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 
 
Household Income Level    
When low-income recipients of the housing allowance accept a job or work overtime, the 
work incentive is greater for higher-income compared to lower-income households. 
Although the higher-income households could take 30-40% of the marginally increased 
income home, it could be less than 15% for lower-income households. Therefore, housing 
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allowance recipients who have higher incomes are less likely to remain in poverty 
compared to households with lower income. However, across all income groups, the 
EMTR increases with the provision of the housing allowance. In addition, the increase in 
EMTR is larger for higher-income households compared to lower-income households. The 
extent of the marginally increased income decreases more for higher-income households. 
Therefore, the negative effect of the housing allowance on the work incentive is more 
serious for higher-income groups, even though their EMTRs are lower.   
 
Household Composition  
The levels of EMTRs and EMTR changes by the housing allowance provision are not 
consistent with those of IRRs for families with and without children. When a household‘s 
labour force participation increases, the likelihood of falling into the poverty trap is higher 
for families without children, whilst the changes in EMTR by the housing allowance is 
lower for these families compared to families with children. Households without children 
could take around 15% of the marginal income increase home. For families with children, 
the comparable figure is around 20%. However, families with children are more likely to 
be reluctant to increase their labour participation even when there is similar or higher work 
incentive for them compared to other family types, as noted in Chapter 2. In addition, the 
negative effects of the Dutch housing allowance on work incentive are more serious for 
families with children compared to families without children. The reduction of work 
incentives by the provision of housing allowance is smaller for families without children. 
Whilst the relative increase in EMTR by housing allowance is only 1.5% for families 
without children, it is 6% for families with children. Therefore, the negative effect of 
housing allowance on work incentive changes (i.e. the increase in the likelihood of being 
trapped in poverty) is larger for families with children because of the lower take-home pay 
from the marginal income increase. Although this research does not examine the difference 
in the employment outcome according to family types, it is expected that households with 
children are at a disadvantage for welfare-to-work transition when it comes to the financial 
incentive to increase labour force participation.  
 
Tenant Tenure  
Regardless of housing allowance take-up, tenants of housing associations or co-operative 
housing are more likely to fall into the poverty trap due to their higher EMTRs (around 
85%) than are private renters, although both groups' EMTRs are high. However, the 
difference in the changes in EMTR by housing allowance was not statistically significant. 
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The effect of the housing allowance on work disincentive change did not differ between 
social and private housing tenants. Although the housing allowance provision itself results 
in a negative effect by boosting the work disincentive, the findings from both the IRR and 
EMTR analyses indicated that the effectiveness of the housing allowance is not different 
across tenancy groups in the Netherlands. This result is comparable to the results of work 
incentive changes in Australia and the UK (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 4) where different 
rules of housing allowance provision are applied to private and public tenants in the dualist 
rental housing system. However, the Dutch housing allowance system, which applies the 
same rule to different tenant groups, could be related to the lack of difference in the effects 
of housing allowance on work incentives. Therefore, when considering only tenant types, 
the decrease in housing allowance provision for working-aged recipients might reduce the 
work disincentive for all types of tenants.  
 
Employment Status 
Whether low-income households receive housing allowances or not, out-of-work 
households face higher EMTRs (more than 90%) compared to working households (around 
70%). Therefore, working households are likely to reap more financial rewards from the 
marginally increased incomes (30% per 1 income unit increase) compared to out-of-work 
households (less than 10% per 1 income unit increase), indicating that working households 
have a greater work incentive. Even when members of low-income workless households 
get a job or enter work-related programmes, they are likely to remain in poverty because 
their increase in marginal income is smaller; thus, there might be fewer work incentives for 
out-of-work families than for working families. However, whilst the provision of the 
housing allowance increases EMTR for working households, it does not increase EMTR 
for workless households. Therefore, it seems that the Dutch housing allowance intensifies 
work disincentives for working households.  
 
However, we do not project that the employment outcome of out-of-work households is 
worse compared to working households due to their lower work incentives and we do not 
conclude that the provision of housing allowance discourages working households from 
increasing their labour participation. As discussed in Chapter 2, other elements such as 
family characteristics and labour market status have effects on the choice of employment, 
although the financial reward from labour activity is regarded as an important element in 
the welfare-to-work transition. The result of this research suggests the varied effects of 
housing allowance on the work disincentive indicators by a household‘s employment status. 
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The housing allowance does not increase a disincentive to work for out-of-work 
households. The effects of the housing allowance related to changes in work disincentive 
are more important compared to in-work benefits for working households.  
 
Summary: Housing Allowance as Work Incentive or Disincentive Booster  
The problem with the work disincentive is the likely contribution of housing allowance to 
income maintenance for low-income tenants. Studies have noted the different effects of a 
housing allowance on employment outcomes. However, although the employment 
outcome of housing allowance recipients is not the concern of this research, this study 
found the negative effects of housing allowance on work incentives for the working poor in 
the Netherlands. Moreover, this study revealed differences in changes in work incentive by 
housing allowance according to household features. The housing allowance is found to 
have the greatest negative effects on higher-income households that are more likely to 
escape welfare dependency. Considering the financial burdens of working families with 
children, such as childcare expenses or higher housing costs, the households with a greater 
work disincentive are at a disadvantage, as noted in Chapter 2. In contrast, private and 
public tenants do not seem to differ in work disincentives and changes in work 
disincentives by housing allowance. This could be related to the characteristics of the 
Dutch housing regime and housing allowance system. Although the work incentive for the 
working poor is an important element, it is not the only one affecting the employment 
outcome. Therefore, this research does not claim that the better outcome of work 
incentives by certain household types indicates better employment outcome. The 
employment outcome, according to the varied effects of housing allowance will be left for 
further studies.   
 
 
5.4 Summary 
 
 
The Dutch housing allowance works as a housing cost subsidy for low-income tenant 
households. With the housing allowance as income support, low-income tenants‘ financial 
burden for housing cost expenditures decreased by 36%. This reduced spending on housing 
costs contributes to the improvement of income maintenance after housing cost 
expenditures, raising the likelihood of escaping poverty and the increasing non-housing 
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consumption. Therefore, the housing allowance provision is a very important factor in 
improving the finances of low-income households in the Netherlands.  
 
However, the provision of housing allowance does not always improve the income 
maintenance and housing affordability for households that obtain greater benefit generosity 
(e.g. lower-income families or smaller households) because the housing allowance 
arrangement considers the individual family‘s features as a whole. At the same time, the 
income maintenance of these lower-income households is not better compared to that of 
other households. Indeed, the reduction in poverty rate by the housing allowance take-up is 
better for higher-income households, regardless of other family characteristics. Although 
benefit rates within the Dutch housing allowance scheme do not differ according to the 
claimant‘s employment status, the housing allowance is more likely to contribute to 
income maintenance as well as housing affordability for unemployed households compared 
to employed households. Moreover, the improvement in income maintenance and housing 
affordability is similar for all tenancy groups because the Dutch housing allowance system 
applies the uniform rule to all households, regardless of tenant type.  
 
In addition, the provision of housing allowance is likely to weaken the work incentive for 
the working poor recipients of the housing allowance in the Netherlands. This problem 
initially relates to the housing allowance‘s contribution to income maintenance. Working 
low-income households can choose unemployment and dependency on social security 
benefits instead of earning income combined with in-work benefits. The take-up of 
housing allowance is likely to expand this possible work disincentive in the Netherlands. 
Moreover, the provision of housing allowance is likely to reduce work incentive due to the 
decreased take-home income. Here, we need to focus on the differences in work incentives 
and the effects of housing allowance on work incentive change according to family types, 
especially family composition and employment status as well as similarities among tenant 
tenure groups.  
 
Considering these results, this research suggests that the form of the housing allowance 
provision should be differentiated according to the characteristics of the working-poor 
families in order to achieve the policy objectives. The results should not be interpreted to 
mean the withdrawal of housing allowance provision in order to increase work incentives 
or to encourage welfare-to-work transition for the working poor. As the Dutch housing 
allowance is within the scope of a housing policy rather than income or labour policy, the 
 127 
effect of the housing allowance in the work disincentive needs to be discussed in light of 
interrelated policy objectives. This explains why the housing allowance must be addressed 
in relation to the entire welfare system.  
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Chapter 6. The Effectiveness of Housing Allowance for Tenants in 
Sweden 
 
 
Introduction  
The Swedish housing allowance system has the long history of policy development. There 
are three different housing allowance schemes that are based on type of family (i.e. 
families with children, young people (18-28 years old) without children and pensioners). 
As benefit rates are calculated differently according to claimant characteristics in terms of 
household incomes, housing costs and number of children within each housing allowance 
scheme, the current benefit forms are more various and complicated than those in the other 
three countries. This chapter focuses on this compositional feature and effectiveness of the 
Swedish housing allowance system. First, I will look at the background of the Swedish 
housing allowance system and its design. Subsequently, I will analyse the effectiveness of 
the housing allowance in improving income maintenance, housing affordability and work 
incentives for low-income tenants who receive a housing allowance.    
 
 
6.1. The Development of National Support for Housing Costs in Sweden 
 
 
The introduction of the Swedish housing allowance dates to the 1930s. In 1936, the 
Swedish government introduced ‗family grants‘ to provide financial support for housing 
costs for families with children. This initial form of housing allowance for families was a 
means-tested benefit and the eligibility was limited only to families with at least three 
children who were living in rental housing. In addition, the rental housing had to meet 
certain minimum standards of housing quality, such as floor space and equipment. 
However, as the government developed the social security system, the provision of housing 
allowance expanded to include other families (i.e. homeowner households in 1938 and 
pensioner households in 1946). Unlike ‗family grant‘, the housing allowance for 
pensioners was a benefit from the local government that determined rules and decisions for 
the aid (Åhren, 2007). Moreover, the family grant was replaced by ‗Housing Allowance for 
families with children‘ in 1948. However, the eligibility of this benefit still limited as the 
families with one child or living in housings built before 1948 were not allowed to claim 
this benefit.  
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Although the shortage of housing buildings was tackled by the national housing supply, 
housing-related problems still remained for low-income households (Åhren, 2007). 
Therefore, the government started to change benefit rules of the housing allowance system.  
The minimum standard of housing quality under the housing allowance scheme was 
abolished in 1972
21
. It has been criticised that the standard of housing quality for housing 
allowance eligibility prevented low-income households from receiving the housing 
allowance because they were unable to afford to live in dwellings that met the minimum 
qualifying housing standards. Additionally, the calculation of the housing allowance 
provision changed. While the former scheme was based on household incomes and their 
needs for housing, the new calculation depended on the number of children, housing 
condition and housing cost expenditures. Moreover, the total housing allowance provision 
reflected household income and was reduced as household incomes increased. However, 
whilst housing allowances for families with children and pensioners have a long history in 
the social security system, families without children were not eligible for this benefit until 
1974. Households without children were able to receive housing allowance only from 
1974-1986 and 1991-1997. In addition, since the 1996-1997 reforms, childless families 
aged 29 years old and older were excluded from benefit eligibility (ibid).  
 
The current form of the Swedish housing allowance administered by the state agency was 
established in the 1990s. In 1995, the local government‘s housing allowance for pensioner 
households was replaced by the housing allowance administered by the central government 
and the same rules were applicable nationwide. Moreover, significant changes in housing 
allowances for families were introduced during the 1996-1997 reforms (Chen & ÖST, 
2005) to improve control of benefit administration and reduce the government‘s 
expenditure for the housing allowance. Although the benefit rates have slightly changed, 
the following are the main rules of the 1997 reform that are currently applied to the benefit 
claim. First, there could be differences in the preliminary housing allowance calculated 
based on the estimated household income for the following 12 months and the final 
allowance calculated once the assessed taxable income for the year is finally decided. The 
difference between the preliminary and final allowance should be repaid to the government 
or beneficiary. Second, different income limits are applied according to household type. 
Third, the expenditure for floor space that exceeds the space limit of the housing allowance 
                                                 
21
 However, because of the 1997 reform, eligible floor space limits were reintroduced and these standards 
are currently applicable according to the number of children.   
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does not qualify for eligible housing costs. Fourth, households without children aged 29 
years and older are not eligible for the housing allowance.  
 
In 2010, almost 180,000 non-pensioner households (4% of total households in Sweden) 
received the housing allowance for families with children and young families without 
children. And 4.4% of total population received housing allowance for pensioner (Housing 
Supplement) in 2008. However, the numbers of all housing allowance recipients (i.e. 
families with children, young families without children and pensioners) have deceased 
since the late 1990s (The Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2010a). 
 
Table 6.1 Non-Pensioner Households Receiving Housing Allowance in Sweden 
Year Households with 
children(a) 
Households without 
children(b) 
Sum (a+b) (a+b) as % of  
All households in Sweden 
 (000s) (000s) (000s) (%) 
2000 227 41 268 6.1 
2001 204 34 238 5.4 
2002 191 33 224 5.0 
2003 179 34 213 4.8 
2004 176 37 214 4.9 
2005 177 42 219 4.9 
2006 170 41 212 4.7 
2007 160 38 198 4.4 
2008 147 33 180 4.0 
2009 141 33 174 3.8 
2010 143 40 183 3.9 
Source: The Swedish Social Insurance Agency, Statistics and Analysis, Housing Allowance, 
internet site
22
. 
 
Among pensioner recipients, the number of female pensioners who receive housing 
supplements is still more than twice the number of male pensioners. This finding relates to 
the lower pension income for women; therefore, they need more financial support for 
housing costs compared to male pensioner (ibid). 
 
  
                                                 
22
 For URL, see Internet Sites in Bibliography. 
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Figure 6.1 Pensioners Receiving Housing Supplement as a % of Total Pensioners in 
Sweden (2008)   
 
 
 
Source: The Swedish Social Insurance Agency (2010a), p. 60. 
  
 
6.2 The Design of Housing Allowance for Tenants in Sweden  
 
 
The Swedish housing allowance system has three different schemes according to family 
composition: Housing Allowance for families with children, Housing Allowance for young 
people (aged 18-28) without children and Housing Supplements for Pensioners
23
. For all 
three types of housing allowances, the level of household income, family composition and 
size of housing cost expenditures may changes the housing allowance provision (The 
Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2008, 2010b, 2012a). 
 
6.2.1 Housing Allowance for Families with Children   
 
The housing allowance for families with children is paid to single parents with children, 
married or co-habiting couples with children younger than 18 years old. Under this housing 
allowance scheme, both tenant and homeowner can claim the housing allowance for their 
housing cost expenditures. If a family lives in rental housing, the rent, heating and any 
management fees that are part of the rent are eligible for housing allowance claim. If a 
family lives in a co-operative housing, annual fees to the co-operative, including heating 
and other fees, are subject to the eligible housing cost. Concerning homeowners, property 
tax, 70% of the site leasehold fee, heating and other running expenses are calculated 
                                                 
23
 The Swedish Social Insurance Agency administers housing allowances for families with children and 
without children and recipients of sickness or activity compensation. The Swedish Pensioner Agency 
administers housing allowances for other pensioners (e.g. old-age pensioners) (The Swedish Social Insurance 
Agency, 2011). 
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according to a special formula and 70% of interest expenses on housing loans are eligible 
for housing allowance (The Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2012a). 
 
Concerning low-income families with children, the important determinants that affect the 
housing allowance provision are the size of family (i.e. the number of children) and 
household income. These criteria are applied because the maximum housing allowance (up 
to the benefit cap), the standard of income threshold for benefit entitlement, floor space 
eligibility for housing allowance and the benefit reduction from the maximum allowance 
vary according to these two features of each family. Of note, the benefit cap, income 
threshold and floor space limit are lager for families with more children compared to 
families with fewer children (The Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2012a). 
 
Table 6.2 Housing Allowance Arrangement for Non-Pensioner Household in Sweden 
Benefit arrangement  Number of children 
 (units) 0 1 2 3 
Maximum HA  (SEK/month) 1,000 2,600 3,200 4,000 
 <Adult>      
Income for  
maximum  
HA provision  
single 
(a) 
(SEK/year) 42,800 117,000 117,000 117,000 
couple 
(b) 
(SEK/year 
/person) 
58,000 58,500 58,500 58,500 
        
Income 
limit 
for  
eligibility 
If all adults' 
income is 
more than (a) 
per annum 
single  (SEK/year) 77,000 247,500 292,500 349,500 
If one adult's 
income is 
more than (b) 
per annum 
couple (SEK/year) 94,000 306,000 351,500 408,000 
       
Taper  (%) 33 20 20 20 
       
Floor space limit*  (㎡) 60 80 100 120 
       
Subsidisation rate for 
eligible housing cost 
75% of (SEK/month) 1,800- 
2,600 
2,000-
3,000 
2,000-
3,300 
2,000-
3,600 
50% of (SEK/month) 2,600- 
3,600 
3,000-
5,300 
3,300-
5,900 
3,600-
6,600 
Source: Chen & ÖST (2005) p. 611; The Swedish Social Insurance Agency (2008, 2012a). 
Note: *housing allowance for young people without children aged 18-28. Maximum floor 
space for one child is 80㎡ and increases by 20㎡ per additional child up to five or more 
(the maximum is 160㎡); household income is calculated based on estimated taxable 
income
24
 for the calendar year, income from capital and income from abroad, 80% of 
student grants and 15% of net economic wealth in excess of SEK 100,000 is added to 
income.  
                                                 
24
 Here, ‗taxable income‘ means an income from employment and business minus general social security 
contributions, basic deductions and deductions for marine income according the definition of Statistics 
Sweden (The Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2012a).  
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The amount of eligible housing costs for the housing allowance provision is assessed 
according to benefit rules and the fixed amount of the child grant, which is based on a 
claimant‘s household composition. Then the number of children and the level of housing 
cost expenditure are added to eligible housing costs. In the next step, the available amount 
of allowance is determined as follows: If the claimant‘s estimated income is below the 
income standard for the maximum housing allowance (a and b in Table 6.2), the sum of 
assessed housing expenditure and child grants are paid to the claimant; if the claimant‘s 
income exceeds this threshold, 20% of the difference between household income and 
income standard for the maximum housing allowance is deducted from the maximum 
housing allowance.  
 
While the benefit rates and calculations are complicated, these rules consider different 
housing needs and family incomes (Åhren, 2007; Chen & ÖST, 2005; The Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency, 2012a). the housing allowance provision based on the this calculation is 
regarded as the preliminary housing allowance imputed with estimated incomes for the 
calendar year or years for which a household is applying. The final housing allowance is 
determined at the end of the final taxation. Therefore, if there are differences between a 
preliminary and final housing allowance, recipients must either repay or will receive the 
difference (The Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2008, 2012a). 
 
6.2.2 Housing Allowance for Young People without Children  
 
The housing allowance for young people without children reflects the smaller household 
size and housing need compared to those of the large family such as families with children 
on the benefit arrangement rule; thus the benefit cap and floor limit for eligible housing 
costs are lower compared to that for families with children. Moreover, the taper applied for 
young family households without children is higher (33%) than that of families with 
children (20%) (Chen & ÖST, 2005; The Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2008).  
 
Households‘ housing cost expenditures for only 60m2 of floor size are eligible for the 
housing allowance for young people without children. These households receive the 
housing allowance at 75% of the eligible housing cost when their income is between SEK 
1,800 and SEK 2,600 per month and 50% of the eligible housing cost when their income is 
between SEK 2,600 and SEK 3,600 per month. This is the maximum housing allowance. 
Similar to the housing allowance reduction for families with children, the claimant could 
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receive their maximum allowance that falls below the benefit cap when the household 
income is higher than the income standard for the maximum benefit (a and b in Table 6.2). 
If household incomes are greater than these standards, the allowance is reduced by 33% of 
the difference between the household income and these standards (Chen & ÖST, 2005; The 
Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2008). Therefore, compared to the benefits for families 
with children, the benefit provision for young people without children may be less 
generous.  
 
6.2.3 Housing Allowances for Pensioners: Housing Supplement and Special Housing 
Supplement  
 
There are two housing allowances provided to low-income pensioners in Sweden: the 
‗housing supplement‘ for pensioner and the ‗special housing supplement‘ for pensioners 
receiving the housing supplement with the lowest income after housing cost expenditures. 
The housing supplement can be paid to people living in Sweden and receiving one of the 
following pensions: a full old-age pension, sickness compensation, activity compensation, 
widows‘ pension, special survivor‘s pension, wives‘ supplement, or any national pension 
of European Union country equivalent to the Swedish benefits (The Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency, 2010b).  
 
When calculating the amount of housing supplement, different rates of household income 
and eligible housing costs, according to type of pension, are applied. First, the maximum 
possible housing supplement is calculated based on the pensioner‘s age and household 
composition. While the housing supplement subsidises the major part of housing cost 
expenditures for pensioners with ‗sickness compensation‘ or ‗activity compensation‘, it 
does not exceed 91% of SEK 4,500 for unmarried persons and SEK 2,250 for married 
persons. Concerning old-age pensioners, the housing supplement subsidises 93%
25
 of 
housing costs per month for single persons with an income below SEK 5,000 and couples 
with an income below SEK 2,500 per person. Second, the reduction in the housing 
supplement is calculated using each person‘s income. The housing supplement is reduced 
by the difference between the maximum housing supplement and 62% of each person‘s 
income up to the price base amount (i.e. SEK 42,400 in 2010
26
 adding to 50% of each 
                                                 
25
 Whilst the subsidisation rate for housing costs of pensioners was 91% prior to 2006, this rate increased to 
93% of housing cost only for old-age pensioners (The Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2010b).   
 
26
 The price base amount is based on cost of living benefits (The Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2010b).  
 135 
person‘s income above the price base amount) (The Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 
2010b).  
 
The special housing supplement can be provided to pensioners who already received the 
housing supplement if their disposable income after housing cost expenditures is smaller 
compared to the reasonable living standard
27
, which are SEK 4,786 for unmarried persons 
and SEK 4,044 for married persons per month (Swedish National Social Insurance Agency, 
2010b). Additionally, there are benefit caps for the housing costs subsidised by this special 
supplement. Concerning persons aged 65 years and older, the reasonable housing cost 
limits are SEK 6,200 per month for unmarried persons and SEK 3,100 for married persons. 
For a person aged under 65, a reasonable housing cost is SEK 5,700 for unmarried persons 
and SEK 2,850 for married persons. For married couples, the housing cost for each spouse 
is calculated at half of their total housing cost (Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2007a, 
2010b).  
 
Summary of the Swedish Housing Allowance System  
Similar to the Dutch housing allowance, the Swedish housing allowance system has a ‗gap‘ 
structure and applies the different subsidisation rates for eligible rent−the lower rate for the 
higher eligible housing cost range and vice versa. Moreover, the benefit arrangement 
considers the varied incomes and housing needs according to the features of different 
families. Based on family composition, benefits are calculated differently for households. 
Therefore, families with children and larger families are likely to receive greater benefits 
compared to childless families in terms of eligible housing costs and the reduction from the 
maximum benefit; however, the benefit is capped for all families at a certain level. 
Moreover, low-income pensioners receiving the housing supplement could also receive 
additional allowances within the housing allowance system. This difference between 
housing allowances for pensioners and non-pensioners could improve the income and 
housing problems of pensioners more so than that for non-pensioner households.  
 
In the following sections, I analyse the effectiveness of the housing allowance for solving 
income and housing problems of low-income tenants in Sweden and discuss the ways in 
                                                 
27
 A monthly reasonable standard of living is considered equivalent to a twelfth of 1.294 price base amounts 
for unmarried persons and a twelfth of 1.084 price base amounts for married persons (The Swedish Social 
Insurance, 2007a). 
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which the results of the analysis relate to the features of the Swedish housing allowance 
system.  
 
 
6.3 The Analysis of Housing Allowance Effects on Tenants in Sweden  
 
 
This section examines the effectiveness of the Swedish housing allowance in improving 
income maintenance, housing affordability and work incentives for low-income tenant 
households. If the housing allowance receipt relieves the significance of income and 
housing problems of low-income tenants, the effectiveness of this subsidy as income 
support for housing cost expenditures exists. In order to analyse the housing allowance 
effects in achieving these policy objects, the changes in the results of five indicators, i.e. 
Residual income after rent payment, Poverty rate, Rent to Income Ratio, Income 
Replacement Ratio and Effective Marginal Tax Rate by housing allowance provision will 
be examined.  
 
Table 6.3 Indictors of Housing Allowance Effectiveness in Section 6.3       
Section Indicator Definition 
6.3.1 Income maintenance  
  6.3.1.1 1.Residual income after housing cost 
expenditures 
Residual Y1: Paying rent without HA 
Residual Y2: Paying rent with HA 
   
  6.3.1.2 2. Poverty Rate (PR)  
(poverty line: 60% of the national median 
income)  
PR1: Before paying rent & receiving HA  
PR2: After paying rent without HA 
PR3: After paying rent with HA 
   
6.3.2 Housing affordability  
 Rent to Income Ratio (RIR)  RIR1 : Paying rent without HA  
RIR2 : Paying rent with HA  
   
6.3.3 Work incentive   
  6.3.3.1 1.Income Replacement Ratio (IRR)= 
Household net income when unemployed 
Household net income when employed 
 
IRR1: Income excluding HA 
IRR2: Income including HA  
   
  6.3.3.2 2. Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) = EMTR1: Income excluding HA 
 
1  - 
Change in household net income 
Change in household gross income  
by 1 income unit 
 
EMTR2: Income including HA 
 
Note: Y and HA stand for household net income and housing allowance respectively. 
 
For the analysis, Household Finances (HEK) 2006 dataset was used. Among households of 
the Household Finances (HEK) 2006 dataset, only tenant households that received the 
housing allowance (size = 1,022) were considered. The benefit rule applied for the analysis 
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in Section 6.3 is not the current one explained in Section 6.2; the benefit rules and 
arrangement of the reference year of the survey.  
 
On average, these low-income tenants received the housing allowance of SEK 21,335 
annually, which accounts for 17.9% of annual household income. However, these tenants 
paid SEK 55,290 in rent. Compared to the UK housing allowance‘s subsidisation rate 
(70%), that of the Swedish housing allowance is less (40%). This relates to the benefit 
rules of the Swedish housing allowance system, which adopts a ‗gap‘ approach28. The 50% 
or 75% of the housing cost is eligible for housing allowance claim and thus, the extent to 
which housing allowance subsidises housing costs might be smaller compared to that of 
the UK housing allowance system. 
 
Table 6.4 Income, Rents and Housing Allowance of Tenant Recipients in Sweden (SEK, 
2006 price) 
Total tenant with HA Annual HH income  Annual HA Annual rents HA÷rents (%) 
Mean  %(N) 128,791.94 21,335.09 55,290.27 40.5 
Total 100.0(1,022)     
Income Quintiles     
1st Q (low Y) 20.0(204) 89,147.10 17,372.01 44,407.17 40.2 
2nd Q 20.0(205) 109,413.84 24,232.58 48,908.54 50.5 
3rd Q 20.0(204) 118,949.59 26,226.47 55,493.86 48.8 
4th Q 20.0(205) 131,156.80 21,786.17 60,832.49 36.2 
5th Q(high Y) 20.0(204) 195,375.77 17,041.82 66,813.41 26.6 
 (F) (217.160***) (15.290***)  (57.916***)  (22.366***)  
Household Composition     
No children 21.8(223)    128,889.55  17,134.22 46,895.48 37.0 
With children 31.7(324)    138,249.18  19,919.92 67,670.81 29.8 
Pensioner 46.5(475)    122,295.27  24,272.59 50,786.58 49.4 
 (F) (8.849***) (19.134***) (136.394***) (44.447***) 
Tenant Tenure     
Co-op   18.1(185) 137,276.79 16,588.21 49,566.68 38.0 
Private or 
Housing 
association  
81.9(837) 126,916.55 22,384.28 56,555.34 41.0 
 (t) (1.607) (-5.553***)  (-3.569***)  (-1.208)  
Employment Status     
Unemployed 74.3(759)    121,437.98  24,011.18 52,220.95 46.8 
Employed  25.7(263)    150,014.96  13,612.08 64,148.13 22.1 
 (t) (-6.858***) (11.415***)  (-7.592***)  (15.199***)  
Source: Household Finances (HEK) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HH, HA and Y stand for household, housing allowance and household net income 
respectively. Co-op stands for co-operative housing. *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001  
 
As Table 6.5 indicates, housing allowance recipients, both tenants and homeowners, are 
lower income households experiencing severe poverty in Sweden. Even before these 
households pay their housing costs, the poverty rates of housing allowance recipients are 
                                                 
28
 This rate of the Dutch housing allowance system employing a similar gap structure is 36%.  
 138 
higher than those of non-recipients. Moreover, the poverty rates of housing allowance 
recipients after housing cost expenditures have increased significantly compared to non-
recipients.  
 
Table 6.5 Poverty Rates before and after Housing Cost Expenditures in Sweden (%)  
Poverty lines Total Household 
(owner + tenant) 
Household without HA 
(owner + tenant) 
Household with HA 
(owner + tenant) 
 (N = 10,703) (N = 9,567) (N = 1,136) 
 before HC after HC before HC after HC bf.HA&HC bf.HAaf.HC 
40% of median  3.8 15.0 2.2 9.7 17.1 70.7 
50% of median  8.6 22.8 4.2 16.5 45.3 81.3 
60% of median  14.4 32.0 8.3 25.7 66.0 88.6 
Source: Household Finances (HEK) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HA and HC stand for housing allowance and housing cost respectively.    
 
Moreover, housing allowance recipients face higher financial burdens (over 50%) for 
housing costs payments compared to non-recipients, although, households in Sweden have 
housing affordability problems, according to the definition of this study (the ratios are over 
30%). This finding means that housing cost payments without the housing allowance 
provision could lead to more serious income and housing problems for low-income 
households. 
 
Table 6.6 Financial Burden for Housing Cost Expenditures in Sweden (%) 
Housing affordability 
measures 
Total household Household 
without HA 
Household 
with HA 
t 
 (N = 10,703) (N = 9,567) (N = 1,136)  
Gross HC over Y 38.0 36.1 54.2 -5.467*** 
 Total tenant Tenant without HA Tenant with HA  
 (6,423) (N = 5,401) (N = 1,022)  
Rents over Y 37.0 33.6 54.7 -4.621*** 
Source: Household Finances (HEK) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HC, HA and Y stand for housing cost, housing allowance and household net income 
respectively. *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
 
6.3.1 Social Policy Object: Income Maintenance Improvement  
 
Within the Swedish social security system, the three housing allowances are provided to 
low-income households for their housing cost expenditures. These housing allowances 
help low-income families maintain their income after paying housing costs to a certain 
degree and the improvement in household income could alleviate poverty among 
economically vulnerable households. In this section, I analyse the effectiveness of the 
Swedish housing allowance in improving income maintenance after housing cost 
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expenditures by assessing the changes in households‘ residual incomes after housing cost 
and changes in poverty rates by the receipt of housing allowance.  
 
6.3.1.1 Residual Income after Rents  
 
The purpose of housing allowance system is to support low-income households for their 
housing cost payments and help them maintain their income for living costs. In practice, it 
seems that the Swedish housing allowance system contributes to its beneficiaries‘ income 
maintenance. As Table 6.7 presents, when the Swedish low-income tenant receives the 
housing allowance, they maintain a residual income after housing costs of around SEK 
18,000, thus, relatively increasing their income by 70% on average. The residual income 
after housing costs change differently according to the households‘ features.  
 
Table 6.7 Changes in Residual Income after Rents by Housing Allowance in Sweden (SEK, 
2006 price) 
Total tenant with HA Residual income after rents Absolute change Relative change 
without HA with HA (SEK) (%) 
Mean  %(N) 66,072.64 84,011.04 17,938.40 70.1 
Total 100.0(1,022)     
Income Quintiles     
1st Q (low Y) 20.0(204) 40,147.08 53,886.85 13,739.77 75.5 
2nd Q 20.0(205) 45,916.82 67,436.60 21,519.77 93.7 
3rd Q 20.0(204) 47,830.56 70,960.49 23,129.94 108.3 
4th Q 20.0(205) 60,867.40 79,901.23 19,033.82 60.0 
5th Q(high Y) 20.0(204) 135,725.65 147,971.41 12,245.76 12.7 
 (F) (174.479***) (169.273***) (28.008***) (8.325***) 
Household Composition     
No children 21.8(223) 68,362.84 84,845.00 16,482.16 64.8 
With children 31.7(324) 87,231.17 98,501.24 11,270.07 23.8 
Pensioner 46.5(475) 50,565.10 73,735.67 23,170.57 104.1 
 (F) (45.861***) (22.586***) (89.143***) (18.791***) 
Tenant Tenure     
Co-op   18.1(185) 81,273.82 96,086.95 14,813.12 34.5 
Private or 
Housing 
association 
81.9(837) 62,712.76 81,341.93 18,629.17 77.9 
 (t) (2.872**) (2.306*) (-3.916***) (-5.566***)                                                                                 
Employment Status     
Unemployed 74.3(759) 54,366.98 75,508.69 21,141.71 89.7 
Employed 25.7(263) 99,854.37 108,548.23 8,693.86 13.2 
 (t) (-11.144***) (-8.244***) (18.465***) (9.853***) 
Source: Household Finances (HEK) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income respectively. Co-op 
stands for co-operative housing. *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
 
Household Income Level 
The reduction in housing cost expenditures by the receipt of housing allowance changes 
the income state of its recipients. However, the changes in income maintenance differ 
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according to a household‘s original income level. The absolute and relative changes are 
greater for households with lower incomes compared to households with higher incomes. 
Under the Swedish housing allowance system for tenants, lower-income households are 
favoured in relation to the benefit arrangement when other features of housing allowance 
claimants are the same. In practice, the extent to which housing costs are subsidised by the 
housing allowance is higher for lower-income tenants than for other households (see Table 
6.4). Therefore, the housing allowance is more likely to improve the residual income after 
rent payments for tenants in a lower-income bracket compared to those in a higher-income 
bracket, which mirrors the Swedish housing allowance benefit rules.  
 
Household Composition 
Concerning pensioners, the additional allowance for housing costs is provided according to 
their income within the housing allowance system in Sweden. In practice, the difference 
between pensioners and non-pensioners who receive the housing allowance concerns the 
extent to which the housing allowance reduces housing costs. The housing allowance 
subsidises a greater amount of housing costs for pensioners rather than for non-pensioners 
whilst the financial burden for housing costs is higher for the former compared to the latter. 
Furthermore, the different standards for eligible housing costs and the varied benefit 
arrangement are applied to families with and without children. Although the benefit 
arrangement is more generous for households with children compared to young households 
without children, the financial burden for housing costs tends to be higher for families with 
children. Accordingly, changes in the residual income after rents by the housing allowance 
provision are smaller for households with children than those for young households 
without children.  
 
Tenant Tenure 
The Swedish housing allowance system applies the uniform benefit calculation rule to all 
types of tenancy. When other conditions of households (e.g. number in household and 
income) are not considered, the housing allowance subsidises low-income tenants from 
different tenant tenures to a similar degree. In practice, the subsidisation rates of the 
housing allowance for housing costs are similar for tenants of co-operative, housing 
association and private housings (see Table 6.4). However, due to different housing costs 
and incomes of families, the absolute and relative changes in the residual income after 
housing costs vary across tenant groups. Both the absolute and relative changes (i.e. 
increase in residual income after rent), are larger for private and housing association 
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housing tenants compared to others. Therefore, housing allowances are more likely to help 
private and housing association housing tenants compared to co-operative housing tenants 
in terms of income maintenance after housing cost expenditures.  
 
Employment Status  
The size of the housing allowance and the extent to which housing allowance subsidises 
housing costs are greater for unemployed households compared to employed households in 
Sweden. Out-of-work households have less household income compared to working 
households and, thus, receive benefits that are based on a more generous arrangement for 
lower-income households. In practice, the absolute and relative changes in residual income 
after housing costs by the housing allowance are larger for unemployed households 
compared to employed households. Although working households were better off after 
housing cost payments, the absolute and relative increases in residual income after housing 
costs are considerably lower compared to those of unemployed households. Therefore, the 
housing allowance is more effective for improving the income maintenance for 
unemployed households.  
 
6.3.1.2 Poverty Rate 
 
If the low-income household‘s poverty rate after housing cost expenditures declines by the 
receipt of housing allowance, we can say that the housing allowance is effective in solving 
income problems. As tenants who receive the housing allowance are the lowest-income 
households among the entire population, they experience more severe poverty problems 
than do others and housing cost payments are likely to increase these problems. However, 
whilst the housing allowance provision accounts for 70% of the relative change in residual 
income after rent payments for low-income tenants, the poverty rates of this group 
decrease by 4%, relatively. Moreover, the changes in poverty rates are different between 
family groups.  
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Table 6.8 Changes in Poverty Rates by Housing Allowance in Sweden (%) 
Poverty lines   60% of median income Absolute  
change (%p) 
PR2–PR3 
Relative 
change (%) 
PR2–PR3 
Total tenant with HA  PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HA af.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
Mean  (%) 66.8 89.9 86.5 3.4 3.8 
Total 100.0       
Income Quintiles       
1st Q (low Y) 20.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
2nd Q 20.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
3rd Q 20.0 88.2 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
4th Q 20.0 43.9 99.5 98.5 1.0 1.0 
5th Q(high Y) 20.0 2.0 50.0 33.8 16.2 32.4 
      
Household Composition      
No children 21.8 67.7 86.1 83.4 2.7 3.1 
With children 31.7 42.6 82.7 74.7 8.0 9.7 
Pensioner 46.5 82.9 96.6 96.0 0.6 0.7 
      
Tenant Tenure      
Co-op  18.1 63.2 87.6 83.8 3.8 4.3 
Private or Housing 
association 
81.9 67.6 90.4 87.1 3.3 3.7 
      
Employment Status      
Unemployed 74.3 79.2 95.3 93.3 2.0 2.1 
Employed  25.7 31.2 74.5 66.9 7.6 10.2 
Source: Household Finances (HEK) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HC, HA and Y stand for housing cost, housing allowance and household net income, 
respectively. Co-op stands for co-operative housing. For poverty rates based on 40% and 
50% of median income, see Table A.5 in Appendices. 
PR1: poverty rate when housing allowance is not provided and before housing costs 
payment.  
PR2: poverty rate when housing allowance is not provided and after housing costs payment. 
PR3: poverty rate when housing allowance is provided and after housing costs payment.  
 
Household Income Level   
As the poverty rate change between PR1 and PR2 indicates in Table 6.8, housing cost 
expenditures without the housing allowance intensifies the poverty of low-income tenants. 
Moreover, poverty is likely to be more serious for households with lower income rather 
than for households with higher income. However, the provision of housing allowance 
contributes to the reduction in poverty after housing cost expenditures. The concern is that 
whilst the housing allowance is more effective in improving residual income after housing 
cost payments for lower-income households, these households experience little change in 
poverty rate by housing allowance receipt. Rather, the absolute (16.2%p) and relative 
(32.4%) changes in poverty rates by the housing allowance are better for households with 
the highest income, although the changes in residual income after housing costs is smaller 
for this group. Among households receiving the housing allowance, the lowest-income 
households are the most economically vulnerable. Therefore, although they receive the 
financial support for housing costs, they are less likely to escape poverty.  
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Household Composition   
Concerning family types, more severe poverty problems exist among pensioners and 
childless families compared to families with children, owing to their lower household 
income (see Table 6.4). Moreover, rent expenditures intensify poverty considerably. The 
Swedish housing allowance could improve income maintenance after housing cost 
payments for all types of families. However, whilst the increase in residual income after 
housing costs is larger for pensioners, the decrease in poverty rate is smaller for this group 
compared to non-pensioner households. Moreover, the absolute (8.0%) and relative (9.7%) 
changes in poverty rates are larger for families with children who have higher household 
incomes. Thus, the increase in residual income after housing costs by the housing 
allowance receipt does not necessarily reduce poverty after housing cost expenditures 
among families.    
 
Tenant Tenure 
Although poverty rates are slightly higher for private and housing association housing 
tenants compared to co-operative housing tenants, the difference in poverty rate changes 
among them is little in comparison to changes among different income groups or family 
compositions. Because only few differences exist in income and rent costs between the two 
tenant groups, both groups might experience similar poverty problems. Moreover, the 
extent to which the housing allowance subsidises housing costs is similar between these 
groups (see Table 6.4). Therefore, whilst the housing allowance provision changes the 
poverty rates of all tenant tenure groups, the effectiveness of the housing allowance does 
not differ across these groups.  
 
Employment Status  
Although both employed and unemployed households that receive the housing allowance 
are low-income households, unemployed households are likely to experience more income 
poverty compared to employed households. The extent to which the housing allowance 
subsidises housing costs is higher for out-of-work households compared to working 
households. Therefore, without the receipt of the housing allowance, out-of-work 
households are likely to face greater poverty problems compared to working households, 
according to the changes between PR1 and PR2. However, whilst the housing allowance 
improves the income maintenance for unemployed households more effectively, the 
absolute and relative changes in the poverty rate by housing allowance are larger for 
employed households.  
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Summary: Income Maintenance Improvement 
The Swedish housing allowance system makes clear contributions to the improvement of 
the income maintenance after housing cost payments for its beneficiaries, although there 
are differences in changes in residual income after rents that are based on household 
features. The same result is found across all family types concerning changes in poverty 
rates by the receipt of housing allowances; the poverty rate changes more for higher-
income households compared to the change for lower-income households. Therefore, the 
financial state after housing cost expenditures is better for households with higher incomes 
compared to households with lower incomes: The improvement in income by the housing 
allowance provides more possibility of non-housing consumption for higher-income 
recipients.  
 
6.3.2 Housing Policy Object: Housing Affordability Improvement  
 
The financial burden for housing costs could be simply expressed by the cost-to-income 
measure, i.e. Rent to Income Ratio (RIR). The meaning of this ratio measure is more 
important for low-income households whose financial resources are limited. As their 
incomes are small, even when the rent-to-income ratio is low, the residual income after 
housing costs is not sufficient to purchase non-housing good and service. In this respect, 
this research examines the effect of the housing allowance on the reduction of the RIR. 
  
Concerning low-income tenants who receive the housing allowance in Sweden, there are 
clear differences in RIR according to the housing allowance provision. As Table 6.9 
shows, the RIR is lower when low-income tenants receive the housing allowance than 
when they do not receive this benefit. Although they still have a severe housing 
affordability problem (RIR over 30%), the housing allowance could relieve the financial 
burden for housing costs. However, there are differences in the change in RIR by the 
provision of housing allowance according to the characteristics of families who receive it. 
  
 145 
Table 6.9 Changes in Rent to Income Ratio by Housing Allowance in Sweden (%) 
Total tenant with HA Rent to Income Ratio Absolute change Relative change 
without HA with HA (%p) (%) 
Mean  %(N) 54.7 31.0 23.7 40.5 
Total 100.0(1,022)     
Income Quintiles      
1st Q (low Y) 20.0(204) 61.2 36.7 24.5 40.2 
2nd Q 20.0(205) 56.7 26.4 30.3 50.5 
3rd Q 20.0(204) 59.6 28.9 30.7 48.8 
4th Q 20.0(205) 55.7 33.7 22.0 36.2 
5th Q(high Y) 20.0(204) 40.3 29.5 10.8 26.6 
 (F) (41.133***) (11.499***) (36.459***) (22.366***) 
Household Composition     
No children 21.8(223) 47.9 28.9 19.0 37.0 
With children 31.7(324) 58.3 39.2 19.1 29.8 
Pensioner 46.5(475) 55.5 26.5 29.0 49.4 
 (F) (19.328***) (59.452***) (31.899***) (44.447***) 
Tenant Tenure     
Co-op   18.1(185) 45.2 27.8 17.4 38.0 
Private or 
Housing 
Association 
81.9(837) 56.8 31.8 25.0 41.0 
 (t) (-7.313***) (-2.786**) (-5.623***) (-1.219) 
Employment Status     
Unemployed 74.3(759) 56.1 28.4 27.7 46.8 
Employed  25.7(263) 50.6 38.6 11.9 22.1 
 (t) (3.525***) (-8.449***) (14.093***) (15.199***) 
Source: Household Finances (HEK) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income, respectively. Co-
op stands for co-operative housing. RIR less than 20: A household does not have a housing 
affordability problem. RIR between 20 and 30: A household has a housing affordability 
problem. RIR over 30: A household has a severe housing affordability problem.  
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
 
Household Income Level  
When low-income tenants do not receive the housing allowance, they are likely to have a 
severe housing affordability problem, owing to their RIR being over 40%. Among them, 
even when they receive the housing allowance, housing cost payments still causes 
problems for the lowest-income households. However, as the Swedish housing allowance 
system applies a more generous benefits arrangement to lower-income households, the 
extent to which the housing allowance subsidises housing costs is actually better for these 
households. As seen in Table 6.9, the relative changes in RIR are larger for lower income 
households compared to others. On the contrary, households with higher incomes are at a 
disadvantage under the benefit rule, which might result in a lower reduction of the housing 
cost burden than that for lower-income households. In this respect, it seems that both the 
different amounts of the housing allowance paid to each household and the varied extents 
to which the housing allowance reduces housing costs for each household could relate to 
the results in housing affordability changes.  
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Household Composition   
The financial burden for housing costs is most significant for families with children. 
Regardless of the housing allowance receipt, these households face greater housing 
affordability problems compared to others. Even when they receive the housing allowance, 
they still have a housing affordability problem owing to their RIR of about 40%. Although 
the housing allowance for families with children is more generous, the extent to which the 
housing allowance subsidises their housing costs is smaller for these families, owing to 
their higher housing costs than those of others. Therefore, the absolute and relative 
reductions in RIR are smaller for families with children compared to childless families and 
pensioners. On the contrary, whilst young people without children receive fewer benefits in 
terms of the standard eligible housing costs and benefit rates, the extent to which their 
housing costs are subsidised with the housing allowance provision is better for these young 
household without children compared to families with children in Sweden. Therefore, their 
relative reduction in RIR by the housing allowance is also higher compared to families 
with children. Moreover, both absolute and relative changes in RIR are larger for 
pensioners with higher housing allowance-to-rent ratio compared to non-pensioners (see 
Table 6.4). Therefore, the extent to which the housing allowance subsidises housing costs 
could change the RIR and, in this respect, the housing allowance provision to families with 
children is less effective compared to other types of families.   
 
Tenant Tenure  
While the private and housing association housing tenants pay more in housing costs, they 
have smaller household incomes compared co-operative housing tenants. Therefore, it is 
expected that private renters or housing association tenants face greater housing 
affordability problems compared to co-operative housing tenants. In practice, RIRs before 
and after receiving housing allowances are higher for private and housing association 
tenants (56.8% and 31.8%, respectively) than that of co-operative housing tenants (45.2% 
and 27.8, respectively). However, the Swedish housing allowance does not have different 
benefit calculation rules based on tenant tenure and the extent to which the housing 
allowance subsidises housing cost are similar for all tenant groups. Therefore, the effect of 
the housing allowance on RIR change is similar for all tenant groups, as indicated by 
similar relative changes in RIRs (around 40%).   
  
 147 
Employment Status  
Without the housing allowance provision, both employed and unemployed low-income 
households face severe financial burden because of high housing costs (half of their 
incomes). However, when they receive the housing allowance, unemployed households do 
not have housing affordability problems while employed households still have affordability 
problems owing to their RIR being 38%. Although unemployed households have lower 
incomes, they could receive better benefits under the current housing allowance system. 
Moreover, because their housing cost payments are lower compared to that of working 
households, their housing allowance could subsidise housing costs to a higher degree. This 
leads to greater absolute and relative changes in RIR for out-of-work households. 
Therefore, the Swedish housing allowance is more likely to reduce the financial burden of 
housing costs for out-of-work households compared to working households. This change 
could lead to more purchasing power for living necessities after housing cost expenditures.  
 
In brief, the housing allowance provision contributes to the improvement of income and 
housing problems of low-income tenants in Sweden. The increase in residual income after 
rents and the RIR reduction are better for the lower-income households compared to other 
higher-income households. This result could relate to the feature of the Swedish housing 
allowance arrangement that favours low-income households. However, similar to other 
countries, the housing allowance does not reduce poverty more for lower income 
households than for higher income households. This is because the changes in poverty are 
related to the original income and housing cost expenditures of households.  
 
The results of income maintenance and housing affordability changes present positive 
effects of housing allowance provision. In next section, we will assess the probable 
negative outcome in work incentive changes due to the income supplement function of 
housing allowance provision.  
 
6.3.3. Housing Allowance as Work Incentive or Disincentive Booster 
 
In this section, I evaluate whether the housing allowance influences work incentives of 
low-income households via two indicators. The first indicator is the Income Replacement 
Ratio (IRR), which indicates the possibility of choosing unemployment owing to few 
differences in household income between being employed and unemployed (i.e. the 
unemployment trap). The second indicator is the Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR), 
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which presents the potential of remaining in poverty although low-income households 
increase their labour participation (i.e. the poverty trap). The changes in work incentives 
could be linked to the behavioural choice of its beneficiaries for employment or 
unemployment. However, the working poor‘s behavioural changes responding to work 
incentive increase or decrease are not addressed here. This research focuses on the extent 
of work incentive for housing allowance recipients itself and the change in work incentives 
by the provision of housing allowance.  
 
The imputation of these two indicators is associated with changes in household income, 
income tax, national insurance contribution and social security benefits. Therefore, the 
measurements of EMTR and IRR are calculated with rules of the Swedish income tax and 
social security system. The benefit rules used for the analysis model are based on data 
collection of the reference year, not the current benefit rules explained in Section 6.2. For 
this analysis, the parameter values and equations of OECD Taxing Wages (OECD, 2007, 
2008b) as well as the country file of OECD Benefits and Wages (2006)
29
 were applied. 
Although the analysis of work incentives addresses the housing allowance effects on 
working-aged households‘ work incentive changes, both employed and unemployed tenant 
households that received the housing allowance (size = 431) are included in the analysis of 
EMTR, whilst the analysis of IRR was confined to employed tenant households receiving 
the housing allowance (size = 124) (see Figure 3.2).  
 
Before analysing work incentive changes by the housing allowance provision to tenant 
recipients, I address the differences in work disincentives between households that 
received the housing allowance and household that did not receive the housing allowance. 
As Table 6.10 indicates, the EMTR of working-aged tenants reached 41.3%, which means 
a household could take about 60% of every new income growth when their gross earnings 
increased. However, tenants receiving the housing allowance have a higher EMTR (76.2%) 
compared to tenants not receiving the housing allowance (36.8%). In other words, when a 
household‘s gross income increases by 1 unit, housing allowance recipients could take just 
a quarter of this newly increased income, whilst non-recipient households could take more 
than 60% of the every extra income increase. Therefore, the possibility of remaining in 
poverty is higher for housing allowance recipients when they work extra hours.  
                                                 
29
 For detail, see OECD Social Policies and Data, Benefits and Wages: Country Specific Information internet 
site (http://www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/benefitsandwagescountryspecificinformation.htm). 
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However, the IRR for tenants is quite high; in particular, IRR for tenants who receive the 
housing allowance is over 100. This is because the average unemployment benefit for full-
time workers is used for all working households‘ income and tax simulations, owing to the 
lack of household information from HEK. Therefore, in practice, the IRR of low-income 
households that receive the means-tested benefit may be lower than 100%. This should be 
considered when addressing IRR changes by the housing allowance provision for tenants.  
 
On the other hand, this indicates that the higher unemployment benefits could increase 
income replacement by the social security benefits for the lowest income households than 
for others. Moreover, although the same unemployment benefit rate is applied to 
households that receive the housing allowance and households that do not receive this 
benefit, housing allowance recipients face higher IRR compared to non-recipients, as 
indicated by a statistically significant difference in IRR between housing allowance 
recipients and non-recipients (t = -29.854, p < 0.001). In this respect, we could say that 
there are likely to be more work disincentives for housing allowance recipients than for 
non-recipients when both groups experience a similar income supplementation based on 
unemployment.  
 
Table 6.10 Work Disincentives of Housing Allowance Recipients and Non-Recipients in 
Sweden (%) 
 
Total tenant 
(Working-aged) 
Tenant Without HA Tenant with HA 
 
Mean  (N = 3,789) (N = 3,358) (N = 431) t 
EMTR  41.3 36.8 76.2 -17.770*** 
 
Total Tenant 
(Working-aged & Employed) 
Tenant Without HA Tenant with HA  
 (N = 2,717) (N = 2,593) (N = 124)  
IRR  87.2 86.1 110.1 -29.854*** 
Source: Household Finances (HEK) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HA stands for housing allowance. Concerning IRR, the average unemployment 
benefit for full-time workers is used for all working households‘ income and tax simulation. 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001 
 
6.3.3.1 Income Replacement Ratio: Unemployment Trap 
 
As indicated above, the IRR of working tenant households that receive the housing 
allowance is quite high because the higher unemployment benefit provision is assumed 
here. Therefore, there could be strong work disincentives for the working-poor who receive 
the housing allowance because it presents a higher possibility of the unemployment trap 
compared to the current employed status, which increases when the more generous social 
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security benefit rate is applied for low-income households. Moreover, as Table 6.11 
displays, the receipt of housing allowance changes the IRR; although the difference 
between IRR1 (109%) and IRR2 (110%) is small, it is statistically significant (t = -2.783, p 
< 0.01). Therefore, the housing allowance provision might influence the increase in the 
work disincentive because of the little difference in household income when individuals 
are employed and when they are unemployed.  
 
Table 6.11 Changes in Income Replacement Ratio by Housing Allowance in Sweden (%)  
Total tenant with HA 
(Working-aged & Employed) 
IRR1 
(without HA) 
IRR2 
(with HA) 
Absolute change 
IRR1-IRR2 (%p) 
Relative change 
IRR1-IRR2 (%) 
Mean  %(N) 109.0 110.1 1.2 1.4 
Total 100.0(124)     
Income Quintiles      
1stQ(low Y) 20.2(25) 120.5 116.1 -4.5 -3.2 
2ndQ 20.2(25) 106.2 107.4 1.2 1.4 
3rdQ 20.2(25) 105.7 108.3 2.6 2.6 
4thQ 21.0(26) 106.6 109.6 3.0 2.9 
5thQ(high Y) 18.5(23) 105.6 109.1 3.5 3.4 
 (F) (9.346***) (4.671**) (20.163***) (20.776***) 
Household Composition     
No children 28.2(35) 110.5 109.5 -0.9 -0.4 
With children 71.8(89) 108.4 110.4 2.0 2.1 
 (t) (0.885) (-0.480) (-2.937**) (-3.097**) 
Tenant Tenure      
Co-op 29.0(36) 108.9 110.4 1.5 1.7 
Private or  
Housing association  
71.0(88) 109.0 110.0 1.0 1.3 
 (t) (-0.025) (0.234) (0.487) (0.642) 
Employment Status      
All in work 79.0(98) 109.0 110.5 1.5 1.7 
Some in work  21.0(26) 108.9 108.6 -0.3 -0.1 
 (t) (0.034) (1.028) (1.783) (2.037*) 
Source: Household Finances (HEK) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income respectively. Co-op 
stands for co-operative housing. *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 
 
Household Income Level  
The incentive to remain in employment or welfare-to-work transition programme is greater 
for working tenant households with higher income than for households with lower income. 
Because the IRR of the lowest-income households is highest, they could realise a better 
financial gain compared to other households when they stop working. However, while the 
other income groups show increases in IRRs when they receive the housing allowance 
while unemployed, the lowest-income groups presents a decrease in IRR (from 120.5% 
down to 116%) even when they receive the housing allowance while unemployed. 
Therefore, the receipt of housing allowance has not always expanded disincentive to work 
for them (i.e. a high possibility of the unemployment trap). However, concerning 
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households with higher incomes, the housing allowance provision could have negative 
effects on the intention to keep their employment position in the labour market.   
 
Household Composition  
For both low-income working family types, the differences in work disincentives as 
measured by IRR are not statistically significant. Therefore, the potential of choosing 
unemployment would be similar for them. However, while the provision of housing 
allowance lowers the IRR for couple-adult households, it increases IRRs for one-parent 
households. Therefore, the housing allowance provision influences the growth of work 
disincentives for working-poor one-parent households. For this reason, the housing 
allowance as in-work benefit could be differently considered according to family type in 
Sweden. Although the housing allowance provision contributes to income maintenance for 
the working-poor as a whole, its effects on the welfare-to-work transition would vary for 
different family groups.  
 
Tenant Tenure  
It is interesting that both social and private housing tenants have similar IRRs; the 
difference in IRRs of both housing tenants are not statistically significant, regardless of the 
housing allowance provision. Additionally, the absolute and relative increases in IRR do 
not vary across households. This result indicates that the possibility of choosing 
unemployment, instead of remaining employed, is similar for all tenants who receive the 
housing allowance. Possibly, this is because the social security and housing allowance 
system treats all tenants equally. Therefore, while the housing allowance is likely to reduce 
working-poor tenants‘ intentions to retain their work, regardless of their tenancy 
conditions, changes do not differ across tenure type. Therefore, concerning only tenant 
tenure types, the provision of the housing allowance could be regulated in the same way to 
encourage the welfare-to-work transition.    
 
Employment Status  
Regardless of the different numbers of workers in a household, their IRRs are similar as 
the difference between IRRs are not statistically significant, like those of different family 
types and tenant tenures. This finding indicates that the possibility of choosing 
unemployment is the same for all working households that receive the housing allowance. 
However, the provision of the housing allowance has not always facilitated an increase in 
IRR for both groups. Whilst the housing allowance is associated with a relative increase in 
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IRR for couple-adult households with two workers and working single-adult households, it 
is associated with a relative decrease in IRR for working couple-adult households with 
only one worker. Therefore, it would be more helpful to receive the housing allowance for 
couple-adult households with two workers and working single-adult households to 
maintain their income at a higher level while unemployed. Concerning these working-poor 
households, the housing allowance could influence a reduction in intent to work because of 
the increase in income maintenance by housing allowance when they give up their earnings 
and choose unemployment.   
 
The IRR findings suggest that the work disincentive relating to income replacement by 
welfare benefits is quite high for all working-poor tenants in receipt of housing allowance 
in Sweden. However, the analysis was limited in terms of capturing the actual work 
incentive because the more generous income replacement is assumed here. Moreover, the 
housing allowance could have a different effect on the changes in the work incentive 
according to households and it could differently affect the intention of the working poor to 
move from welfare to work. Concerning working-poor tenants with high IRRs and who 
experience an increase in IRR by the receipt of housing allowance, the negative effect of 
the housing allowance should be considered. 
  
6.3.3.2 Effective Marginal Tax Rate: Poverty Trap     
 
As Table 6.12 shows, the EMTR increased from 64% to 76% by the provision of housing 
allowance. This finding means that low-income tenants could take less than 30% of the 
every new income growth when they receive housing allowances whereas they could take 
almost 35% of the every additional income increase when they do not receive housing 
allowance. The housing allowance provision changes the possibility of remaining in a state 
of poverty (the poverty trap) for low-income tenants. Hence, for tenant recipients, the 
housing allowance is likely to be less effective in providing a work incentive to increase 
labour participation and help them escape the current welfare benefit dependency. 
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Table 6.12 Changes in Effective Marginal Tax Rate by Housing Allowance in Sweden (%) 
Total tenant with HA EMTR1 EMTR2 Absolute change Relative change 
(Working-aged) (without HA) (with HA) EMTR1-EMTR2 EMTR1-EMTR2 
    (%p) (%) 
Mean  %(N) 64.0 76.2 12.2 43.8 
Total  100.0(431)     
Income Quintiles     
1stQ(low Y) 22.0(95) 99.8 99.8 - -    
2ndQ 20.9(90) 57.5 86.0 28.6 117 
3rdQ 17.2(74) 65.5 70.0 4.5 6.3 
4thQ 20.0(86) 51.3 65.2 13.9 46.3 
5thQ(high Y) 20.0(86) 42.6 55.9 13.3 45.5 
 (F) (45.579***) (14.777***) (6.224***) (5.778***) 
Household Composition     
2 adults + children 36.9(159) 75.3 92.4 17.0 70.5 
1 adult + children 63.1(272) 57.4 66.7 9.3 28.3 
 (t) (4.956***) (5.389***) (1.559) (1.861) 
Tenant Tenure     
Co-op 15.3(66) 48.3 61.8 13.6 25.4 
Private or  
Housing association  
84.7(365) 66.8 78.8 11.9 47.2 
 (t) (-4.062***) (-2.780**) (0.289) (-0.871) 
Employment Status     
All in work 64.3(277) 76.7 85.2 8.5 38.0 
Some in work  35.7(154) 41.1 59.9 18.8 54.4 
 (t) (11.162***) (5.782***) (-2.402*) (-0.876) 
Source: Household Finances (HEK) 2006; author calculations.   
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income respectively. Co-op 
stands for co-operative housing. *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 
 
Household Income Level 
While lower-income households have little profit from increased earnings due to the higher 
EMTR, the highest-income household preserves half of these earnings when earnings 
increase marginally. Therefore, work incentives are higher for households with a certain 
level of income rather than for the poorest households. The result also indicates differences 
in EMTR changes among households by housing allowance. While the housing allowance 
is not associated with changes in EMTR for the lowest-income group, the EMTR of the 
other four income groups has increased. Therefore, whilst the receipt of housing allowance 
could have little effect on work incentive change for the lowest-income households, it is 
more likely to intensify work disincentives for the lowest-income households than for 
others.  
 
Household Composition  
Concerning family types, more work incentives exist for one-parent households compared 
to couple-adult households because marginal income changes are better for the former 
owing to their lower EMTR. Therefore, couple-adult households receive little financial 
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reward to change their employment status. However, the take-up of housing allowance is 
likely to boost the work disincentive for both family types (i.e. the likelihood of remaining 
in poverty); the difference in work disincentive change by the receipt of housing allowance 
is not statistically significant between couple-adult and lone-parent households.  
 
Tenant Tenure  
The EMTR is higher for private or housing association tenants compared to others, thus, 
the possibility of being trapped in poverty is higher for these households (i.e. less take-
home pay when they participate more actively in labour). However, the receipt of the 
housing allowance increases the work disincentive for recipients regardless of tenant 
tenure. Particularly, private or housing association housing tenants have experienced worse 
conditions compared to co-operative housing tenants. While EMTR has increased by 25% 
for co-operative housing tenants, it increased twice as much for private and housing 
association housing tenants. Therefore, in encouraging tenant households to increase 
labour participation, the housing allowance provision is unlikely to be effective in 
improving the financial gain from additional labour participation for private or housing 
association housing tenants. This negative effect might be more serious for them compared 
to other housing tenants. 
 
Employment Status 
When low-income households that receive the housing allowance opt to increase their 
labour participation to earn greater incomes, households with only one adult working reap 
greater financial reward for their increase in take-home pay because of their lower EMTR 
compared to households with all adults working. This indicates that the possibility of 
remaining in poverty is higher for households with all adults working when these 
households intend to work extra hours. Therefore, although both groups are low-income 
households, each group faces different work incentives. Moreover, although the housing 
allowance provision contributes to the expansion of work disincentives for both 
households, it leads to a smaller increase in EMTR for households with all adults working 
than other households. Therefore, concerning households with all adults working, the 
problem of work disincentives and the negative effect of the housing allowance provision 
on work incentive are not serious. Hence, the housing allowance as a work benefit is more 
useful for these households to improve the welfare-to-work transition with the support of 
income maintenance than for other households.  
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Overall, the Swedish working-poor who receive housing allowances are likely to 
experience severe work disincentives (i.e. the high possibility of falling into 
unemployment trap as well as poverty trap). The housing allowance receipt has more 
negative effects for increasing the probable work disincentive for lower income tenants 
compared to higher income tenants. The housing allowance provision is related to the 
increase in EMTR, thus, this change is likely to disturb the encouragement of the welfare-
to-work transition for low-income tenants who receive in-work benefits.  
 
 
6.4 Summary   
 
 
The Swedish housing allowance is likely to achieve different policy goals for more 
economically vulnerable households for which benefits are assigned. However, there are 
differences in the improvement of income maintenance and housing affordability across 
various households that receive the housing allowance. The design of housing allowance 
concerns this result. The Swedish housing allowance system applies different benefit 
arrangements according to household income and family type. These two factors relate to 
the achievement of income and housing policy aims for low-income households. The more 
important factor is household income, which determines the maximum or reduced benefit 
size. In practice, while the lower-income household or the unemployed are more likely to 
have lower income, they experience more improvement in income maintenance after 
housing cost expenditures and housing affordability compared to the higher-income 
household or the employed.  
 
In terms of income maintenance, different allowance schemes according to family 
composition also affect the results. In particular, pensioner households experience more 
improvement in income maintenance compared to other types of households because they 
can receive an additional allowance for housing costs after receiving the housing 
allowance. Moreover, the Swedish housing allowance system considers housing needs 
depending on different family features (i.e. bigger floor space and higher housing costs for 
families with more children).  
 
However, whilst the financial burden arising from expenditure on housing cost decreases 
due to the housing allowance provision to all households, the benefit arrangement does not 
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always improve the condition of families that are more favoured by the benefit rules. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the effect of housing allowance on income maintenance 
and housing affordability improvement is similar for households with different tenancy, 
unlike the results in relation to family composition or household income. This could be 
related to the feature of the Swedish housing allowance system which does not 
differentiate tenure tenancy when calculating benefits. However, while the improvement in 
income reduces the poverty among households that receive the housing allowance, the 
housing allowance improves the conditions of higher-income households more compared 
to lower-income households.  
 
Although low-income households could reduce their financial burden arising from housing 
cost expenditures by housing allowance, there is concern that the housing allowance relates 
to the reduction in work incentives for low-income households with members who are able 
to work or currently work. As the Swedish housing allowance boosts the working poor‘s 
income if they opt to be out-of-work, this increases the possibility of the unemployment 
trap. Moreover, it reduces the financial reward from the marginal take-home pay growth 
and increases the possibility of remaining in poverty for the working poor.  
 
Among households that receive the housing allowance, the housing allowance could 
increase work incentives for some households whilst it could play a negative role in 
reducing work incentives for other households. The most prominent difference in the work 
incentive changes by the housing allowance provision is between lower- and higher-
income households. The housing allowance is less likely to reduce both work incentives 
(IRR and EMTR) for lower income recipients. This difference in work incentive changes 
needs to be considered for welfare-to-work transition relating to housing allowance 
recipients.    
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Chapter 7. The Effectiveness of Housing Allowance for Tenants in South 
Korea 
 
 
Introduction 
For decades, the main stream of housing policy has been premised on housing supply in 
South Korea (S. Korea). Since the 1960s, the government has facilitated the supply of 
housing and thus homeownership-oriented housing market has been developed. In addition, 
with regards to poor households, the government has expanded the supply of public rental 
housing below market price. A rent subsidy programme is available, although this has only 
been the case for the last ten years. In order for the housing allowance system to become an 
efficient and effective policy tool for low-income households, it is necessary to examine 
the effectiveness of the current housing allowance system. In this chapter, I will first 
explore the evolution of national housing support schemes from the supply and demand 
perspectives in S. Korea. I will then address the feature of the Korean housing allowance in 
the national social security system. Subsequently, I will analyse the effects of housing 
allowances on low-income tenants by examining the changes in income maintenance, 
housing affordability and work incentives.  
 
 
7.1. The Development of National Support for Housing Costs in S. Korea 
 
 
Housing Supply Facilitation by the State since the 1960s 
Since the 1960s, the supply of newly built houses has been the top priority of the national 
housing policy in S. Korea. Its objectives were to solve the housing shortage and drive 
national economic development (S. Park, 2007; Y. Park, 2009). The Park Cheung Hee 
government (1963-1979), which came to power through a military coup d‘état in 1961, 
launched its Five-Year Economic Development Plan with foreign aid (Jin, 2007; Kwon, 
1998, 2009; S. Park, 2007). Under the Five-Year Economic Development Plan, large-scale 
housing building construction was regarded as an effective measure due to its direct 
economic effects on land development and employment. Moreover, the mass construction 
of housing brought public support and legitimacy to the military dictatorship (S. Park, 
2007; Jin, 2007; Kwon, 1998; Y. Park, 2009). During this period, the Korean government 
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constructed housing units through a state housing company
30
 administered by the housing 
ministry and provided construction subsidies via the state-owned bank
31
 to private housing 
builders. This government legislated the Livelihood Protection Act in 1961 and introduced 
the first national social security system (Livelihood Protection system) in 1966 as part of 
its populist policy (Kwon, 1998). However, the eligibility of this benefit was limited to 
selected beneficiaries such as young person below working age or those who were unable 
to work owing to disability or sickness and it subsidised only food and fuel cost 
expenditures.    
 
Although the government-led housing building supply was affected by the budget spending 
cuts stemming from the economic downturn in the early 1970s, its supply-centred housing 
policy continued into the 1980s. The government‘s housing policy from 1972 to 1981 was 
characterised by the slogan ‗One House per One Household‘, by the deregulation of the 
housing construction for private housing and the introduction of special savings accounts, 
known as Housing Subscription Savings and Housing Subscription Deposit that gave 
priority to the first homebuyer applying for the newly built housing allocation scheme
32
 in 
urban areas. However, although the housing shortage was alleviated in the 1970s, the 
increase in housing stock has been slower than the growth of household formation in S. 
Korea (S. Park, 2007; Y. Park, 2009; Kim, 2010).  
 
Housing Construction and the Development of Social Insurance Schemes in the 1980s  
In the 1980s, the government‘s housing policy still focused on homeownership. The new 
military regime under Cheon Doo Hwan (1980-988) expanded state intervention in land 
development and the construction of housing. Under the Rental Housing Construction 
Promotion Act of 1984, the government also promoted the construction of public rental 
                                                 
30
 This state-owned company, known as Korea National Housing Corporation was merged with another state 
company, Korea Land Corporation in 2009 and is now the Korea Land and Housing Corporation.   
 
31
 In 1966 the Korean government established Korea Housing Bank, a state-owned and specialised bank for 
housing finance. This bank provided loans for housing construction to local governments and private builders 
whilst also raising funds from customers through the management of housing subscription accounts, the 
issuing of housing bonds and the sale of housing lotteries. This bank was converted to a private commercial 
bank (Housing and Commercial Bank) in 1997 before being merged with another private bank (Kookmin 
Bank) in 2001. At present, Kookmin Bank is a private commercial bank and maintains only some housing 
finance businesses commissioned by the government (S. Park, 2007; Kookmin Back internet site, 
www.KBstar.com). 
 
32
 If people are planning to purchase a newly built housing for sale or rent a newly built public rental 
housing in urban areas, they have to apply for the housing allocation scheme. Having a Housing Subscription 
or a Housing Deposit account is one of the application eligibility for this scheme and gives them a priority for 
the first allocation of housing (S. Park, 2007; Kookmin Bank internet site, www.KBstar.com).   
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housing in urban areas. However, the initial type of public rental housing supplied in the 
mid 1980s, known as Five-year Public Rental Housing was not for the low-income 
households. It was instead to be sold to sitting tenants or new homebuyers after the five-
year rental contract.  
 
However, under the Roh Tae Woo government (1988-1993), the supply of public rental 
housing was tailored to low-income households (Kwon, 1998; S. Park, 2007; Y. Park, 2009; 
Kim, 2010). The government released its Two Million Housing Construction Plan after the 
1987 election. The national housing corporation provided Permanent Public Rental 
Housing
33
 for the lowest-income households which were receiving income support from 
the social security system (Livelihood Protection system) (ibid). As the rental prices of 
public rental housings remained below market level, low-income people were able to 
afford their rent. At the same time, the government introduced National Pension (1986) 
and Health Insurance (1988-89) schemes whilst also expanding the eligibility for social 
assistance benefit to people who were able to work in 1982 (Lee & Ahn, 1990). However, 
the social security system still failed to make allowances for housing cost expenditures of 
low-income people.  
 
Under the next Kim Young Sam government (1993-1998), the construction of Permanent 
Public Rental Housing was interrupted for financial reasons and due to concerns regarding 
vacant dwellings of Permanent Public Rental Housing in certain areas (Jin, 2007). As a 
result, from 1993, 50-year Public Rental Housing
34
 replaced the supply of Permanent 
Public Rental Housing. However, several deregulation policies of this government, e.g. the 
deregulation of the land development, the redevelopment and reconstruction of housing 
blocks in urban area and the finance system, led to a national economic crisis in 1997, 
which was compounded by the Asian financial crisis in late 1990s. Given this situation, the 
new Kim Dae Joong government began to reform the national system and rent allowance 
was introduced as part of the new social security system in 2000 (Y. Park, 2009; Kim, 
2010).   
 
                                                 
33
 The entitlement to social security benefit for the low-income household is one of the eligibility conditions 
for the tenancy of this public housing. Unlike Five-year Public Rental Housing, this public rental housing 
was not for sale after a certain period. Therefore, the low-income households are able to keep their tenancy 
contract constantly as long as the tenant receives this national income support from the government.  
 
34
 This public rental housing is accessible for non-homeowners and the housing is to let for long-term 
periods at lower rent price compared to the private market.  
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Introduction of Housing Allowance under the New Social Security System and  
the Emergence of Various Public Rental Housing  
Whilst the Kim Dae Joong government (1998-2003) implemented conditions attached to 
the International Monetary Fund‘s lending programmes, it also expanded the eligibility of 
four national social insurance schemes between 1998 and 2001 in addition to reforming the 
public assistance system in 2000 (Lee, 2004). The newly social security system, i.e. the 
National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) system, was designed to ensure the national 
standard of living cost for low-income households. It also introduced the welfare-to-work 
programme as a condition of benefit receipt for households whose members are able to 
work. Moreover, for the first time ever the social security system made allowances for 
housing costs. However, the government still placed a higher priority on housing supply 
than on the expansion of housing allowance. This government, unlike its predecessor, 
increased the supply of public rental housing in order to ensure tenant households‘ 
residential stability.  
 
The increase in public rental housing supply was related to the worsened housing market 
situation for the tenant households due to the increase in rent prices during this period:  
Middle-income and low-income private tenants faced a substantial housing cost burden (S. 
Park, 2007; Jin, 2007; Y. Park, 2009; Kim, 2010). In response to this situation, the 
government launched its One Million National Rental Housing Plan, providing public 
rental tenancies with a government-controlled rent and deposit system for households 
ineligible for Permanent Public Rental Housing (ibid). This plan offered 10-year and 20-
year-contract National Rental Housing with wider income eligibility and more spacious 
floor sizes than those offered by Permanent Public Rental Housing for the lowest income 
households.  
 
The next Roh Moo Hyun government (2003-2008) continued supplying public rental 
housings via new construction and the transformation of private rental housings to public 
ones. Moreover, by concentrating on the supply of National Rental Housing, the 
government attempted to create a variety of public rental housing systems in response to 
different families' housing needs (Jin, 2007; Y. Park, 2009; H. Park, 2012).  
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Table 7.1 Public Rental Housing in S. Korea (2010)  
 
Permanent 
public 
housing 
50-year public 
rental 
housing 
National 
rental housing 
(10&20 years) 
Rental 
housing 
for employees 
Selling to 
tenant after  
5or10-year 
contract 
Transforming private housing 
into public housing 
National rental 
housing 
Buying & 
Letting scheme 
Long-term 
tenancy 
public 
housing 
No. of dwelling 190,519 100,722 317,878 28,347 213,352 58,063 15,574 
As a % of the 
total public 
rental housing  
20.6 10.9 34.4 3.1 23.1 6.3 1.7 
Supply period 1989-1993 1993-1998 1998-present 1990-present 1993-present 
(10-year: 
from 2004) 
2004- present 2005-
pesent 
Rent contract deposit 
+monthly 
rent  
deposit 
+monthly rent  
deposit 
+monthly rent 
  
deposit 
+monthly rent 
 
deposit 
+monthly  
deposit 
+monthly rent 
  
deposit 
only 
or 
deposit 
+monthly 
rent  
Total Period 
of tenancy 
(including 
renewal)  
50 years 50 years - 10 & 20  
years 
 - 30 years at 
maximum 
3 / 5/ 50 
 years 
- 5 years  
- 10 years 
2 years  2 years 
The size of 
dwelling 
26.34-
42.68m² 
Less than 
 50 m² 
-More than  
60m² 
-60-50 m² 
-Less than  
50m² 
 Less than  
83 m² 
  
Tenant 
eligibility 
-lowest- 
income 
households  
-NBLS 
recipients 
Non owner-
occupier 
-lowest- 
income 
households  
-NBLS 
recipients 
-households 
with income 
less than 70% 
of average 
urban 
worker‘s 
income  
Private 
employees 
Non owner-
occupiers 
(HSS 
subscriber) 
-lowest- income households 
-NBLS recipients  
Source: Jin (2007), MLTM (2011) Table 11-3, p. 410. 
 
The government introduced a new public rental housing scheme, whereby the government 
agency purchases or hires unoccupied private housing on behalf of the public and 
transforms those houses into public rental housing. Moreover, the government changed the 
housing allowance in the NBLS system in 2008. In the national social security system, the 
eligible housing costs of the NBLS beneficiaries were subsidised only with NBLS Housing 
Benefit; other benefits made no allowance for housing costs. However, NBLS Housing 
Benefit was a fixed amount prior to 2008, and was adjusted only for household size. From 
2008, NBLS Livelihood Benefit and Housing Benefit were calculated based on household 
income, with 20.65% of NBLS benefit paid as Housing Benefit up to the benefit cap (see 
Section 7.2).  
 
The Lee Myung Bak government (2008-2013) has supported the diversity of public rental 
housing and increased the supply of public rental housing through the New Plus housing 
plan. In this period, the nationwide introduction of the Housing Voucher system has been 
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discussed as a housing policy instrument by the central government
35
. However, at the 
local level, the Seoul (capital city of S. Korea) Metropolitan government merged income 
support for housing costs of the low-income citizen and launched a rent subsidy 
programme
36
 in 2010. This Seoul Housing Voucher Programme is designed for low-
income private tenants ineligible for the NBLS benefit due to their income being higher 
than the NBLS means-test standard (Park & Oh, 2012). These changes reflect an 
awareness of the shortcomings of the housing allowance under the current social security 
system.   
 
 
7.2 The Design of Housing Allowance for Tenants in S. Korea 
 
 
The Korean housing allowance has been provided under the National Basic Livelihood 
Security (NBLS) system since 2000. Unlike housing allowances in the other three 
countries, the Korean housing allowance is not a separate social assistance benefit, but one 
of the seven benefits of NBLS system: Livelihood, Housing, Education, Health, Maternity, 
Funeral and Self-Support.  
 
Income Standard of NBLS Benefits Eligibility: Minimum Cost of Living  
The NBLS system aims to fill the income gap between the poverty line income and the 
low-income households' income for guaranteeing a minimum living income. For this 
purpose, the government's Minimum Cost of Living (MCL), has become the income 
standard for a household‘s NBLS benefit claim (Yeo et al., 2007). Therefore, if low-
income households wish to receive NBLS benefits including the Housing Benefit, their 
incomes should be less than the MCL, adjusted for household size (see Table 7.2). If any 
members of the household are able to work, the NBLS benefit will be provided on the 
condition that family member participates in the welfare-to-work programme or the Self-
Support Programme
37
. If the household‘s income is lower than the MCL for a given 
                                                 
35
 The implementation of Housing Voucher has been delayed until now. 
 
36
 The cap of Seoul City government‘s rent allowance is based on the minimum housing cost calculated for 
the Minimum Cost of Living. See Table 7.2 for the Minimum Cost of Living. 
    
37
 Under the NBLS scheme, the claimant who is able to work must participate in welfare to work 
programmes in order to receive NBLS benefits. Based on the claimant‘s labour ability level, job experience 
and the features of household, available welfare to work programmes, i.e. Self-Support Programme, are 
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household size, Livelihood and Housing Benefits are provided to meet their basic living 
costs. Other NBLS benefits are need-based.  
 
However, the maximum sum of the NBLS Livelihood and Housing Benefits is smaller than 
the MCL. This is because other social support allowances, such as medical care, school fee 
support and other cash benefits are considered as national income support. Therefore, these 
allowances are deduced from the MCL and the rest is the maximum NBLS Livelihood and 
Housing Benefits (c in Table 7.2).  
 
Table 7.2 The Minimum Cost of Living and the NBLS Benefit Cap in 2012 (KRW)  
 Household size 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
The MCL (a) 553,354 942,197 1,218,873 1,495,550 1,772,227 2,048,904 
Other allowances(b) 100,305 170,789 220,941 271,093 321,245 371,398 
NBLS benefit cap  
(c=a-b) 
453,049 771,408 997,932 1,224,457 1,450,982 1,677,506 
Max. Housing Benefit 
(19.348%* of c) 
87,656 149,252 193,079 236,906 280,736 324,583 
Max. Livelihood Benefit 
(80.652%* of c) 
365,393 622,156 804,853 987,549 1,170,246 1,352,943 
Source: MOHW (2012a).  
Note: *These ratios have been changed every year since 2008.  
 
The Arrangement of Housing Allowance in the NBLS system  
Under the NBLS system, both renters and homeowners are eligible for Housing Benefit. 
However, the households living in care homes or hospitals are ineligible for Housing 
Benefit, whilst they could receive other NBLS benefits. The NBLS Housing Benefit offers 
different allowances according to tenure types. Low-income renters could receive their 
allowances in cash and use the allowances for rent and housing repair costs. Low-income 
homeowners could use repair or maintenance services provided by the community service 
project team consisting of the NBLS welfare-to-work programme participants. The fixed 
amount of service charge is deducted from their housing allowance while the rest is paid to 
low-income homeowners in cash.   
 
Table 7.3 Monthly Deduction of Housing Benefit for Owner-Occupiers in 2012 (KRW) 
 Number of Household 
1 2 3 4 5 
Monthly  
Deduction  
26,000 45,000 58,000 71,000 86,000 
Source: MOHW (2012a).   
                                                                                                                                                    
assigned. These programmes are as follows; job search service, job placement, job training programme, low-
salary work for the public, internship programme, entrepreneurship programme and small business projects.  
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In 2008, the new NBLS Livelihood Benefit and Housing Benefit calculation rule was 
introduced. Prior to 2008, whilst the amount of Livelihood Benefit was income-based, 
Housing Benefit was based on the number of people in a household. Therefore, the same 
NBLS Housing Benefit was paid out to claimants with families of the same size, regardless 
of different income and housing needs. Thus, in 2007, 33,000 KRW was provided for one- 
and two-member households, 42,000 KRW for three- and four-member households and 
55,000 KRW for five- and six-member households (MOHW, 2007a).  
 
Eligible claimants of the NBLS Benefit now receive the Livelihood and the Housing 
Benefits with a fixed percentage. In 2008 the initial percentages of these benefits were 
79.35% and 20.65% for Livelihood Benefit and for Housing Benefit respectively (MOHW, 
2008b). As a result, every household could have Housing Benefits in different amounts. 
Moreover, while both Livelihood Benefit and Housing Benefit made allowances for the 
housing cost before 2008, only Housing Benefit makes allowances for housing costs to the 
NBLS beneficiaries. 
 
Figure 7.1 The NBLS Livelihood Benefit and Housing Benefit before and after 2008 
 
 
In the NBLS system, the benefit cap of Housing Benefit is the Minimum Cost of Housing 
(MCH), which is the amount of housing costs as a part of the MCL (15-17%). This MCH 
amount is also adjusted for the household. Therefore, the actual financial burden for 
housing costs payment of the low-income is not considered. This benefit rule is the clearest 
difference between the housing allowance systems in S. Korea and in the other three 
countries.  
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In 2010, 1,549,820 persons (3.2% of the population and 5.1% of all households in S. 
Korea) received NBLS benefits. Most NBLS recipients (95%) are general recipients 
receiving Livelihood and Housing Benefits together because they do not live in a care 
home or hospital.  
 
Table 7.4 The Number of NBLS Recipients from 2001 to 2010  
 Total recipients 
General recipients 
 (Eligible for HB) 
Other recipients* 
(Ineligible for HB) 
Year 
No. of 
household 
No. of 
recipient 
As % of 
total 
population 
No. of 
household 
No. of 
recipient 
As % of 
total 
recipients 
No. of 
recipient 
As % of 
total 
recipients 
  (person) (%)  (person) (%) (person) (%) 
2001 698,075 1,419,995 3.0 698,075 1,345,526 94.8 74,469 5.2 
2002 691,018 1,351,185 2.8 691,018 1,275,625 94.4 75,560 5.6 
2003 717,861 1,374,405 2.8 717,861 1,292,690 94.1 81,715 5.9 
2004 753,681 1,424,088 3.0 753,681 1,337,714 93.9 86,374 6.1 
2005 809,745 1,513,352 3.1 809,745 1,425,684 94.2 87,668 5.8 
2006 831,692 1,534,950 3.2 831,692 1,449,832 94.5 85,118 5.5 
2007 852,420 1,549,848 3.2 852,420 1,463,140 94.4 86,708 5.9 
2008 854,205 1,529,939 3.1 854,205 1,444,010 94.4 85,929 6.0 
2009 882,925 1,568,533 3.2 882,925 1,482,719 94.5 85,814 5.8 
2010 878,799 1,549,820 3.2 878,799 1,458,198 94.1 91,622 6.3 
Source: MOHW (2012b).  
Note: *NBLS recipients living in care homes or hospitals are not eligible for HB. 
 
Among households receiving the NBLS benefits, 55.7% are tenants whilst 12% are 
homeowners. Moreover, 16.7% of all NBLS households are tenants in Permanent Public 
Rental Housing for the lowest income household (MOHW, 2012b). In terms of family 
composition, households with elderly or disabled members comprise 48% of all NBLS 
recipients, whilst lone-parent households comprise approximately 12% of all recipients 
(MOHW, 2011).  
 
Figure 7.2 Households Receiving the NBLS Benefit in S. Korea  
 
(a) Tenure type (2011) (b) Family composition (2010) 
 
Source: MOHW (2012b) for (a); MOHW (2011) Table 6-1-6, p. 323 for (b).   
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7.3 The Analysis of Housing Allowance Effects on Tenants in S. Korea    
 
 
This section analyses the effectiveness of the Korean housing allowance for low-income 
tenant households. The analysis focuses on the effects of housing allowance in achieving 
different policy aims, i.e. improving income maintenance, housing affordability and work 
incentives for its beneficiaries. The changes in income maintenance after housing cost 
expenditures, financial burden for housing costs payments and work incentives by housing 
allowance provision are examined using different indicators in Table 7.5.  
 
Table 7.5 Indictors of Housing Allowance Effectiveness in Section 7.3       
Section Indicator Definition 
7.3.1 Income maintenance  
  7.3.1.1 1.Residual income after housing cost 
expenditures  
Residual Y1: Paying rent without HA 
Residual Y2: Paying rent with HA 
   
  7.3.1.2 2. Poverty Rate (PR)  
(poverty line: 60% of the national median 
income)  
PR1: Before paying rent & receiving HA  
PR2: After paying rent without HA 
PR3: After paying rent with HA 
   
7.3.2 Housing affordability  
 Rent to Income Ratio (RIR)  RIR1 : Paying rent without HA  
RIR2 : Paying rent with HA  
   
7.3.3 Work incentive   
  7.3.3.1 1.Income Replacement Ratio (IRR)= 
Household net income when unemployed 
Household net income when employed 
 
IRR1: Income excluding HA 
IRR2: Income including HA  
   
  7.3.3.2 2. Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) = EMTR1: Income excluding HA 
 
1  - 
Change in household net income 
Change in household gross income  
by 1 income unit 
 
EMTR2: Income including HA 
 
Note: Y and HA stand for household net income and housing allowance respectively. 
 
The 3rd wave dataset of Korea Welfare Panel Study (KOWEPS 2008) is used for analysis. 
The tenants receiving housing allowance (N=460) are the target of analysis. Since 2008, 
the revised housing allowance under the NBLS system has been implemented. However, 
the benefit rule applied for the analysis is the NBLS rule before 2008, which is the 
reference year of KOWEPS 2008 data collection. Therefore, there are some limitations 
when it comes to discussion regarding the effectiveness of housing allowance. Moreover, 
according to the limited information from the dataset, the categories of tenant type are 
different from those used in Chapters from 4 to 6. The Permanent Public Rental Housing 
tenant is one category and another category consists of other types of public housing 
tenants (see Table 7.1) and private rental housing tenants.    
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In S. Korea, low-income households eligible for NBLS Housing Benefit received housing 
allowance of 431,000 KRW, which accounts for 33% of rent expenditures. This housing 
allowance subsidised housing costs least for the lowest-income household among housing 
allowance recipients. Moreover, larger families are likely to receive larger housing 
allowances, although they also tend to pay higher rents. In addition, there is a significant 
difference in the housing cost subsidisation rate between Permanent Public Rental Housing 
tenants (50%) and other tenure types (29%).  
 
Table 7.6 Incomes, Rents and Housing Allowance of Tenant Recipients in S. Korea (000 
KRW, 2007 price)  
Total tenant with HA Annual HH income Annual HA Annual rents HA÷rents (%) 
Mean   7,388 431 2,066 33.0 
Total (%) 100.0     
Income Quintiles                    
1st Q (low Y) 20.6 4,218 402 2,001 27.4 
2nd Q 19.1 5,593 406 1,750 41.5 
3rd Q 20.4 6,602 424 1,866 33.1 
4th Q 20.4 8,127 460 2,074 32.4 
5th Q(high Y) 19.6 12,569 467 2,641 31.2 
 (F) (500,131.8***) (26,229.97***) (9,749.959***) (1,408.476***) 
Household Composition         
No children 19.6 7,371 396 1,587 37.9 
With children 32.3 9,955 506 2,661 29.6 
Pensioner 48.0 5,693 396 1,860 33.3 
 (F) (140,641.4***) (366,210.1***)  (39,635.39***)  (1,118.108***)  
Tenant Tenure                        
Permanent Public 
Rental Housing   
19.5 7,675 416 1,008 51.4 
Other public &  
all private housing  
80.5 7,334 435 2,293 28.7 
 (t) (37.60142***)  (-111.371***)  (-419.309***)  (247.0675***)  
Employment Status                
Unemployed 69.6 6,363 413 1,916 33.6 
Employed  30.4 9,777 474 2,332 31.6 
 (t) (-356.325***)  (-281.305***)  (-120.08***)  (14.66039***)  
Source: 2008 Korea Welfare Panel Study, author calculations.   
Note: HH, HA and Y stand for household, housing allowance and household net income 
respectively. *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 
 
Much like recipients of housing allowance in the other three countries, those in S. Korea 
are economically vulnerable. In practice, all poverty rates of housing allowance recipients 
based on three poverty lines are higher than those of non-recipients, regardless of housing 
cost expenditures and housing allowance receipt. Therefore, the housing allowance could 
be an important financial resource for relieving income and housing cost-related problems 
of low-income households in S. Korea.    
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Table 7.7 Poverty Rates before and after Housing Cost Expenditures in S. Korea (%) 
Poverty 
lines 
Total household 
(owner+tenant) 
Household without HA 
(owner+tenant) 
Household with HA 
(owner+tenant) 
 (N=6,314) (N=5,591) (N=723) 
 before HC after HC before HC after HC bf.HA&HC bf.HAaf.HC 
40% of median  13.1 22.2 10.5 18.6 47.2 70.1 
50% of median  19.6 28.9 16.0 24.8 66.2 81.4 
60% of median  25.1 35.4 21.0 31.3 78.2 87.7 
Source: 2008 Korea Welfare Panel Study, author calculations.   
Note: HA and HC stand for housing allowance and housing cost respectively.    
 
Moreover, the housing costs impose a severe financial burden on many Korean households 
which spend approximately 40% of their income on gross housing costs. Tenant 
households‘ rent-to-income ratio is higher than 30%, thus indicating severe housing 
affordability problems in S. Korea. It is found that the ratio of rent to income is higher for 
households who do not receive allowances than for housing allowance recipients. This 
might be because recipients of housing allowance are on low income and are eligible for 
public rental housing residency with below market rent. In addition, the financial burden 
arising from high market rent and repaying loan for large lump-sum deposit (almost 50% 
of housing price for sale) of the Korean private rental housing system may relate to this 
result.   
 
Table 7.8 Financial Burdens for Housing Cost Expenditures in S. Korea (%) 
Source: 2008 Korea Welfare Panel Study, author calculations.   
Note: HC, HA and Y stand for housing cost, housing allowance and household net income 
respectively. *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 
 
The remainder of this chapter examines the effectiveness of housing allowance for tenant 
recipients in achieving aims of social and housing policy and welfare-to-work transition in 
S. Korea.      
 
7.3.1 Social Policy Object: Income Maintenance Improvement  
 
As shown in Table 7.7, renters who receive a housing allowance are likely to have more 
serious income problems. However, considering housing allowance as an income support 
Housing affordability 
measures 
Total household 
 
Household  
without HA 
Household  
with HA 
t 
 (N=6,314) (N=5,591) (N=723)  
Gross HC over Y 39.5 39.1 44.8 -44.510*** 
 Total tenant Tenant without HA Tenant with HA  
 (N=2,233) (N=1,773) (N=460)  
Rent over Y 41.3 42.6 33.0 72.301*** 
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instrument, the household‘s economy would be expected to improve because of the 
reduced housing cost expenditure. This section will therefore analyse the effects of housing 
allowance on the income maintenance of the low-income tenant household. Two indicators 
are used: the change in residual incomes after rents and poverty rates by housing allowance.  
 
7.3.1.1 Residual Income after Rents  
 
If households have more residual income after rent payment when they spend their housing 
allowances on rent, the receipt of housing allowance contributes to the preservation of 
household income, which is a valuable resource for non-housing good consumption for 
low-income households. In practice, the provision of housing allowance makes changes to 
the residual income after rent payment for its beneficiaries: Their residual income after 
rents increased relatively by 11.6%. The improvement in the residual income after rent 
payment varies across households in S. Korea, as indicated in Table 7.9.  
 
Table 7.9 Changes in Residual Income after Rents by Housing Allowance in S. Korea (000 
KRW, 2007 price) 
Total tenant with HA Residual income after rents Absolute change Relative change 
  without HA with HA (000 KRW) (%) 
Mean   5,469 5,808 339 11.6 
Total (%) 100.0     
Income Quintiles     
1st Q (low Y) 20.6 2,044 2,410 367 30.4 
2nd Q 19.1 3,711 4,072 361 10.8 
3rd Q 20.4 4,804 5,133 329 7.5 
4th Q 20.4 6,401 6,737 336 5.6 
5th Q(high Y) 19.6 10,512 10,816 304 3.1 
 (F) (413,766.715***) (413,031.350***) (22,350.884***) (2,190.889***) 
Household Composition     
No children 19.6 5,631 5,999 368 12.1 
With children 32.3 8,123 8,407 284 3.6 
Pensioner 48.0 3,616 3,981 365 16.8 
 (F) (156,862.785***) (151,812.332***) (180,413.583***) (1,494.152***) 
Tenant Tenure     
Permanent Public  19.5 6,516 6,864 348 6.4 
Other public & 
private  
80.5 5,215 5,552 337 12.8 
 (t) (140.901***) (142.995***) (53.365***) (-48.518***) 
Employment Status     
Unemployed 69.6 4,396 4,752 355 14.5 
Employed  30.4 7,924 8,227 304 4.9 
 (t) (-372.405***) (-368.015***) (320.130***) (62.944***) 
Source: 2008 Korea Welfare Panel Study, author calculations.   
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income respectively.  
*p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 
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Household Income Level 
The receipt of housing allowance increases the residual income after rent payment for all 
low-income households in S. Korea. Moreover, the housing allowance take-up is more 
likely to improve the income maintenance after housing costs expenditure for the lowest-
income households. The absolute and relative changes in the residual income after rent 
payment by housing allowance were most notable for the lowest-income group (30%) and 
least notable for the highest-income group (3%). The Korean housing allowance rule pre- 
2008 was not based on the household income and the actual housing costs. Nevertheless, 
the lowest-income households which were under the most pressure from housing costs 
were the most likely to maintain their incomes because of the housing allowance.  
 
Household Composition  
As the 2007 NBLS Housing Benefit rate increases with household size, larger households 
are more likely to receive greater housing allowances compared to smaller households. In 
practice, families with children receive larger housing allowances than families without 
children. However, the increased housing allowance did not always contribute to a more 
significant increase in the residual income after housing costs expenditure. Both the 
absolute and relative changes in residual income after rent payment were smallest for 
families with children: 284,000 KRW and 3.6% respectively. Although families with 
children received more generous housing allowances, their housing costs were less 
subsidised by the housing allowance because they paid higher rents (see Table 7.6). In 
contrast, the receipt of housing allowance is more likely to be effective for income 
maintenance after housing costs expenditure for pensioners and households without 
children. These households‘ residual income after housing costs increased more than it did 
for families with children, although the size of the benefit itself was smaller. In this respect, 
it is necessary to consider the actual housing costs of individual households for the housing 
allowance rate in order to reflect on a family‘s housing need.   
 
Tenant Tenure  
As the rent of the Korean public rental housing is capped by the government at 55-83% of 
the local rental price in the private housing sector, there is a price gap between public and 
private rental housing. The tenants of Permanent Public Rental Housing paid half the rent 
of those living in private rental housing and other public housing (see Table 7.6). Moreover, 
the different changes in the residual income after rent payment emerged by tenure types: 
Whilst the absolute change in the residual income after rent payment was larger for 
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Permanent Public Rental Housing renters (348,000 KRW) compared to other renters 
(337,000 KRW), the relative change in the residual income after rent payment was lower 
for Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants (6.4%), which was only a half of the others 
(12.8%). However, the NBLS system has not considered the differences in rents between 
tenure types and applies a uniform rule to all tenants. Although, there is a difference in 
residual income changes between tenant groups, this is not related to the features of the 
housing allowance system. Rather, the outcome is associated with other family features 
regarding original rent costs or household income.  
 
Employment Status  
The Korean housing allowance system has never reflected actual housing costs (before and 
after 2008). However, the employed recipient who paid the higher rents received greater 
housing allowances than the unemployed recipient, although the former have more income 
than the latter. However, the receipt of housing allowance is likely to be more effective to 
reduce income problems for out-of-work households with low income than for working 
households with high income. Both the absolute (355,000 KRW) and relative changes 
(14.5%) in the residual income after rent payment by housing allowance are larger for 
unemployed households than for employed households. Therefore the Korean housing 
allowance contributes to the income improvement more for lower-income unemployed 
households which are more economically vulnerable than employed households.   
 
7.3.1.2 Poverty Rate      
 
The next indicator of income maintenance improvement is poverty rate changes by housing 
allowance-whether the increase in residual income after rent payment by the receipt of 
housing allowance is linked to poverty alleviation. Three poverty rates (PR1, PR2 and 
PR3) compared are based on different household incomes according to the provision of 
housing allowance and housing costs expenditures (see Table 7.5).  
 
The poverty rates of S. Korea's housing allowance recipients tend to be higher than those 
of non-recipients as presented in Table 7.7. Moreover, rent payments without housing cost 
subsidy are likely to worsen poverty problem for them: PR2 is higher than PR1 and PR3. 
However, whilst the housing allowance provision accounted for 11.6% of the relative 
change in the residual income after rent payment for the beneficiaries, the poverty rates of 
its beneficiaries relatively declined by an average of only 1.6%. 
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Table 7.10 Changes in Poverty Rates by Housing Allowance in S. Korea (%) 
Poverty lines   60% of median income Absolute  
change (%p) 
PR2–PR3 
Relative 
change (%) 
PR2–PR3 
Total tenant with HA  PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HA af.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
Mean  (%) 83.0 89.6 88.2 1.4 1.6 
Total 100.0       
Income Quintiles      
1st Q (low Y) 20.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
2nd Q 19.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
3rd Q 20.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
4th Q 20.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
5th Q(high Y) 19.6 13.2 47.0 39.9 7.1 15.2 
       
Household Composition      
No children 19.6 86.4 88.9 88.9 0.0 0.0 
With children 32.3 57.6 75.1 70.8 4.3 5.8 
Pensioner 48.0 98.8 99.7 99.7 0.0 0.0 
       
Tenant Tenure       
Permanent public  19.5 83.7 86.8 85.1 1.7 2.0 
Other public & 
private  
80.5 82.9 90.3 89.0 1.3 1.5 
      
Employment Status      
Unemployed 69.6 93.5 95.1 95.1 0.0 0.0 
Employed  30.4 59.0 77.1 72.5 4.6 6.0 
Source: 2008 Korea Welfare Panel Study, author calculations.   
Note: HA, HC and Y stand for housing allowance, housing cost and household net income 
respectively. For poverty rates based on 40% and 50% of median income, see Table A.6 in 
Appendices. 
PR1: poverty rate when housing allowance is not provided and before housing costs 
payment. 
PR2: poverty rate when housing allowance is not provided and after housing costs payment. 
PR3: poverty rate when housing allowance is provided and after housing costs payment. 
 
Household Income Level   
Although the tenants receiving housing allowances are regarded as living with the lowest 
income, among them, lower-income groups suffer the most from poverty after housing cost 
expenditures. Even after they receive allowance for rent payment (PR3), most lower-
income households among housing allowance recipients still live in poverty. However, the 
income of these households increased as a result of the housing allowance provision. The 
housing allowance improved poverty rates better for the higher income groups than did it 
for lower-income groups. The receipt of housing allowance contributes to the absolute 
(7.1%) and relative (15.2%) decreases in poverty rates for the allowance recipients with the 
highest income. Although these households are also low-income households receiving a 
means-tested benefit, their incomes could more easily increase to the poverty line through 
the reduction in housing costs expenditure with housing allowances. Therefore, the 
improvement in residual income after housing costs as a result of the housing allowance is 
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most likely to reduce the income deficit for higher-income households than for lower-
income households in S. Korea.  
 
Household Composition  
Among housing allowance recipients, families with children pay the highest rent. 
Therefore, their higher financial burdens are more likely to exacerbate their income 
problems if they do not receive a housing allowance. As is evident from Table 7.10, the 
change in the absolute poverty rate between PR1 and PR2 is larger for households with 
children than for pensioners and households without children. When housing allowances 
are used for rent payment, the poverty rates after rent payment are reduced for all 
households. However, regardless of housing cost expenditures with or without housing 
allowance, the poverty rates are lowest for households with children, whilst the poverty 
rate is quite high for most pensioners and households without children. In addition, the 
poverty rate decreased as a result of the housing allowance receipt only for households 
with children: The absolute reduction was 4.3% and the relative reduction was 5.8%. As 
the higher income of families with children indicates, those households‘ incomes are much 
closer to the poverty line; thus, they are more likely to escape from poverty through the 
housing allowance provision and have more opportunities for non-housing consumption 
after housing cost expenditures compared to childless families and pensioners, although the 
improvement in residual income after housing costs was better for households without 
children and pensioners.   
 
Tenant Tenure  
Whilst Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants have higher incomes than other low-
income tenants, their rent costs are just half of others in S. Korea. Therefore, it is expected 
that poverty might be less of a problem for Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants. In 
practice, the poverty rates are lower for Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants 
compared to other housing tenants. The Korean housing allowance alleviates the poverty 
for all types of tenants. Among them, Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants experience 
slightly higher absolute and relative reduction in poverty rates compared to other tenant 
groups. Moreover, Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants have greater residual income 
after rent payment and thus they are more likely to escape poverty resulting from decreased 
housing costs payment. Again, households with higher income are at an advantage for 
solving poverty problems by the receipt of housing allowance.    
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Employment Status     
Out-of-work households receiving housing allowance are more likely to fall into poverty 
than are working households, regardless of housing costs. In addition, whilst out-of-work 
households have paid lower rents than working households, housing expenditure could 
increase more the risk of poverty for out-of-work families than for working families, as 
shown by the larger increase in poverty rates from PR1 to PR2 in Table 7.10. However, the 
take-up of housing allowance is more likely to alleviate poverty problems for the employed 
than for the unemployed. The absolute and relative reductions in poverty rates were better 
for working families than workless families. Whilst the increase in the residual income 
after rent payment by the housing allowance provision was larger for out-of-work 
households than for working households, this result did not bring about a more reduction in 
the poverty rate for the former than the latter. Therefore, employed higher-income 
households are more likely to alleviate poverty problems stemming from housing costs 
when compared to unemployed lower-income households through the receipt of housing 
allowance.  
 
Summary: Income Maintenance Improvement  
Although the Korean housing allowance system has never been calculated based on the 
actual housing costs, it does help the poor households maintain their income after housing 
cost expenditures to a certain degree. This benefit improves the residual income after rent 
payment for its beneficiaries. In addition, the income increase by housing allowance 
receipt is slightly related to poverty alleviation. However, rather households with the better 
income maintenance by the housing allowance provision, households with higher income 
experience the more reduction in poverty rates as a result of the housing allowance receipt 
and thus have more opportunities for non-housing good and service consumption after 
housing costs expenditures.   
 
7.3.2 Housing Policy Object: Housing Affordability Improvement  
 
The high ratio of housing costs to income indicates the undesirable division of the limited 
financial resources for low-income household. Therefore, if the housing allowance relates 
to the decrease in this ratio, the housing allowance contributes to the reduction of housing 
cost related poverty for the poor household. In practice, the housing costs impose a heavy 
financial burden on low-income tenant households in S. Korea. If they do not receive 
housing allowance, they spend a third of their income on rent (see Table 7.11). However, 
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the housing allowance take-up could ease their financial burden for rent costs because their 
Rent to income ratio (RIR) would drop from 33.6% to 26.4%, thus improving their housing 
affordability by 33%, although they still have problem when it comes to affording housing 
costs.  
 
Table 7.11 Changes in Rent to Income Ratio by Housing Allowance in S. Korea (%) 
Total tenant with HA Rent to Income Ratio Absolute change Relative change 
  without HA with HA (%p) (%) 
Mean  33.6 26.4 7.2 33.0 
Total (%) 100.0     
Income Quintiles      
1st Q (low Y) 20.6 55.0 43.8 11.2 27.4 
2nd Q 19.1 33.4 25.6 7.8 41.5 
3rd Q 20.4 29.9 23.1 6.8 33.1 
4th Q 20.4 26.4 20.5 5.9 32.4 
5th Q(high Y) 19.6 22.2 18.2 4.0 31.2 
 (F) (44,672.627***) (30,787.947***) (207,977.132***) (1,408.476***) 
Household composition     
No children 19.6 25.9 19.1 6.7 37.9 
With children 32.3 31.1 25.1 6.0 29.6 
Pensioner 48.0 38.3 30.2 8.1 33.3 
 (F) (12,968.576***) (10,875.454***) (29,794.458***) (1,118.108***) 
Tenant Tenure      
Permanent Public  19.5 14.9 8.6 6.3 51.4 
Other public & 
private  
80.5 37.7 30.3 7.4 28.7 
 (t) (-466.900***) (-482.276***) (-126.718***) (247.068***) 
Employment Status     
Unemployed 69.6 35.8 28.0 7.8 33.6 
Employed  30.4 27.3 21.6 5.7 31.6 
 (t) (153.120***) (123.509***) (293.093***) (14.660***) 
Source: 2008 Korea Welfare Panel Study, author calculations.   
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income. RIR less than 20: 
A household does not have a housing affordability problem. RIR between 20 and 30: A 
household has a housing affordability problem. RIR over 30: A household has a severe 
housing affordability problem. *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 
 
Household Income Level  
In S. Korea, lower-income recipients of the housing allowance have greater financial 
burdens arising from expenditure on housing costs, as shown by their higher RIRs in Table 
7.11. In reference to the lowest-income group, their non-housing consumption is 
considerably limited as they spend half of their income on rent. However, the housing 
allowance contributed to the reduction in RIRs of all income groups, although the pre-2008 
Korean housing allowance was linked to family size and the benefit was based on the 
minimum housing cost standard set by the government. Although it is unlikely to solve the 
housing affordability problem for all income groups, the tenants with the highest incomes 
could solve housing affordability problems because their RIR falls to 20% or below. 
Moreover, the RIR of higher-income groups decreases the most whilst the absolute change 
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in RIR is larger for the lowest-income group. This is because the housing allowance 
subsidises the housing cost of the higher-income household more than it does the housing 
cost of the lowest-income household, although the size of housing allowance receipt is 
larger for the lowest-income group compared to others. Therefore, the housing allowance 
has a greater effect on reducing the financial burden for housing cost expenditures of 
higher-income households. Both their higher residual income and lower RIR give them 
more opportunity to spend their income on non-housing good necessities.  
  
Household Composition  
Although families with children pay higher rents compared to other families, RIR was 
higher for pensioners. Moreover, among pensioner households, there are still housing 
affordability problems when their housing costs are subsidised with housing allowances. 
Unlike the housing allowances in Sweden and the Netherlands, there has never been a 
supplementary element of housing allowance for pensioners in S. Korea. In particular, as 
the pensioner households' residual income is smallest, the housing costs are likely to place 
a heavier financial burden on pensioners and restrict more significantly their non-housing 
consumption opportunities. However, the absolute changes in RIR are bigger for 
pensioners while the relative changes in RIR are larger for pensioners and for families 
without children. Whilst pensioners and families without children pay lower rents than 
families with children, more of their housing costs are subsidised by the housing allowance 
when compared to families with children. Therefore, the take-up of housing allowance 
could improve their RIR more than the RIR of families with children. However, unlike 
households without children, pensioner households are more likely to have housing 
affordability problems because their RIRs are higher compared to others, despite the 
absolute and relative reductions in RIR.  
 
Tenant Tenure  
Unlike other household groups, there was a significant difference in RIR between 
Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants and other types of tenants in S. Korea. Whilst 
Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants receiving housing allowance do not have 
housing affordability problems (RIR below 20%), other households do (RIR above 30%) 
even with the housing allowances. Therefore, the low-income tenants of Permanent Public 
Rental Housing could maintain their residency with below market rent, as the lowest- 
income households receiving social security benefit are eligible for Permanent Public 
Rental Housing tenancy. Moreover, they have more residual income after housing costs 
 177 
than other housing tenants. Furthermore, these households‘ RIR decreased relatively by 
50% through the take-up of housing allowance, although the absolute decrease in RIR is 
smaller for Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants compared to other tenants. This is 
because Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants‘ housing costs are further subsidised by 
the provision of housing allowance, although the size of housing allowance is smaller for 
Permanent Public Rental Housing. In the Korean rental housing system, the rent of 
Permanent Public Rental Housing is lower than it is for other public and private rental 
housing. In addition, the rent of all public housings is capped by the government at a price 
which is lower than local private housing rents. Therefore, under the current housing 
allowance system, which does not consider the gap in rent between different types of rental 
housing, non-Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants remain at a disadvantage.    
  
Employment Status  
Although unemployed households receiving housing allowance pay lower rents than 
employed households do, housing costs place a heavier financial burden on unemployed 
households. Whilst the RIR for out-of-work households is around 30%, regardless of 
housing allowance take-up, the RIR remained between 21% and 27% for working 
households. Moreover, as the residual income after housing costs payment is larger for 
employed households, their income problems are less severe than for unemployed 
households after housing cost expenditures. However, both the absolute and relative 
reductions in RIR by housing allowance take-up were better for unemployed households 
(7.8% and 33.6%, respectively) than for employed households (5.7% and 31.6%, 
respectively). Although unemployed households receive smaller housing allowances than 
working households do, their rent costs are lower and are more subsidised by the housing 
allowance. Therefore, the housing allowance is more likely to relieve the financial burden 
for housing costs for out-of-work households.  
 
In S. Korea, the improvement in RIR is related to the extent to which the housing costs of 
low-income households are subsidised by housing allowance. The problem of housing 
affordability as measured by RIR is worst for pensioners and the private housing tenants. 
Moreover, the housing allowance is not effective in solving housing affordability problems 
of pensioners and private housing tenants. This is due to the fact that the Korean housing 
allowance scheme does not provide additional allowance with housing costs for the 
disadvantaged family by the benefit arrangement. Moreover, the benefit arrangement does 
not reflect the actual rent price gap between the public and private housing markets. This is 
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the weakness of the Korean housing allowance system, the benefit rules of which should 
certainly be changed.  
 
7.3.3. Housing Allowance as Work Incentive or Disincentive Booster   
 
The work incentive is an important instrument of the welfare-to-work transition, as the 
financial benefit affects the choice of employment or unemployment by welfare 
beneficiaries who are able to work. The provision of housing allowance could change the 
beneficiary‘s income and thus affect his or her incentive to find a job. In this study, two 
indicators are used to measure the work incentive for low-income households who are 
receiving housing allowances (see Table 7.5). The changes in each indicator by the receipt 
of housing allowance are compared to examine the effects of housing allowance on 
incentive to work. However, this research does not examine the possible changes in the 
work-poor‘s behaviour in labour market according to work incentive changes. The analysis 
will focus on the extent of work incentive for working-aged households receiving housing 
allowance and the increase or decrease in their work incentives by the receipt of housing 
allowance.  
 
The first indicator, Income Replacement Ratio (IRR) is the extent to which a worker‘s 
employment income would be replaced with social security benefit provision while being 
unemployed. A high IRR means that the household could maintain its income at a certain 
degree without labour force participation. This high RIR is understood as the work 
disincentive, which could lead the working poor to unemployment, indicating the 
possibility of the unemployment trap. The second indicator, Effective Marginal Tax Rate 
(EMTR), refers to the extent of a worker's additional net earnings after tax and social 
security contributions. Because the high EMTR indicates a small increase in the net 
income by extra work, the working poor are more likely to remain in their poverty state, 
meaning the probability of the poverty trap.  
 
The measurement of IRR and EMTR is based on changes in the income, social security 
benefits and tax contribution of each household. In order to impute IRR and EMTR, this 
study uses the equations and parameter values for income tax, national insurance 
contributions and social security benefit of S. Korea from OECD Taxing Wages books 
(OECD, 2006, 2007) as well as the country information files of S. Korea from the OECD 
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Benefits and Wages
38
. Again the model for IRR and EMTR imputation is based on the pre- 
2008 NBLS rules and tax rules. Among the households from the 2008 Korea Welfare 
Panel Study, only working-aged households are subject to the analysis of this section. 
However, whilst working-aged households receiving housing allowance are used in EMTR 
analysis, only working-aged and employed households receiving housing allowance are 
used in IRR analysis.    
 
Before interpreting the results of housing allowance recipients, it might be helpful to look 
at the work incentives of working-aged households in S. Korea. As shown in Table 7.12, 
working households which are not receiving housing allowance have more incentives than 
households receiving housing allowance: Working households may perceive 
unemployment as less attractive (lower IRR) and see employment as a way out of poverty 
(lower EMTR).  
 
Table 7.12 Work Disincentives of Housing Allowance Recipients and Non-Recipients in S. 
Korea (%)  
 
Total household 
(Working-aged) 
Household Without HA Household with HA 
 
Mean (100.0) (97.7) (2.3) t 
EMTR  18.7 18.5 26.8 -84.604*** 
 
Total household 
(Working-aged & Employed) 
Household Without HA Household with HA  
 (100.0) (99.4) (0.6)  
IRR  39.5 39.3 86.1 1,747.834*** 
Source: 2008 Korea Welfare Panel Study, author calculations.   
Note: HA stands for housing allowance. *p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 
 
With regards to EMTR, there is higher incentive to increase labour force participation in S. 
Korea. As the average EMTR is 18.7%, workers would pay around a fifth per extra income 
increase by 1 income unit for tax and social security contribution and take the rest home. 
However, this incentive is smaller for households receiving housing allowance than for 
non-recipient households. Moreover, there is a considerable difference in IRR between 
housing allowance recipients and non-recipients among working households. Whilst the 
incomes of housing allowance recipients are to be replaced by social security benefit at 
86% of the current income, the incomes of non-recipients are to be replaced at only 39% 
when the main wage earner becomes unemployed. This would be more likely to lead to 
                                                 
38
 For detail, see OECD Social Policies and Data, Benefits and Wages: Country Specific Information internet 
site (http://www.oecd.org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/benefitsandwagescountryspecificinformation.htm).  
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unemployment for working-poor recipients of housing allowance. These results seem to be 
contradictory as they indicate both the increased possibility of choosing unemployment 
whilst the decreased possibility of being in poverty when the housing allowance recipients 
intend to work extra hours.  
 
In the following sections, I examine the work incentive of tenant housing allowance 
recipients and the effects of the housing allowance on work incentive changes.  
 
7.3.3.1 Income Replacement Ratio: Unemployment Trap  
 
The IRR of working tenants who receive housing allowance is quite high: over 80%. This 
means that the unemployment income of the working-poor recipients of housing allowance 
is 80% of their employment income. Therefore, these families face a higher possibility of 
falling into the unemployment trap. However, the absolute and relative changes in IRR by 
housing allowance are just 1%. Therefore, since the housing allowance hardly changes the 
IRR, its effect on work incentive changes is minimal in S. Korea. The differences in IRR 
changes among family groups are shown in Table 7.13.        
 
Table 7.13 Changes in Income Replacement Ratio by Housing Allowance in S. Korea (%) 
Total tenant with HA 
(Working-aged & Employed)  
IRR1 
(without HA) 
IRR2 
(with HA) 
Absolute change 
IRR1-IRR2 (%p) 
Relative change 
IRR1-IRR2 (%) 
Mean   83.7 84.5 0.8 0.9 
Total (%) 100.0     
Income Quintiles     
1st Q (low Y) 9.6 87.2 88.2 1.0 1.1 
2nd Q 33.7 79.4 80.5 1.1 1.4 
3rd Q 14.6 83.8 84.5 0.7 0.8 
4th Q 14.7 89.6 90.0 0.4 0.4 
5th Q(high Y) 27.4 84.6 85.1 0.5 0.6 
 (F) (4,708.864***) (4,154.959***) (22,683.130***) (21,224.970***) 
Household Composition     
No children 26.1 84.6 85.7 1.2 1.4 
With children 73.9 83.4 84.0 0.6 0.8 
 (t) (18.155***) (27.868***) (170.688***) (128.200***) 
Tenant Tenure     
Permanent Public  15.1 82.4 83.4 1.0 1.2 
Other public & 
private  
84.9 83.9 84.7 0.7 0.9 
 (t)  (-27.747***) (-25.893***) (30.877***) (29.746***) 
Employment Status     
All in work 85.3 82.7 83.5 0.8 1.0 
Some in work  14.7 89.6 90.0 0.4 0.4 
 (t) (-179.621***) (-171.510***) (192.137***) (188.560***) 
Source: 2008 Korea Welfare Panel Study, author calculations.   
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income respectively.  
*p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 
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Household Income Level  
When employed tenants receiving housing allowance become unemployed, the high rate 
replacement of the income by social security benefits makes unemployment attractive. For 
households of different incomes, the lowest- and the second-highest income groups are 
more likely to face low work incentive due to their IRRs of around 90%, although the 
difference in IRRs is small. For all income groups, the receipt of housing allowance 
accounts for approximately 1% of absolute and relative changes in IRR. However, the 
increase in IRR is bigger for lower-income households than higher-income households 
among housing allowance recipients. The Korean housing allowance affects income 
maintenance when the working-poor family enters or leaves the labour market. With this 
income maintenance effect, the receipt of housing allowance could have a negative effect 
on the intention to work and escape the welfare dependency, although the difference in 
IRR by the take-up of housing allowance is small.  
 
Household Composition  
The IRRs of families with children are slightly lower than those of childless families. 
Families with children could maintain similar levels of employment and unemployment 
income when they choose unemployment. As higher IRR could reduce the working poor‘s 
intention to participate in labour market or workfare programmes, families with children 
are less likely to be trapped in unemployment. Moreover, both the absolute and relative 
increases in IRR by housing allowance take-up are bigger for households without children. 
Housing allowance improves the low-income households‘ residual income after rent and 
social security benefits help them maintain their incomes when they choose a different 
employment status; thus, unemployment is more likely to be attractive for households 
without children than for households with children. Therefore, in order to reduce the 
likelihood of being trapped in unemployment, the differentiated benefit arrangements 
according to both family types and their incomes should be considered.  
 
Tenant Tenure  
As the IRRs of Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants are lower than those of other 
tenants, Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants would maintain a lower portion of their 
current working income if they became unemployed. Therefore, the work disincentive 
affecting the working-poor tenant‘s choice of employment or unemployment might be 
lower for Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants than for other tenant households. 
However, the take-up of housing allowance represents the larger absolute and relative 
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changes in IRR of Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants compared to other public 
rental housing tenants and private tenants. Therefore, the housing allowance receipt could 
increase the possibility of the unemployment trap for Permanent Public Rental Housing 
tenants. Moreover, the effect of housing allowance receipt on the decrease in their 
intention to work might be less important for private housing tenants than for Permanent 
Public Rental Housing tenants. The low-income of these households will make them 
eligible for Permanent Public Rental Housing residency below market rent even when they 
become unemployed. In contrast, private housing tenants and other public housing tenants 
face a more serious financial burden for rent costs than tenants in Permanent Public Rental 
Housing. Although their IRRs are higher than those of Permanent Public Rental Housing 
tenants, it might not be easy for them to give up their main earnings as the loss of income 
would intensify their housing and income problems. Therefore, Permanent Public Rental 
Housing tenants are more likely to be trapped in unemployment due to their high IRR and 
lower rent than private sector tenants, although their income replacement ratios are not 
better when compared to other types of tenants.   
 
Employment Status  
The IRR is higher for families of which one adult in a couple works. These families are 
more likely to maintain their income at a similar level when they become unemployed: 
Thus work incentive is lower for households of which one adult of the couple works. As 
seen in Section 7.3.1, the effect of housing allowance on income maintenance after rent 
payment is smaller for employed households than it is for unemployed households. 
However, when working households become unemployed, the housing allowance 
contributes to their income maintenance while leaving the labour market because the 
receipt of housing allowance increases the IRRs of both working household groups. In 
addition, both the absolute and relative increases in IRR are bigger for households where 
all adults are working. In terms of the working poor‘s welfare-to-work transition, greater 
labour participation of household members who are able to work could result in a faster 
transition from dependency on in-work benefit to independence from welfare. However, 
the housing allowance for these households could reduce their intention to work than it 
would for working-poor households due to their higher changes in IRR by the receipt of 
housing allowance. Therefore, housing allowances are likely to have a greater negative 
effect on the households with more labour force participation and more engagement in the 
welfare-to-work transition.  
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7.3.3.2 Effective Marginal Tax Rate: Poverty Trap  
 
Although work incentives for extra labour are smaller for housing allowance recipients 
than for non-recipients as the former‘s EMTR is higher (26.8%) than that of the latter 
(18.7%), housing allowance recipients could take around 70% of one additional earning 
unit home. Moreover, the EMTR of tenants receiving housing allowance is approximately 
20%, as seen in Table 7.14. Therefore, housing allowance recipients have incentives to 
increase their labour force participation and earn additional income. However, the EMTR 
of the low-income tenant receiving housing allowance does not change by the provision of 
housing allowance in S. Korea. It might relate to the fact that the size of housing allowance, 
which may cause earning changes does not differ according to the income under the pre-
2008 NBLS rule used for the analysis. As the pre-2008 housing allowance is adjusted for 
family size, the same benefit is paid to households of the same size, regardless of income. 
Therefore, the difference in household disposable incomes before and after a 1% earnings 
increase could be the same, regardless of the inclusion or exclusion of housing allowance 
for income calculation. If the amount of housing allowance changes with household 
income, the EMTR results would be different.  
 
Table 7.14 The Effective Marginal Tax Rate of HA Recipients in S. Korea (%)  
Total tenant with HA 
(Working-aged) 
EMTR F or t 
Mean    21.0    
(%)       
Income Quintiles 1
st
(low Y) 2nd 3rd 4th 5
th
(high Y)  
(100.0) (21.6) (18.5) (19.3) (22.8) (17.8)  
 7.3 40.2 34.8 7.3 20.1 (F=5,923.872***) 
Household Composition No children With children  
(100.0) (27.0) (73.0)  
 16.4 22.7 (t=-30.999***) 
Tenant Tenure Permanent Public Rental Other public & private  
(100.0) (9.9) (90.1)  
 54.4 17.3 (t=84.934***) 
Employment Status Unemployed Employed  
(100.0) (11.7) (88.3)  
 7.3 22.8 (t=-136.453***) 
Source: 2008 Korea Welfare Panel Study, author calculations.   
Note: HA and Y stand for housing allowance and household net income respectively. 
*p <0.05 **p <0.01 ***p <0.001 
 
Household Income Level 
There might be more incentive to increase labour participation for the lowest- and the 
second-highest income groups than for other income groups. They could preserve more 
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than 90% of their extra earnings per one income unit increase whereas other income groups 
could save 60-70% of extra income increase. Therefore, if these five working-poor groups 
receiving housing allowance increase their labour participation, the lowest- and the second-
highest-income groups would reap greater financial rewards than households of other 
income groups. However, the lowest- and the second highest-income groups‘ IRR is higher 
than that of other housing allowance recipients. Therefore, whilst the possibility of being in 
unemployment trap is higher for them, they are also more likely to escape poverty if they 
increase their labour force participation. For these groups, the social security system needs 
to provide greater incentives to increase their working hours.  
 
Household Composition 
The difference in EMTRs between these two family types is not as big as findings relating 
to household income, tenancy and employment status. Both households with and without 
children could take around 80% of one extra earning home when they increase their labour 
participation. However, when these households increase their working hours or accept a 
job, families with children are more likely to remain in poverty because their EMTR is 
higher than it is for families without children. This might be because the current income 
tax credit and other social security benefits for the working-poor with children are still 
insufficient in the Korean welfare system. However, the IRR of working families with 
children is slightly lower than it is for working families without children and thus the 
possibility of the unemployment trap is less for families with children. Therefore, greater 
incentives to remain employment should be provided for families with children within the 
welfare-to-work programme.   
 
Tenant Tenure 
Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants tend to be at a higher risk of being trapped in 
poverty due to their higher EMTR (over 50%) whilst the EMTRs of other public housing 
tenants and all private tenants are less than the average EMTR. In terms of working tenants, 
Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants are more likely to be trapped in unemployment 
because of their stable rental tenancy and lower housing costs burden, although their IRRs 
are lower compared to the IRRs of other tenants. However, the social welfare system, even 
the housing allowance arrangement, does not consider this difference between public and 
private housing tenants in S. Korea.   
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Employment Status 
A workless family‘s EMTR is three times lower (7.3%) than a working family‘s EMTR 
(22.8%). Therefore, unemployed households might be more likely to seek a job because 
these households could take more than 90% of their one additional income home. 
However, although employed households might preserve their increased earnings at lower 
rates than unemployed households, the poverty trap seems to be low for both types of 
households. Because they would save around 80% of an additional income unit by extra 
labour participation, the work incentive may be enough to convince them to increase their 
labour force participation.  
 
Whilst the Korean households receiving housing allowance observe the work incentives to 
increase the labour participation, they also face the work disincentive expressed by income 
replacement and marginal increase in take-home pay. However, taking into account 
housing allowance‘s function as income support, an interesting result that the provision of 
housing allowance does not affect the increase or decrease of work incentive for its 
beneficiaries emerged.  
 
 
7.4 Summary  
 
 
For the last decade, the S. Korean social security system has provided housing allowance 
to the low-income household as an income supplement for housing cost expenditures. 
However, despite the change in the post-2008 NBLS benefit arrangement, the housing 
allowance does not actually consider housing costs of low-income households. The benefit 
cap of the Korean housing allowance is still calculated with the national average housing 
costs at minimum level. Moreover, due to the adjusted benefit rate for the family size, the 
larger families could receive a more generous housing allowance than smaller families if 
their incomes are similar.  
 
As the housing allowance is not tailored to the actual housing cost expenditures, housing 
allowances in S. Korea have a smaller influence on tenants with higher rent payments than 
such allowances do in other countries. Nevertheless, the receipt of housing allowance 
improves the residual income after rent expenditure of low-income tenants and also 
decreases their housing affordability problems. The effects of housing allowance on 
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income maintenance and housing affordability are better for the lowest-income recipients, 
pensioners and families without children as well as the unemployed recipients. However, 
the housing allowance-related reduction in poverty rate is less likely to occur among 
lower-income than among higher-income tenants, which is similar to findings in the other 
three countries. Moreover, the change in the poverty rate is smaller in S. Korea. This is 
because the government has set the housing allowance rate at a minimum cost standard of 
livelihood. 
  
The housing allowance for low-income tenants has lightened the financial burden of 
housing costs and provided more opportunities for non-housing goods and services 
consumption for their living. However, the housing cost subsidies are not based on the 
actual housing cost expenditures but on household size. Therefore, although the Korean 
housing allowance eases the considerable burden for housing cost payment for low-income 
tenants, some tenants who are struggling to pay their rent still have housing affordability 
problems when they receive housing allowances. In particular, housing affordability for 
pensioners in S. Korea has improved less than in the other three countries which provide a 
supplementary allowance for housing costs (such as Sweden) or apply a more generous 
benefit rate (such as the Netherlands) for such families. Hence, it is essential that the 
housing allowance system considers different forms of families in addition to income and 
housing costs.   
 
Moreover, the receipt of housing allowance as income supplement could affect the change 
in work incentives for the working poor. For some NBLS beneficiaries, their benefits are 
conditional on their participation in the welfare-to-work programme. For them, the work 
incentive helps them to escape welfare dependency. However, this could pose a dilemma 
for recipients of the Korean housing allowance because the strong disincentive to keep a 
job and the powerful incentive to increase labour force participation exist at the same time. 
Although the effects of housing allowance receipt on work incentive changes is small, it 
appears with the changes in income replacement by welfare benefit while being 
unemployed. Therefore, the NBLS housing allowance should be arranged with attention to 
its two opposite outcomes. 
  
This study is based on the pre-2008 Korean NBLS system, according to which the housing 
allowance is based on family size, rather than on the actual housing costs or income. Still, 
the NBLS housing allowance is not based on the low-income household‘s actual housing 
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cost need. As long as the NBLS housing allowance is based on the average minimum cost 
for housing set by the government and does not consider the actual financial burden for 
housing costs, considerable changes in income maintenance, housing affordability and 
work disincentive might not be expected in S. Korea.  
 
                       
Chapters 4 to 7 of this study have examined the effectiveness of housing allowance 
provision in each county of the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and S. Korea. The next 
chapter will compare the results of Chapters 4-7 whilst simultaneously analysing the 
changes in low-income tenants‘ income maintenance, housing affordability and work 
incentives in the four countries.   
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Chapter 8. Comparing the Effectiveness of Housing Allowance for 
Tenants 
 
 
Introduction  
The aim of this study is to examine the effectiveness of housing allowance as a rent 
subsidy programme for low-income tenants and explain how varied institutional features of 
housing allowance systems make different changes in income maintenance, housing 
affordability and work incentives in the four countries. This chapter compares the features 
of housing allowance systems and findings obtained by examining five indicators—the 
Residual Income after Housing Costs, Poverty Rate, Rent to Income Ratio (RIR), Income 
Replacement Ratio (IRR) and Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR)—to find connections 
among the various housing allowance systems and their effects on the low-income 
households‘ living conditions. In Section 8.1, I will compare the features of housing 
allowance systems in the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and S. Korea in terms of the 
selection of beneficiaries, benefit size and design complexity. In Sections 8.2 through 8.4, I 
will explain how changes in these five indicators are associated with the institutional 
feature of the housing allowance systems in the four countries.  
 
 
8.1 The Design of Housing Allowance for Tenants in the Four Countries 
 
 
The aim of housing allowances in the four countries is quite similar: to reduce a low-
income household‘s financial burden arising from housing costs and therefore secure 
residential stability and protect household from deprivation. However, similarities and 
differences in the national housing allowance system among the four countries reflect the 
varied features of each country‘s housing allowance system that contributes to the 
difference in housing allowance effectiveness. This section focuses on the three aspects of 
the housing allowance design—the eligibility conditions for housing allowance entitlement, 
the subsidisation rule for housing costs and the structural complexity of the housing 
allowance system—in the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and S. Korea. 
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8.1.1 Eligibility Conditions for Housing Allowance Entitlement 
 
Low-income Households versus the Social Assistance Recipients 
In the four countries, the most crucial housing allowance eligibility condition is a 
claimant‘s economic status because a means test is the gateway to the housing allowance 
entitlement. However, differences occur in how a means test is carried out for claimants 
across the countries. Although the means test for the housing allowance is separated from 
the main social assistance in the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden, no separate means test 
for housing allowance exists in S. Korea. The Korean housing allowance is part of the 
national social assistance system, the National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) system, 
meaning the eligible beneficiaries of the housing allowance are confined to only NBLS 
recipients who qualify for residential conditions (i.e. not living in a care home or hospital).  
 
As Table 8.1 presents, the share of housing allowance recipients of the entire population or 
total households is least for S. Korea, at just around 5% of the total population. In contrast, 
housing allowances in the three European countries subsidise a greater proportion of the 
population compared to S. Korea. The share of the Dutch housing allowance recipients is 
highest: A third of total households receive housing allowance. The share of the UK 
recipients is around 8%, which is similar to the Swedish results. This is because both social 
assistance recipients and other low-income households passing the means test for housing 
allowance entitlement are able to receive housing allowance in the UK, the Netherlands 
and Sweden. Unlike benefit rules of these countries, the benefit rule of the Korean NBLS 
system restricts the size of low-income households receiving a housing allowance. 
  
Table 8.1 Housing Allowance Recipient Share of Population in the Four Countries (%)  
 the UK the Netherlands Sweden S. Korea 
Year 2011 2008  2010 
% of Population  7.8 - Housing Supplement for 
pensioner only: 4.4 (2008) 
- 
% of Household - 30 HA for families with and 
without children only: 3.9 
(2010) 
NBLS recipients 
eligible for NBLS HB: 
5.1 
 
In practice, low-income households in S. Korea are placed in a more economically 
vulnerable situation compared to other countries. As presented in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3, 
poverty is more widely spread in S. Korea: The relative poverty rate of S. Korea is higher 
(15%) than that of the Netherlands (7.2%), Sweden (8.4%) and the UK (11.3%). Moreover, 
the income distribution among the population is more unequal in S. Korea than in the 
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Netherlands and Sweden. Even when unemployed low-income households receive a 
housing allowance, income maintenance is worse for the Korean households than those in 
the other three countries. This is because the unemployment benefit, including the housing 
allowance, replaces a lower portion of employment income in S. Korea (see Table 8.3). 
Therefore, poor households with an income level slightly higher than the NBLS eligibility 
income threshold face more serious income and housing problems than those who are 
eligible for the housing allowance in S. Korea.  
     
Condition for the Maximum Benefit Provision  
In each country, different conditions must be met for the maximum benefit rate up to the 
cap of housing allowance provision. These conditions are commonly the household‘s 
income level or family composition or both. However, the ways in which these conditions 
are applied in the national system differ among the countries. In the UK, low-income 
households receiving social assistance are able to take their housing allowances at the 
maximum rate according to their eligible rent and other deductions. For other households, 
the housing allowance is reduced according to the difference between their incomes and 
the amount of their personal allowances, which vary across family types.  
 
Moreover, in the Netherlands and Sweden, both income and family composition affect the 
reduction of housing allowance from the maximum rate. In the Netherlands, the household 
income level, family member‘s age and family composition determine the size of housing 
allowance provision and subsidisation rates for different ranges of housing costs. In 
Sweden, the income standard for the maximum benefit provision and the housing 
allowance reduction rate are adjusted for family types. Whilst the maximum benefit rate is 
applied when a household‘s income is lower than this income standard, the size of housing 
allowance is reduced from the maximum rates by applying tapers according to family types, 
if a household‘s income is higher than the income standard.   
 
However, although the current Korean housing allowance system (post-2008) adopts the 
household income level as well as household size for the benefit arrangement, household 
size only influenced the benefit provision in the pre-2008 system, which is the rule used for 
the data analysis in the study. The pre-2008 Korean housing allowance system offered 
fixed-amount benefits: The fixed higher rate housing allowance is provided to bigger 
families while the lower rate to smaller families. In addition, household income had no 
effect on the benefit arrangement of the Korean housing allowance recipients before 2008.  
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Reflection of National Rental Housing Structure upon Benefit Arrangement for Different 
Tenancies   
The situation of tenant households within housing markets varies by their rental market 
structures: One is the ‗unitary‘ rental system in the Netherlands and Sweden and the other 
is the ‗dualist‘ rental system in the UK and S. Korea. Although the housing allowance 
system subsidises housing costs for both social and private housing tenants in the four 
countries, differences emerge in the way in which the housing allowance system considers 
the feature of the national rental housing system. In the ‗unitary‘ rental system countries, 
the same housing allowance rule is adopted for all claimants, regardless of their tenancy 
types. However, whilst the UK housing allowance applies different benefit caps to the 
social housing tenant and the private housing tenants (e.g. the local-based rent reference of 
LHA for private tenants), the Korean housing allowance system does not consider the 
‗dualist‘ rental structure.  
 
Due to the same benefit rule for both public and private housing tenants, the housing 
allowance system is likely to provide fewer financial advantages to the private housing 
tenants facing a higher burden for rent payments compared to the public housing tenants in 
S. Korea. If the housing allowance system does not deal with the housing price gap 
between different tenant tenures in the ‗dualist‘ rental system, one tenant tenure would 
receive ‗double benefits‘—living in housing with sub-market rent prices and receiving the 
housing allowance from the national system—whilst another tenure group would be at a 
disadvantage. This could weaken the effects of the housing allowance in terms of 
improving the income and housing problems of the low-income private housing tenants.  
 
8.1.2 The Subsidisation for Eligible Housing Costs  
 
Although the four countries‘ housing allowance systems aim to relieve financial burdens 
associated with housing cost payments, only some sorts of housing costs are regarded as 
eligible for the housing allowance claim. Moreover, differences exist in the range of 
‗eligible housing costs‘ for the housing allowance claim among countries: Whilst rent is 
regarded as an eligible housing cost for housing allowance in the UK, the Netherlands and 
S. Korea, the rents plus heating costs are eligible costs for housing allowance in Sweden. 
In assessing households‘ housing costs, this eligible housing cost concept is applied to 
determine the ultimate size of housing allowance provision. However, the amount of  
housing allowance is calculated based on the amount of eligible housing costs based on 
 192 
actual rent cost expenditures in the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden whereas the 
calculation of the housing allowance is not based on the actual housing costs in S. Korea. 
Therefore, the information about housing cost payments and eligible housing costs is not 
collected for the benefit claim process in S. Korea.  
 
The core issue is the extent to which the national housing allowance system could 
subsidise these assessed eligible housing costs. In practice, the UK housing allowance 
subsidises the greatest portion (77.5%) of assessed eligible housing costs, which is twice as 
high as the subsidisation rates in the other three countries. This high subsidisation rate is 
associated with one of the benefit rules in the UK‘s housing allowance system. In the UK, 
the various benefits-calculation rules are applied according to the claimant‘s entitlement of 
social assistance benefits (e.g. Income Support). If the housing allowance claimant receives 
one of these benefits, their housing allowance amount is the same as their assessed eligible 
housing costs under the benefit cap. Indeed, most UK housing allowance recipients are 
also social assistance recipients. Moreover, no benefit makes allowance for housing costs 
in the UK‘s social security system. Although the low-income household in other countries 
might use some parts of their personal allowance for housing cost expenditures, they 
cannot do it in the same way in the UK. Therefore, when we compare the subsidisation rate 
of housing allowance only, the UK‘s rate is likely to be higher than that of the other 
countries.  
  
However, in Sweden and the Netherlands, the housing allowance claimants are likely to 
receive a smaller housing allowance compared to their assessed eligible housing costs. 
Their systems adopt a ‗gap‘ structure, requiring a personal contribution for housing cost 
payments with their own income and subsidise with different rates according to the 
housing cost level, which are large for the low level housing costs and small for the high 
level housing costs. In Sweden, if a household‘s income is larger than the income standard 
for the maximum benefit, the provision of housing allowance is reduced by applying 
different tapers (20% or 33%) according to family types. The Swedish housing allowance 
also subsidises 50% or 75% of a claimant‘s assessed eligible housing costs, at most. In the 
Netherlands, the housing allowance system requires low-income households to contribute 
to their rent payments with their income. Moreover, the Dutch housing allowance system 
subsidises the housing costs at three different rates: 100% for the lowest limit, 75% for 
middle and 50% for highest limit. Finally, before 2008, the Korean claimants received a 
fixed amount of housing allowance adjusted to household size; even after 2008, the 
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housing allowance provision is not based on the actual rent payment and subsidises just 
partial rents in S. Korea.   
 
8.1.3 Simple versus Complex Structure of Housing Allowance System 
 
Among the four countries‘ housing allowances, the Korean housing allowance is likely to 
be least supportive because only rents are partially subsidised by a fixed amount of housing 
allowance, which is adjusted for household size (pre-2008 system). The housing allowance 
provision did not consider the feature of family, such as household income, house space 
and/or housing costs, in S. Korea. Moreover, the benefit amount is based on the minimum 
expenditures of housing costs because the government calculates a fixed amount of 
housing allowance with the Minimum Cost of Living (MCL). This standard cost is imputed 
for the national poverty line and used to determine the maximum social assistance benefit 
cap in Korea. However, the housing costs accounted for just 15-17% of MCL. In practice, 
the expenditure for housing allowance was less than 10% of the total NBLS benefit 
expenditure before 2008 (MOHW, 2008a). The Dutch housing allowance system has quite 
a simple, yet reasonable structure for its housing allowance system: the claimants‘ self-
contribution to rent payment according to their income and three tiers of housing cost 
limits with different subsidisation rates.  
 
The Swedish housing allowance system works with the most complicated eligibility 
filtering and benefit arrangement. The housing allowance is determined based on the 
family composition and income level. There are three-band housing expenditure limits, 
two subsidisation rates (50% and 75% of the eligible housing cost) and two tapers (20% 
and 33%), which are applied according to family types and household income. The 
housing allowance would be reduced from their maximum amount when households‘ 
incomes are over the income threshold, which varies according to family types. Some 
portions of the housing allowance include the supplementary allowance for the children of 
family with children and for the elderly.  
 
Moreover, it seems that the UK housing allowance system has a similar structure as the 
Swedish housing allowance; once claimants pass a means test, they are categorised into 
two groups and different benefit calculation rules are applied to them. Although the social 
assistance recipients could receive the same amount as their assessed rent cost up to benefit 
caps, the housing allowance amount of the non-social assistance is different from those of 
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social assistance recipients because their housing allowance is the same as the amount that 
their assessed rent costs minus 65% of the difference between household income and the 
applicable amount. Regarding the applicable amount, the UK housing allowance reflects 
the household‘s feature upon the size of the applicable amount: the higher rate of the 
applicable amount for families with children or the elderly. This applicable amount affects 
the size of the housing allowance reduction because the difference between the 
household‘s income and the applicable amount is deducted from the maximum benefit 
amount. Therefore, if the household income is similar across different families, the higher 
applicable amount gives advantages to households because of the smaller deduction from 
the maximum housing allowance provision.   
 
However, the benefit arrangements are simpler in the Netherlands and S. Korea compared 
to those of the UK and Sweden because the Dutch and Korean housing allowance systems 
use only family size or family composition to determine the benefit amount. If the 
claimants are eligible for housing allowance after the means test, they can take up their 
allowances, although there are variations in benefits among family groups between the two 
countries. The Dutch housing allowance system decides the size of housing allowances 
according to the claimants‘ family types; it applies higher benefit cap limits for single, 
elderly and disabled households than for large families. Under the Korean housing 
allowance system, which is the simplest one, the fixed housing allowances adjusted to 
household size were given to the social assistance beneficiaries before 2008. 
 
Of course, the UK and the Swedish housing allowance systems consider different family 
features in the entire process of the housing allowance arrangement. For example, different 
income limits, personal allowance standards and benefit deduction rules are applied to 
household members in the UK system. Moreover, the Swedish housing allowance system 
has a more sophisticated benefit arrangement adjusted for the family‘s specific condition 
(e.g. income, housing space limit and family composition) compared to other countries‘ 
system. Therefore, the structure of the benefit arrangement process is more complex in the 
UK and Sweden, where other family characteristics and housing conditions are 
simultaneously considered, in contrast to the Netherlands and S. Korea.  
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Table 8.2 Design of Housing Allowances for Tenants in the Four Countries  
 the UK the Netherlands Sweden S. Korea*** 
Beneficiary 
 
SA* recipients and non-recipients who passed HA income-test SA* recipients only  
Tenant tenure 
 
All tenant tenure 
Eligible housing cost 
(main) 
 
Rents Rents Rents + heating  Rents 
Floor space limit 
 
LHA** since 2011 No Yes No 
Subsidisation for 
eligible housing cost  
-Full for SA recipients 
-Partial for non-SA 
recipients  
 
Partial for all  Partial for all  
 
Partial for all 
Differentiation  
applied by  
 
Family type  Family type & size Family type & size  Family size  
Reduction by family 
condition 
 
Yes  
(SA receipt or not)  
No  Yes  
(income threshold) 
No 
Benefit arrangement  -Assessed eligible HC 
for SA recipients 
-Taper applied HA for 
non-SA recipients 
-3 tiers of rent limits 
with different 
subsidisation rate 
-Varied rates and 
taper  
Fixed HA adjusted to 
family size  
Note: *SA refers to the national social assistance benefit in each country; **in 2011, the UK 
housing allowance system introduced the maximum rates adjusted for the number of 
bedrooms and set the rate of a four-bedroom property as the maximum rate of Local 
Housing Allowance for private tenants; ***the NBLS Housing Benefit pre-2008.    
 
In terms of household‘s living conditions, although households receiving housing 
allowance are low-income households, their living conditions are different among the four 
countries as seen in Table 8.3.  
 
Table 8.3 Income Distribution and Income Maintenance by Social Security System in the 
Four Countries  
 Income distribution Income maintenance by social security system 
 
Poverty rate 
Gini coefficient of 
income inequality 
Gross 
replacement rate 
Net replacement rate 
 excluding (a) including (b) 
 Social Assistance & Housing Allowance 
Year  2008 2009 2009 2010 2010 
      
UK 11.3* 0.3422 11 29 49 
Netherlands 7.2 0.2937 33 38 68 
Sweden 8.4 0.2611 38 43 60 
Korea 15.0 0.3150 9 20 35 
OECD 11.1 0.3152**    
Source: OECD Income Distribution and Poverty database for Poverty rate 
(www.oecd.org/els/social/inequality); OECD Tax-Benefit Models for Gross and Net 
Replacement Rates (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives).  
Note: * 2007, ** 2008. 
1) Poverty rate is defined as a percentage of persons living with less than 50% of median 
equalised household income. 
2) Gross Replacement Rate is defined as the average of the gross unemployment benefit 
replacement rates based on incomes before any tax and social security contributions have 
been deducted, or cash benefits (social assistance and housing allowance) received. 
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3) Net Replacement Rate is defined as the average of the net unemployment benefit 
replacement rates based on incomes after any tax and social security contributions have 
been deducted and cash benefits (social assistance and housing allowance) received. 
4) (a) is based on incomes after any tax and social security contributions when social 
assistance and housing allowance are not received. 
5) (b) is based on incomes after any tax and social security contributions have been 
deducted when social assistance and housing allowance are received. 
 
Compared to the Netherlands and Sweden, poverty is more widely spread in the UK and S. 
Korea. Low poverty rates are generally related to low income inequality (Atkinson & 
Marlier, 2010), and the two continental European countries studied here have lower overall 
income inequality than the UK and S. Korea. Therefore, low-income households in the UK 
and S. Korea are placed in worse living conditions compared to those in the Netherlands 
and Sweden. Moreover, the social security system works to a varied extent of income 
protection for unemployed households. Similar to the result of income distribution between 
the two continental Europe countries and the UK and S. Korea, the income maintenance 
effect of the housing security system is likely to be higher for households in the 
Netherlands and Sweden than those in the UK and S. Korea. Regardless of the income tax 
and social insurance contribution payments and income-related social assistance and 
housing allowance entitlement, the unemployed household‘s income is well maintained by 
the receipt of social security benefits in the Netherlands and Sweden due to their higher 
income replacement rate compared to those in the UK and S. Korea. This is related to the 
common characteristic of the Dutch and Swedish social security systems, with their 
generous social security benefit and supplementary income-related benefit system.  
 
Moreover, in S. Korea, the social protection provided by the social security system has 
generated less momentum than that in the other three countries. As seen in Table 3.1 of 
Chapter 3, the social protection expenditures of the Korean government did not reach half 
the social protection shares of GDP in the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden. Therefore, we 
can find that the Korean housing allowance system is likely to offer fewer social benefits 
compared to other countries analysed in this study. These contextual factors create 
differences in the design of housing allowances and different housing allowance 
effectiveness is not only caused by the housing allowance itself but also by these 
contextual factors.  
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Table 8.4 Current Situation of Housing Allowances for Tenants in the Four Countries 
 the UK the Netherlands Sweden S. Korea 
Welfare regime  Liberal Corporatist/Social 
democratic 
Social democratic East Asian 
The national rental 
housing structure 
Dualist Unitary Unitary Dualist 
Recent changes  -2008, LHA for 
private tenant 
-2011, benefit cap 
for LHA 
-April 2013, total 
social benefit cap for 
working-aged 
households and 
reduction for under-
occupying in social 
housing  
-October 2013, 
replaced with UC 
2008, standard rent 
calculation formula 
introduced 
2010, Swedish Pension 
Agency administers 
housing supplement for 
old-age pensioner 
2008, NBLS benefit 
calculation rule 
changed 
Poverty rate (50% of 
median income) (2008) 
11.3 7.2 8.4 15.0 
Gini coefficient (2009) 0.3422 0.2937 0.2611 0.3150 
Net income replacement 
rate by social security 
benefit (%) (2010) 
49 68 60 35 
HA Share of GDP (%) 
(2007)*  
1.15 0.38 0.47 0.03 
Social Protection Share 
of GDP (%) (2007)*  
20.5 20.1 27.3 7.5 
*Source: see Tables 3.1 in Chapter 3 and Table 8.3. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will compare the results of research indicators-changes 
in residual household income after rents, housing affordability and likelihood of work 
disincentive increase-by housing allowance provision in the four countries.  
 
 
8.2 Improvement in Income Maintenance of Low-Income Tenants  
 
 
In order to examine the effectiveness of housing allowance for its beneficiaries‘ income 
maintenance, we focused on the change in the residual income after rents and poverty rates. 
The change in the residual income after rents shows the effect of housing allowance on the 
household‘s finance directly whereas the poverty rate presents the housing allowance‘s 
effect on a household‘s poverty problem as a whole. As Table 8.5 presents, the housing 
allowance beneficiaries could maintain greater incomes after paying rents when the 
housing allowance is provided than when this benefit is not provided. Moreover, their 
poverty rates decrease due to their income improvement stemming from the housing 
allowance provision. Thus, the housing allowance contributes to low-income households‘ 
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income maintenance, thereby expanding the probability of non-housing good and service 
consumption after housing cost expenditures. Indeed, the more relative changes in the 
residual income after rents payment by housing allowance provision do not relate to a 
greater reduction in poverty rates in all countries. However, differences in changes in 
residual income after rents and poverty rates exist amongst the four countries. In the 
following sections, I will discuss whether and how this result is related to the design of the 
housing allowance system in its national policy environment.    
 
Table 8.5 Changes in the Residual Income after Rents and Poverty Rates by Housing 
Allowance in the Four Countries  
Mean (%) the UK the Netherlands Sweden S. Korea 
Rent subsidisation rate by HA  77.5 36.0 40.5 33.0 
Relative change in residual income after 
rents   
61.0 21.3 70.1 11.6 
Poverty rate before HA provision  72.3 93.8 89.9 89.6 
Poverty rate after HA provision 61.6 85.0 86.5 88.2 
Absolute change in poverty rate (%p)  10.7 8.8 3.4 1.4 
Relative change in poverty rate   14.7 9.4 3.8 1.6 
Note: This result is limited to tenant housing allowance recipients in the four countries. In 
the UK and S. Korea, the pre-2008 housing allowance system was analysed here.     
 
8.2.1 Changes in the Residual Income after Rents by Housing Allowance  
 
Two clear differences exist in the changes in income maintenance between the three 
European countries and S. Korea. First, the Korean housing allowance recipients 
experience smaller changes in the residual income after paying rents as well as poverty rate 
by housing allowance provision compared to households in the other three countries. 
Concerning this result, it is necessary to consider the contextual factors surrounding the 
housing allowance system. The characteristic of the national housing allowance would not 
be the only reason for explaining the difference in the results of this study because budget 
and policy limitations exist in each country. For example, countries place different 
importance on the housing allowance in the welfare policy expenditure. Moreover, these 
countries differ in the total social protection expenditure, with 28% of GDP in Sweden, 
20% of GDP in the UK and Netherlands, followed by only 7% of GDP in S. Korea in 
2007. Therefore, the Korean housing allowance is anticipated to have less influence on 
changing households‘ economic status. Second, the larger housing allowance provision and 
the higher subsidisation rates are associated with improved income maintenance in the UK, 
the Netherlands and Sweden. Moreover, two major factors nested in the housing allowance 
design are associated with the changes in the income maintenance by housing allowance. 
The first factor concerns the way in which the national housing allowance system 
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subsidises the housing costs. The second factor concerns the way in which the benefit 
arrangement considers various family features.  
 
Reflection of the Actual Size of Financial Burden for Rents Cost   
In the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden, the calculation of housing allowance size is based 
on the actual rent payment paid by claimants. Although there are benefit caps in each 
country, the provision of housing allowance might be bigger for households with a higher 
rent payment compared to those with a lower rent payment. This could contribute to the 
greater reduction in rent payment, which seems to be associated with improved income 
maintenance to some extent in the three European countries. However, the actual rent 
payment was not considered in the process of the housing allowance calculation in S. 
Korea before (and after) 2008 system and the benefit rates were decided by the size of 
families. Hence, it is not anticipated that more benefits would result in improved income 
maintenance. In practice, the results of income maintenance and housing affordability have 
confirmed the limitation of the housing allowance provision that does not consider the 
actual rent payment in S. Korea.    
 
Reflection of Family Characteristics   
When the improvement in income maintenance is compared by households‘ features (i.e. 
household income level, family composition, tenant tenure and employment status), 
several results are related to the way in which the housing allowance system considers 
different family features for the benefit arrangement. First, concerning the household 
income level, the UK and the Swedish housing allowance systems have separate rules of 
benefit calculation according to the household‘s income level (and the social assistance 
entitlement in the UK). In practice, the relative changes in the residual household income 
after rents were bigger for lower income groups in these countries.  
 
Second, the housing allowance system considers different features of families for benefit 
arrangement (e.g. family size or the number of children or pensioners in a family) because 
these features could be related to the size of housing consumption and non-housing 
consumption for a living. In the UK, the housing allowance provision makes more absolute 
and relative changes in the residual income after rents for families with children and 
pensioners because their personal allowances are commensurate with their family 
composition. In Sweden and the Netherlands, pensioners and childless families experience 
more income changes through the housing allowance provision compared to families with 
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children. The additional allowance for housing costs for the elderly in Sweden and the 
higher benefit cap for elderly people in the Netherlands are more likely to decrease these 
households‘ financial burdens. In the case of S. Korea, the social assistance benefit (i.e. 
NBLS) is based on the National Minimum Cost of Living, which is only adjusted for 
family size. Although the Korean housing allowance provision also changes with the 
number of family members, it does not reflect other family characteristics as in the case of 
other countries. However, it is noted that families with children receiving the housing 
allowance experience smaller income changes compared to other family types.   
 
Third, there are differences in the changes in the residual income after rents by housing 
allowance provision according to tenants‘ tenure in the four countries. The same benefit 
rules are applied to both the private and social housing tenants in Sweden and the 
Netherlands, yet the improvement in the residual income after rents differs among tenure 
groups. The problem is found in the case of the low-income tenants in S. Korea. In the 
Korean rental housing market, the price gap between private and public rental housing can 
be noted. The government has set the rent price cap for public housing and supplied public 
rental housing for low-income households (e.g. Permanent Public Rental Housing
39
).  
 
However, the Korean housing allowance system does not employ any devices resolving 
rent gap among tenants with different tenures. Moreover, Korean low-income households 
not living Permanent Public Rental Housing are more likely to face serious income and 
housing affordability problems compared to others. The relative changes in residual 
income after rents is likely to be larger for the private housing tenant because their original 
income level is lower compared to households living in Permanent Public Rental Housing. 
Significant differences in the reduction in housing affordability problems between the two 
tenure groups in Korea exist, indicating that the Korean housing allowance systems do not 
adequately reflect this rental structure.  
 
Another explicit common finding of residual income changes is that workless households 
have shown better absolute and relative changes in residual income after rents in the four 
countries, although no separate benefit rules for households‘ employment status existed in 
all four countries. However, improvement in income maintenance by housing allowance 
could raise the work disincentive issue for those capable of working among the housing 
                                                 
39
 This kind of public rental housing was supplied to accommodate the lowest-income household (e.g. social 
assistance beneficiaries) in S. Korea. See Table 7.1 in Chapter 7. 
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allowance recipients. This is a different kind of issue from income maintenance—namely, 
the increase in work disincentive by housing allowance provision in the hypothetical 
unemployment or employment position. This issue will be discussed in Section 8.4.  
 
8.2.2 Changes in Poverty Rates by Housing Allowance  
 
Another issue of income maintenance is the extent to which a change in the income 
maintenance by housing allowance provision improves poverty of low-income households 
receiving housing allowance. The poverty problem of housing allowance recipients tends 
to be more serious compared to poverty problems of non-housing allowance recipients 
across all four countries. Moreover, the financial burden for housing cost is quite high. In 
practice, low-income households receiving housing allowance in the four countries spend 
30-50% of their household incomes on rent. This would increase poverty problems for the 
low-income households. However, the provision of housing allowance gives financial 
advantages to low-income households‘ finances because they spend less income on 
housing costs than they would if they do not receive housing allowance; thus, they could 
have more residual income after rents. Hence, it is anticipated that the reduced rent 
payments through housing allowance could play a role in tackling the poverty problem and 
lead to the increased non-housing necessities consumption needed for a living. In practice, 
the poverty rates after the provision of the housing allowance decreased across all four 
countries, although there are differences in the poverty rate changes among these countries.  
 
However, a greater improvement in residual income after rents does not necessarily lead to 
a more poverty rate reduction when we look at the national averages. The relative income 
change is best for the Swedish housing allowance recipients (70.1%), followed by the UK 
households (61%) and the Dutch households (21.3%). The improvement is smallest for the 
Korean households (11.6%). In contrast, both absolute and relative changes in poverty 
rates are largest for the UK households, followed by the Dutch households, with around 
3% in Sweden and 1% in Korea (see Table 8.3). These results could be related to the result 
indicating that housing allowance provision is more likely to subsidise the UK households‘ 
rents rather than those of households in other countries. However, the housing allowance in 
S. Korea does not reduce poverty as much among low-income households as in other 
countries. Their poverty rates changed by fewer than 2% points due to the housing 
allowance provision. This result could be related to the smallest changes in residual income 
after rents by housing allowance provision in S. Korea compared to other countries. In 
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addition, the Korean housing allowance does not reflect the actual rent payment of its 
beneficiaries. Therefore, the changes in residual income after rents as well as poverty rates 
are likely to be smaller compared to those of other countries.  
 
Commonly, the poverty rate changes more for the low-poverty households compared to 
other types of households in all four countries, regardless of the size of housing allowance 
provision and the high or low subsidisation rate for housing costs. In practice, the housing 
allowance recipients with higher incomes are more likely to experience better 
improvement in poverty rates compared to other recipients with lower income in the four 
countries. The growth in the residual income after rents due to the provision of housing 
allowance could help fill the gap between the poverty line income and the low-income 
household‘s income. However, except for this common feature, there are differences 
among household subgroups facing the greater decrease in poverty rate amongst the four 
countries: They are pensioners in the UK and the Netherlands, but they are families with 
children in Sweden and Korea; they are public and housing association tenants in the UK, 
private housing tenants in the Netherlands and social tenants living in Permanent Public 
Renal Housing in Korea; they are workless households in the UK but working households 
receiving housing allowances in the other three countries.  
 
Therefore, contrary to the result of the residual income after rent changes, it is not easy to 
draw a connection between the factors within the housing allowance design and the 
poverty rate reduction. The provision of housing allowance accounts for the improvement 
in low-income households‘ income problems. However, the poverty rate change is 
subordinate to the change in residual income after rents by housing allowance. Some 
household groups with a greater housing allowance provision or a higher subsidisation rate 
are likely to experience the greater poverty rates reduction compared to others in the UK 
and the Netherlands. However, other household groups do not show the same results. 
Moreover, it has been shown that housing allowance recipients experiencing greater 
poverty rate reduction are unlikely to experience changes in the residual income after rents 
by housing allowance compared to others in Sweden and S. Korea. 
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8.3 Reduction in Housing Affordability Problem of Low-Income Tenants  
 
 
Compared to the households not receiving a housing allowance, the households with the 
housing allowance experience a greater financial burden arising from housing cost 
payments in all four countries, as indicated by their higher Rent to Income Ratio (RIR) in 
Table 8.6. Therefore, if such households pay their rent costs from their own incomes 
without housing allowances, their household budget for non-housing consumption would 
be lessened. Indeed, the low-income tenants receiving a housing allowance spent between 
one-third and half of their incomes on rent payments. 
  
Table 8.6 Changes in Rent to Income Ratio by Housing Allowance in the Four Countries  
Mean (%) the UK the Netherlands Sweden S. Korea 
RIR without HA 45.2 44.0 54.7 33.6 
RIR with HA 9.7 27.7 31.0 26.4 
Absolute change in RIR(%p) 35.6 16.3 23.7 7.2 
Relative change in RIR  77.5 36.0 40.5 33.0 
Note: This result is limited to tenant housing allowance recipients in the four countries. In 
the UK and S. Korea, the housing allowance system before 2008 was analysed here.     
 
However, concerning the changes in RIR, differences exist between the UK tenants 
receiving the housing allowance and those in the other three countries. Although the low-
income tenants receiving the housing allowance do not have a housing affordability 
problem due to the provision of housing allowance, those in other countries still have 
problems affording their housing cost expenditures as their rent costs account for 
approximately 30% of their incomes, even when the housing allowance is provided to them. 
Moreover, the UK housing allowance recipients experienced the greatest absolute and 
relative changes in RIR.  
 
The differences in the housing cost subsidisation rules in the UK and the other three 
countries could explain this result. The housing allowance system aims to reduce low-
income households‘ rent cost burden. However, at the same time, it prevents the housing 
allowance from subsidising the entire rent costs in all circumstances, as evident in the UK, 
where it is possible to have all eligible rent subsidised by housing allowance receipt. To 
address this issue, the housing allowance system adopts some practical devices, such as 
benefit caps or residual space limits. Such tools were likely to be less strong in the UK 
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(before 2011)
40
 compared to similar efforts in the Netherlands and Sweden. For example, 
the UK housing allowance claimants receiving social security benefits could receive the 
maximum amount of the housing allowance for the assessed eligible housing costs. If low-
income tenants do not receive social security benefits, a single taper (65%) is applied for 
benefit reduction, irrespective of other household features. In contrast, other countries‘ 
housing allowance system contains strict rules, such as the limit on living space and 
housing costs for which the household can claim housing allowance in Sweden and the 
definite benefit limits adjusted for household types in the housing allowance systems in the 
Netherlands and S. Korea. Moreover, in S. Korea, the size of NBLS housing allowance is 
based on the national minimum housing costs. Therefore, it cannot be expected that the 
Korean housing allowance recipients could experience the same improvement in housing 
affordability as recipients in the other three countries. 
  
Concerning the changes in RIR by household groups in each country, an identical result 
was found across the four countries. Household groups that receive the greatest housing 
allowance for their housing costs experienced the greatest improvement in their housing 
affordability problems. However, since household groups with the greatest housing 
allowance provision experienced greater RIR reduction than other groups in the UK, 
Sweden and the Netherlands, the size of housing allowance is unlikely to affect the extent 
of RIR decrease in S. Korea. This is because the benefit arrangement of the Korean 
housing allowance system is based on the national average housing cost set at a minimum; 
thus, the provision of housing allowance might not be enough to change RIR. Moreover, it 
is noted that lower-income groups and unemployed households have experienced the 
greatest absolute and relative reduction in housing affordability problems across the four 
countries.  
 
However, concerning household composition and tenant tenure, the absolute RIR changes 
of the low-income tenants in the UK and the Netherlands differ from those in Sweden and 
Korea. Whereas families with children in the UK and the Netherlands have experienced 
greater absolute RIR decrease, in Sweden and S. Korea pensioner households experienced 
the greatest RIR reduction. Families with children tend to pay higher rents compared to 
                                                 
40
 However, from 2010, a housing allowance cap was introduced for LHA (housing allowance for private 
housing tenants in 2011). Moreover, from April 2013, the benefit cap will be applied for the total social 
security benefit paid to working-aged households and the housing allowance reduction will be forced for 
‗under-occupying‘ social housing tenants in the UK. See Chapter 4 for details. 
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others in these countries and their systems reflect the actual rent payment in the UK and 
the Netherlands. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the Swedish pensioners could receive 
supplementary allowances for housing costs, leading to the greater RIR reductions 
compared to those of other households.  
 
Furthermore, whilst all tenant tenure groups in the UK and the Netherlands have 
experienced a decrease in RIR to a similar extent, the reduction in the housing affordability 
problem was greater for private housing tenants than for other tenant groups in Sweden and 
S. Korea. Markedly, this result relates to the way in which the housing allowance system 
reflects the actual rent in the UK and the Netherlands. In the UK, the national housing 
allowance system subsidises full eligible housing costs for the low-income tenant receiving 
social assistance, regardless of their tenant tenure. In the Netherlands, the housing 
allowance system does not treat their benefit claimants differently by their tenure. Because 
of these features, the housing allowance could contribute to the RIR improvement at a 
similar extent for tenants regardless of their tenant tenures in two countries.  
 
Moreover, concerning the relative changes in RIR, whereas tenants with lower income than 
other housing allowance recipients and out-of-work households are likely to experience 
greater relative decrease in RIR across the four countries, there are differences in relative 
changes in RIR by household composition and tenant tenure. Families with children have 
faced the greatest relative reduction in housing affordability problems in the Netherlands, 
yet the greatest relative changes in RIR were noted for childless families or pensioners in 
the other three countries. In addition, the UK public housing tenants and the Korean 
tenants living in Permanent Public Rental Housing have experienced the greatest relative 
reduction in housing affordability problems; however, such improvement did not vary 
between different tenant groups in the Netherlands and Sweden.  
 
Such results differ from the result of the absolute RIR changes. In practice, the housing 
allowance provision in Sweden and the Netherlands subsidises low-income tenants at a 
similar level. However, this might not be the case in S. Korea. There is no difference in the 
size of the housing allowance provision according to tenant tenure in Korea, but public 
rental housing is provided with sub-market rents. Therefore, the housing allowance 
recipients living in Permanent Public Rental Housing are at an advantage in the current 
Korean housing allowance system. In practice, the housing cost subsidisation rate for the 
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low-income tenants living in Permanent Public Rental Housing is over 50%, which is twice 
that for other tenants in S. Korea.  
  
However, although the RIR has improved due to the housing allowance provision, the 
household groups with an originally higher financial burden for housing costs still face a 
higher burden for housing costs when the housing allowance is provided. Similarly in the 
four countries, these housing allowance recipients are tenants with lower income compared 
to other tenants, those living in private housing, working households and families with 
children (except for the case of the Korean housing allowance recipients). The receipt of 
housing allowance is less likely to solve the housing affordability problem effectively for 
these tenant groups.  
 
 
8.4 Changes in Work Disincentives of Low-Income Tenants  
 
 
The housing allowance is effective for solving low-income households‘ income and 
housing problems. However, income improvement resulting from the social security 
benefit provision might not increase active participation of its beneficiaries in the labour 
market due to their satisfaction with the income supplement of the social security system. 
Moreover, low-income households could also be at risk of losing their means-tested benefit 
due to their increased earnings. Even if the working-poor households increase their 
participation in the labour force, they could experience the poverty problem because their 
net incomes would be reduced by the income tax and the national insurance contribution 
payment. Although this situation is linked to the changes in employment or unemployment 
state of households, the issue of the behavioural changes due to work incentive is not 
addressed in this research. Here, we focus on the changes in work incentives of low-
income households by housing allowance.  
 
As shown in Table 8.3, the receipt of housing allowance and social assistance makes clear 
changes to the income replacement rates in the four countries. Therefore, the housing 
allowance take-up is related to the work incentive issue of the working poor in the welfare 
system. Hence, this study compared and examined the changes in households‘ simulated 
incomes by housing allowance receipt as indicators of work incentive changes-the Income 
Replacement Ratio (IRR) and the Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR).  
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Table 8.7 Changes in Work Disincentives by Housing Allowance in the Four Countries  
Mean (%)  the UK the Netherlands Sweden* S. Korea 
Income Replacement Ratio     
IRR1 (without HA) 69.3 63.2 109.0 83.7 
IRR2 (with HA)  90.1 68.7 110.1 84.5 
Absolute change in IRR (%p) 20.8 5.5 1.2 0.8 
Relative change in IRR 39.2 10.0 1.4 0.9 
     
Effective Marginal Tax Rate      
EMTR1 (without HA) 47.1 83.7 64.0 21.0 
EMTR2 (with HA) 54.5 85.1 76.2 21.0 
Absolute change in EMTR (%p) 7.4 1.4 12.2 - 
Relative change in EMTR  24.8 3.4 43.8 - 
Note: This result is limited to the current tenant and working-aged recipients in the four 
countries. Whilst both working and workless households are analysed for EMTR, only 
currently working households are studied for IRR. The discussion is confined to these 
groups and the result could be different from the national average. *As the full-time 
workers‘ average unemployment benefit amount is used for the low-income households‘ 
IRR imputation, the IRR is higher compared to those in other countries.  
 
8.4.1. Changes in Income Replacement Ratio by Housing Allowance  
 
The IRR levels of the working-poor tenants receiving the housing allowance are quite high, 
regardless of housing allowance provision across the four countries. This ratio is smallest 
for the Dutch tenant households receiving the housing allowance. As the difference 
between the current income and the simulated income for the unemployed position is 
bigger in the Netherlands compared to the other countries, there could be fewer work 
disincentives for the Dutch housing allowance recipients compared to others. In addition, 
except for the Swedish tenant receiving the housing allowance, household groups with 
higher IRR1 also faced higher IRR2 in the UK, the Netherlands and S. Korea, although 
there is no consistency in the family features of household groups high on both IRR1 and 
IRR2 in these countries. The social security system gives greater financial advantages to 
these households to maintain their income while being out of work.   
 
The issue is whether the housing allowance provision could make changes in the income 
replacement when the working poor lose their earnings. As Table 8.7 presents, IRRs of the 
low-income tenants receiving the housing allowance have increased as a result of the 
housing allowance receipt in all four countries. If the IRR changes due to the housing 
allowance receipt are quite large, the size of the housing provision accounts to a certain 
extent for the sum of social security benefits paid to the household and plays a role in 
increasing the possibility of work disincentives.  
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Among the four countries, the changes in IRR of the UK housing allowance recipients are 
greater compared to those in the other three countries. In the UK, a claimant whose income 
is lower, such as a social assistance recipient, is more likely to receive higher housing 
allowance. Moreover, the housing costs subsidisation rate is highest for the UK tenants 
receiving housing allowances. Therefore, when the UK working poor lose their major 
earnings, the housing allowance provision is likely to contribute to their income 
replacement to a higher degree. On the contrary, the Swedish and Korean housing 
allowance recipients experienced little change in IRR as a result of the provision of 
housing allowance. Thus, their housing allowances account for smaller portions of the 
entire social security benefits paid to them when these working poor households‘ income 
loss is subsidised with the social benefits.  
 
Although, the households with higher IRR before housing allowance provision still face 
higher IRR when they receive the housing allowance, not all household groups with higher 
IRR experienced the biggest increase in their potential work disincentives. The family 
groups who experienced the most changes in IRR are low-income tenants with lower IRR1 
and IRR2 in the UK. Although these households have lower IRR among income groups 
and family types, they have higher IRR among tenant tenure and employment status types 
in the Netherlands. Households with higher IRR among family types and households with 
lower IRR among tenant tenure and employment status groups experienced more work 
disincentive growth due to the housing allowance provision in Sweden.  
 
However, commonly, the tenant housing allowance recipients with higher absolute changes 
in IRR experienced greater relative changes in the four countries, although some household 
groups are similar while others are different across the four countries. The housing 
allowance recipients experiencing a greater increase in work disincentives are households 
with lower income in the Netherlands and S. Korea; they are private housing tenants in the 
UK and the Netherlands but social tenants living in Permanent Public Housing in S. Korea. 
In addition, childless families and households with all adults working experienced greater 
changes in IRRs in all of the countries except Sweden. Clearly, there are differences in the 
types of household groups and the extent to which the social security benefit and tax 
system‘s interaction could change their work disincentives. Nonetheless, certain tenant 
groups receiving housing allowance experience greater financial advantages for 
maintaining their incomes at a higher level compared to other groups. Thus, the housing 
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allowance provision could have greater negative effects on work disincentive for these 
households.   
  
Moreover, it should be considered that the measurement of the possibility of 
unemployment trap is based on a hypothetical situation and refers to the household income 
before paying housing costs. As the actual situations of the current or future rent payments 
are not considered here, the residual income after rent payments might affect the 
behavioural choice for employment and unemployment.     
 
8.4.2 Changes in the Effective Marginal Tax Rate by Housing Allowance  
 
Increase in Earnings by 1 Income Unit and Marginal Change in Take-Home Pay  
Another work incentive also relates to the income maintenance of the low-income 
households when they increase their labour force participation. This incentive is expressed 
as the Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR), which is the extent that the households could 
take income home as a result of increased participation in labour force. In order to examine 
EMTR, it is assumed that housing allowance increases housing allowance recipients‘ 
income by 1%. The EMTR obtained from the analysis is the average EMTR across 
different types of working and working hours.  
 
If the EMTR is high, incomes remain at low level even when a household participates in 
the labour force more actively (i.e. the high possibility of the poverty trap). Therefore, the 
work incentive is likely to be low for low-income households because the net income from 
increased labour participation after income tax and the national insurance contribution 
payment would be small for them. As Table 8.7 indicates, the Korean housing allowance 
beneficiaries would take greater portions of their income increase among the four 
countries. This could relate to the relatively lower income tax rate and the social security 
contribution in S. Korea than those in the three European countries (see Table 8.8). 
 
Table 8.8 Income Tax and Social Security Contribution of Single Adult in the Four 
Countries 
Country As a % of gross wage earnings in 2011 
 Income tax Social security contribution 
The UK 15.6 9.5 
The Netherlands 16.0 15.4 
Sweden  17.8 7.0 
S. Korea 4.3 8.1 
OECD 14.8 10.0 
Source: OECD Taxing Wages: Comparative Tables, OECD Tax Statistics database.  
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Note: Income tax and social security contribution of single individual without children at 
the income level of the average worker in each country. 
 
Within a country, the differences in EMTR among housing allowance beneficiary groups 
are marked. In the UK, the work incentive is worse for higher-income groups and families 
with children receiving housing allowances than for other housing allowance recipients. It 
does not seem that the entire tax and benefit system provides greater financial advantages 
to these households in terms of their net income increases. In contrast, the possibility of 
falling into the poverty trap is more severe for low-income households, childless families 
and workless households compared to other types of households in the Netherlands and 
Sweden. In S. Korea, the EMTR is higher for the middle- and highest-income groups, 
families with children, Permanent Public Rental Housing tenants and working households. 
Therefore, these households are likely to be at a disadvantage in terms of the net income 
growth when their gross incomes increase due to the changes in their labour participation.  
 
Clear differences are evident in EMTR changes by the provision of housing allowance 
between S. Korea and the other three European countries. Concerning the low-income 
tenants receiving the housing allowance in S. Korea, there is no difference in the EMTR 
before and after housing allowance provision. If the housing allowance recipients have the 
same net income increase regardless of the provision of housing allowance, it could be 
interpreted that the role of the housing allowance in the process of the income tax and 
social security interaction is minor in S. Korea. The Korean housing allowance pre-2008 
was a fixed-amount according to the household size and therefore not based on the 
household‘s actual income. Thus, the importance of housing allowance is too small to be 
recognised (or to play a role) in relation to the entire tax and social security benefit system.  
 
In contrast to the Korean case, the provision of housing allowance is likely to deepen the 
potential poverty trap for its beneficiaries in the UK, the Netherlands and Sweden. The 
tenant housing allowance recipients face higher EMTR when the housing allowance is 
provided than when it is not provided. In these countries, whilst the housing allowance 
provision could contribute to the current income maintenance, it would reduce their net 
income growth in the likely anticipated situation when they work extra hours. In addition, 
the housing allowance tenants facing higher EMTR before housing allowance provision 
also experienced higher EMTR after they received housing allowances in these three 
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countries. Furthermore, the same household groups experience more absolute and relative 
changes in EMTR due to the housing allowance provision. 
 
However, differences in EMTR by housing allowance provision across the three European 
countries have been noted. The increases in EMTR by housing allowance (i.e. the probable 
further reduction in take-home pay) are greater for the Swedish and UK housing allowance 
recipients compared to those for the Dutch recipients. Moreover, whilst the UK household 
groups with higher EMTR2 have experienced more absolute and relative changes in 
EMTR by housing allowance provision, the household groups with the lower EMTR have 
faced greater EMTR increases in the Netherlands. In Sweden, the result is restricted to 
income group categories and the employed, although households with higher incomes have 
even lower EMTR. These households comprise the working households in the UK, the 
Netherlands and Sweden and also include families with children in the Netherlands. 
Therefore, the housing allowance provision has more negative effects on the increase in 
work disincentive (i.e. increasing the possibility of the poverty trap) for these households 
compared to other households.  
 
 
8.5 Summary 
  
 
The comparative analysis found significant features in the national housing allowance 
systems that affect changes in income maintenance and housing affordability problems of 
its beneficiaries. The most important compositional factors are the higher housing cost 
subsidisation rate by housing allowances and the reflection of the actual rent payments 
upon housing allowance. In addition, the research identified that the differentiated benefit 
arrangements according to family composition could improve particular family groups, 
such as pensioners in Sweden or families with children in the UK. The results also related 
to the way in which the housing allowance system deals with rent prices in different rental 
housing structures. Moreover, it was necessary to consider other contextual factors to 
compare the housing allowance effects between the three European countries and Korea.  
 
Concerning the main research questions (i.e. the housing allowance‘s effects on improving 
income and housing problems), the housing allowance provision improves low-income 
tenants‘ finances after rent payment in the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and S. Korea. 
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However, the provision of the housing allowance can also increase work disincentives for 
its recipients in these four countries by supplementing the household income and reducing 
housing cost expenditures when tenants do not intend to work more. Therefore, the 
housing allowance has both positive and negative aspects as income support for the 
working poor. Amongst the four countries, the UK housing allowance recipients are more 
likely to fall into this dilemma because they experience greater improvements in income 
maintenance and housing affordability compared to the recipients in the other three 
countries.  
 
However, the effect of housing assistance on the employment outcome is not clear and the 
positive and negative results are mixed in the findings detailed by researchers (see Chapter 
2). Therefore, the effectiveness of housing allowance should be considered from a more 
flexible point of view. Moreover, the extent to which the provision of housing allowance 
could increase work disincentive differs across family groups. The size of the negative 
effects of housing allowance provision might vary according to households, which might 
be another issue to reconsider when improving the housing allowance as in-work benefits 
for different families in order to facilitate the welfare-to-work transition of certain 
households.   
 
The next chapter presents the conclusion of this study. I will discuss the research findings 
and implications of this study as well as make recommendations for the improvement of 
the Korean housing allowance system based on the findings of the comparative analysis.  
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
 
 
Introduction 
Through comparative analysis, this research finds that the provision of housing allowance 
does solve the income and housing problems of its beneficiaries in the UK, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and S. Korea. Moreover, the study has identified the features of 
housing allowance design that are commonly or exclusively associated with the larger 
effects of housing allowances in those countries. This final chapter discusses the research 
findings and acknowledges limitations of the study in Section 9.1. And then I make 
recommendations for the improvement of housing allowance system in S. Korea and offer 
concluding remarks in Section 9.2.  
 
 
9.1 The Review of Research  
 
 
Discussion  
A housing allowance programme should enable low-income households to solve their 
income and housing cost-related problems (Council of Europe, 2008). This research 
examines the effectiveness of housing allowance in improving income maintenance, 
enhancing housing affordability and providing work incentives for low-income tenant 
households. To compare the effects of housing allowances on policy objectives in 
countries with different welfare and housing regimes, this study concentrated on the UK, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and S. Korea.  
 
The results revealed that the ability of a housing allowance to solve the income and 
housing cost problems of low-income people does not fit the characteristics of welfare 
regime. This is consistent with the previous studies on the variation of housing allowance 
effects according to welfare regimes (e.g. Stephens et al., 2010; Griggs & Kemp, 2012). 
Previous studies have assumed that the feature of housing allowance reflects the varied 
characteristics of income support benefits according to welfare regime, i.e. greater 
proportion of housing allowance recipients among population with lowest income and 
greater benefit generosity in liberal welfare regime than those in social-democratic and 
conservative-corporatism regimes. Therefore, the varied effects of housing allowance were 
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expected to be determined by the type of welfare regime (i.e. a greater effect of housing 
allowance in the former than in the latter). In explaining the lack of fitness between welfare 
regime and housing allowance effects, Griggs and Kemp (2012) have noted the limitation 
of welfare regime typology, which does not fit the actual welfare system and does not 
incorporate housing. Moreover, the housing allowance system reflects the objectives of 
both income and housing policies. However, these studies are not based on the analysis of 
the combination of housing allowance and income support benefit in the entire welfare 
system.   
 
An analysis of the design of the UK's housing allowance reveals that the UK has more 
generous rules for calculating the benefits than the Netherlands, Sweden and S. Korea. 
Moreover, among the three European countries, the UK‘s housing allowance system does 
not employ the ‗gap approach‘ but provides fewer reduced allowances for the ‗maximum 
benefit‘ than other two countries. Based on the variation in the benefit arrangement, it is 
expected that the UK‘s housing allowance subsidises the actual housing cost more than 
those of the other countries. In addition, the proportion of the poorest households among 
housing allowance recipients is smaller in the UK than in social-democratic and 
conservative corporatism regimes as shown in Griggs and Kemp‘s (2012) work. Therefore, 
this study suggests that to compensate for the weakness of income support system, welfare 
regime that is more residual (as in the UK) provides a more generous housing allowance. 
The generosity of housing allowance differs from that of welfare regime. 
 
Moreover, this research emphasises that the features of housing allowance design are 
associated with the improvement of income maintenance and housing affordability. The 
housing allowance systems in countries within and between regimes have different rules 
pertaining to the subsidisation of housing costs. The results of this study demonstrated that 
the extent to which the actual housing cost is subsidised by housing allowance is linked to 
the effects of housing allowances that vary by country. Not surprisingly, the improvement 
in income and housing cost-related problem of low-income households is larger for 
recipients of the housing allowance in the UK than it is for recipients in other countries. 
The result of Stephens et al. (2010) and Griggs and Kemp‘s (2012) studies also revealed 
the larger effect of housing allowance in the UK than in other countries. Therefore, this 
research suggests that the generous subsidisation of housing costs is an important factor in 
the variation in the effects of the housing allowance.  
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In addition, this study suggests that the combination of the housing allowance‘s generosity 
and the reflection of the actual housing cost for benefit arrangement have a stronger effect. 
The UK, Sweden and the Netherlands‘ housing allowance provisions, based on actual 
housing costs, have greater effects on solving income and housing costs problems of the 
poor compared to S. Korea‘s housing allowance system not based on the actual housing 
cost paid by the benefit recipients. In particular, the effect of housing allowance in the UK, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands is larger than it is in other European countries studied in 
Stephens et al.‘s (2010) work, although the comparison is not based on the same indicators 
that are used in this study. Therefore, this research emphasises that the variations in the 
design of housing allowance according to countries change their effectiveness of housing 
allowance.  
 
Regarding the effect of housing allowance on the improvement of income maintenance, the 
residual income after rent payment and the poverty rate after rent payment are both 
improved by the provision of housing allowance in the four countries studied; this is 
consistent with the previous studies. Here, the UK housing allowance is more likely to 
reduce the poverty rate of housing allowance recipients than other countries‘ housing 
allowances are, although the improvement in residual income after rent payments is better 
for the Swedish housing allowance recipients than for the UK recipients. However, 
considering overall changes in poverty rate and residual income after rents, the UK‘s 
housing allowance system with its higher subsidisation for housing cost had a larger effect 
on income maintenance improvement compared to other countries‘ housing allowance 
system.  
 
Moreover, the effects of S. Korea‘s housing allowance and those of the three European 
countries should not be overlooked. The housing allowance in S. Korea is less likely to 
improve the income maintenance of low-income tenants. This is because of the minimal 
benefit generosity that does not reflect the actual housing cost of the housing allowance 
recipients but is calculated based on the minimum standard for housing cost. The limited 
benefit generosity of housing allowance is less effective in achieving its policy objective. 
Therefore, the result revealed the importance of the housing allowance design in improving 
the effectiveness of housing allowance.  
 
In terms of making housing more affordable, the results revealed a relationship between 
the higher housing cost subsidies (the greater benefit generosity) and the larger effect of 
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housing allowance. Griggs and Kemp‘s (2012) work also supports the strength of this link. 
The changes in the Rent to Income Ratio (RIR) in the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands, 
where the effects of the housing allowance on housing affordability are better than in other 
European countries (Stephens et al., 2010), differ from those in S. Korea. This result 
relates to the variation in housing allowance design, which is based on the applicant‘s 
actual housing cost in the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands; in S. Korea, it is based on the 
national minimum cost of housing. The greatest improvement in RIR of the UK‘s housing 
allowance recipients and the least RIR change in S. Korea reveal the significant 
relationship between the housing cost subsidisation rule of housing allowance design and 
the effectiveness of housing allowance.  
 
Moreover, the variation in RIR changes does not result from different features of welfare 
regimes. Instead, this result clearly relates to the design of each country‘s housing 
allowance. However, changes in RIR across tenant tenure groups reveal differences 
between dualist (the UK and S. Korea) and unitary housing regime countries (Sweden and 
the Netherlands). The housing cost subsidisation rate by housing allowance is higher for 
public housing tenants in the UK and S. Korea, but similar for both tenants in public and 
private housing in Sweden and the Netherlands. In dualist rental housing system, private 
housing tenants with low income are more likely to be at a disadvantage in the housing 
market. However, their housing allowance systems are less likely to consider this varied 
situation between private and public housing tenants. In practice, the Korea housing 
allowance system applies the same rule to all tenants. Moreover, the UK housing 
allowance system did not favour private housing tenants over public housing tenants. 
  
As a result, the provisions of housing allowance in the UK and S. Korea are likely to have 
a greater effect on the RIR improvement of public housing tenants. Stephens et al. (2010) 
explained that this result implies the strong influence of the combination of public rental 
housing tenure and housing allowance in the UK. In line with Stephens et al.‘s (2010) 
work, the results of this study revealed that the tendency of the housing allowance design 
to favour certain tenant tenures improves that type of tenant tenures more than others, 
particularly in the dualist rental housing system. In contrast, the findings showed no 
difference in the housing cost subsidisation by housing allowance in Sweden and the 
Netherlands and no variation in RIR changes in the Netherlands between tenant tenure 
groups. Therefore, if the housing policy is to solve the problems of low-income tenants 
arising from the rental housing system, the design of housing allowance could be modified 
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to compensate for the disadvantage of a certain tenant tenure group. This change in the 
benefit design improves the effect of housing allowance in a given rental housing system.  
  
This research also examined the effect of housing allowances on incentives to work for 
low-income tenants. Although some studies focused on the income support aspect of 
housing allowances (e.g. Griggs & Kemp, 2012), other studies incorporated the analysis of 
the relationship between housing allowance receipt and labour activity or employment 
outcome (e.g. Chen, 2006; Wood et al., 2009; Stephens et al., 2010). These studies reveal 
the negative effect of housing allowance provision on beneficiaries' acceptance of 
employment. However, other factors also affect the change in labour activity or 
employment outcome, such as demographic features of families, education or age of family 
members. This research extends its analysis of the housing allowance effects in income and 
housing policy to those in welfare-to-work policy. However, it does not take into account 
the extent of positive or negative effects of housing allowances on changes in labour 
activity. Instead, this study focuses on the variation in work incentives among a variety of 
household types of housing allowance recipients and the presence of housing allowance 
effects on work incentive; in this respect, it is not in line with previous studies.  
 
The financial reward for employment is tied to the variation in income by employment 
status and housing allowance provision. This research demonstrated that the provision of 
housing allowance increases household income. Income support effect from social benefits 
rather than from increased earnings worsened the work incentives for the working poor 
who receive the housing allowance as in-work benefit. Therefore, this result suggests that 
housing allowance is a deterrent to work incentives. However, although the reduced work 
incentives in the form of a housing allowance was expected to discourage the beneficiaries 
from remaining employed, this research did not account for changes in employment status. 
As seen in other studies, changes in employment status of the working poor depends not 
solely on the increase or decrease in financial incentive to work, but also on other factors. 
 
Moreover, the results revealed the variation in work incentives and the effects of the 
housing allowance on work incentives among different household types. Therefore, the 
combined effect of households‘ features and the provision of housing allowance could 
exist. The work incentive indicators relate to the interaction between the social security 
benefit system and the tax system. The variations in work incentives and their changes by 
housing allowance provision emerge according to the characteristics of this interaction 
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between two systems in the national context. Some household types are more likely to be 
favoured by income tax and social security systems than others. However, the combination 
of family characteristics and the income support effects of housing allowance is likely to 
have a negative effect on work incentives, especially for private housing tenants in the UK 
and the Netherlands and for employed households in the UK, the Netherlands and S. Korea. 
This negative effect should be reduced in order to improve the housing allowance as a 
form of in-work benefit. Therefore, this research suggests that the housing allowance 
system could alter the arrangement of original housing allowance provision for these 
households in ways that would strengthen the incentive to work.   
 
Limitations of Research  
However, this study is not without limitations. First, although this research adopted 
quantitative analysis, it was not intended to produce or estimate a model that would explain 
the relationship of housing allowance to changes in income maintenance, housing 
problems and work incentives. Although we can discuss the effectiveness of housing 
allowance based on the findings of comparative analysis by different systems and 
variations in family features, the effect of housing allowance on low-income households‘ 
living conditions could not be estimated in this study. Moreover, this research did not 
project the behavioural changes of the working poor in labour force participation according 
to the changes in work incentives by the provision of housing allowance.  
 
Second, this research does not address the income and housing problems and the 
effectiveness of housing allowance for low-income households over their life cycles. As 
the point-in-time analysis is carried out, findings and discussions of this research are 
confined to a specific time point. Therefore, the changes in households‘ living conditions 
and effects of housing allowance receipt according to their stages of life cycle are not 
within the scope of this study. Moreover, the analysis is based on the dataset collected at a 
single time point, the effects due to benefit rule changes over time could not be assessed in 
this study. Therefore, the recent changes in the housing allowance arrangement in the UK 
and S. Korea were not addressed here.   
 
Third, there are limitations in the comparisons made in this study. Although I compared 
housing allowance systems in the four countries, the compositional and effectiveness 
aspects of the Korean housing allowance for comparison are limited. As the Korean 
housing allowance is one allowance of the national social security benefit (NBLS) 
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consisting of total seven allowances, the feature of Korea‘s housing allowance is that of the 
NBLS benefit system as a whole, rather than its own one. Moreover, as Housing 
Allowance of NBLS is not a major benefit such as Living Allowance accounting for 80% 
of NBLS benefit provision, its effects on income maintenance and housing affordability is 
restricted. Furthermore, the comparative analysis did not include a county in which 
housing voucher system operates, for example the US. The introduction of housing 
voucher system has been discussed in recent years alongside the NBLS housing allowance 
in S. Korea. If we had compared the European housing allowance system and the US‘s 
housing voucher system, this study could have provided more useful findings. 
 
Fourth, the equivalence of independent variables is of concern. In particular, as tenant 
tenure variable reflects the characteristics of each country‘s housing system, the 
categorisation of tenant tenure applied to survey data may be different across countries. 
Therefore, this study used several definitions and categorisations of tenant tenure variable 
because each national dataset has somewhat different categorisation of tenant tenure 
reflecting its own housing system. Concerning household composition variable, the finding 
does not capture income and housing problems of all family types because this study 
analysed only four prototypes of households.  
 
Lastly, this research analysed the effect of housing allowance using five indicators, i.e.  
Residual Income after Rents Payment, Poverty Rate, Rent to Income Ratio, Income 
Replacement Ratio and Effective Marginal Tax Rate. However, the literature has used 
more indicators to address these issues. For instance, the change in poverty could be 
measured using the poverty gap approach, which addresses the distance between household 
income and the poverty line. As this research adopted only the poverty rate measure, the 
changes in poverty gap were not within the scope of the analysis.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite these limitations, this study confirms the importance of understanding the features 
of housing allowance itself in addition to the combined features of the welfare regime and 
housing allowance in the analysis of the effectiveness of housing allowance. Especially, 
the comparative research based on regime typology should consider the likelihood of 
discrepancies between the features of housing allowance and those of welfare regimes. 
Without the consideration of these discrepancies, the researcher would miss the 
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significance of the housing allowance design itself that is more important in deciding the 
effectiveness of housing allowances. 
  
Among the elements of the housing allowance design, this study identified the generous 
subsidisation for the actual housing cost as the most important factor that explains the 
differences in housing allowance effects. The modification of benefit generosity for 
housing allowance recipients at a disadvantage in the welfare system could make the 
housing allowance more effective. Therefore, this result offers a clear answer to the 
research question and offers insight into the improvement of housing allowance systems in 
all welfare and housing regimes. The analysis of the effects of housing allowances in 
countries with a range of welfare or housing regimes but similar types of housing 
allowance could provide additional explanations for the results of this study. 
 
Moreover, variations in the effects of housing allowances according to household types 
should be considered, even in the most generous housing allowance system. If a large 
proportion of housing allowance recipients belongs to household groups with the smallest 
improvement in income and experiences housing problems, it raises a question about the 
actual effectiveness of housing allowance, despite its generosity. Therefore, this study 
suggests that it is necessary to identify household groups that find themselves at a 
disadvantage in relation to the effects of housing allowance and to consider alternative 
rules for these households in order to enhance the positive effects and mitigate the negative 
effects of housing allowance.  
 
This study emphasises the contribution of housing allowance as an important instrument of 
a variety of policies and systems. Therefore, the modified application of housing allowance 
could be considered to alleviate the adverse effects of housing allowance in income and 
housing affordability on one hand and work incentive on the other. We need to take 
cognisance of the effectiveness of housing allowances in the interaction between different 
policies and in the wider welfare and housing systems.  
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9.2 Recommendations for the Korean Housing Allowance System 
 
 
We can summarise the S. Korean government‘s response to income and housing problems 
of the low-income household as the provision of the social security benefit in social policy 
and the provision of the public rental housing with sub-market rent in housing policy. 
Compared to other European countries, the implementation of rent subsidy programme is 
relatively new in S. Korea. Moreover, the Korean housing allowance system has a less 
importance as a public policy measure. Although the arrangement of housing allowance 
provision changed from flat amount adjusted for household size to fixed rate (almost 20%) 
of the total NBLS benefit
41
 in 2008, the housing allowance provision is still based on the 
Minimum Cost of Living (MCL)
42
 for the benefit maximum and capped at the rate of 
around 15-17% of the MCL. This minimal housing allowance provision is not enough to 
enable the low-income household to afford the cost of rents (Lee et al., 2010). Moreover, it 
does not reflect the rent price differential between the private and public rental housing 
sectors in S. Korea. Therefore, the explicit weakness of the Korean housing allowance 
arises from the benefit arrangement in which the housing allowance provision does not 
consider the actual financial need of low-income tenant households. 
 
Therefore, the introduction of the alternative or supplementary rent subsidy programme has 
been discussed in S. Korea. For instance, the Seoul Metropolitan Government introduced 
Seoul Housing Voucher Programme in 2010 for low-income citizens who live in private 
rental housing but are not entitled to the NBLS Housing Benefit due to their incomes being 
over the NBLS means test standard (Park & Oh, 2012)
43
. This local government‘s rent 
allowance considers severe financial burden of the low-income tenants living in private 
rental housing in the metropolitan city under the Korean rental housing system. In addition, 
the central government has also considered the nationwide ‗Housing Voucher Programme‘ 
                                                 
41
 The major NBLS benefit comprises Living Benefit and Housing Benefit and the ratio of these two benefits 
is around 8:2. However, this ratio has changed every year since 2008. As of 2012, the Living Benefit 
comprised 80.652% of the NBLS benefit and Housing Benefit share is 19.348% of the NBLS benefit 
(MOHW, 2012a).   
 
42
 The Minimum Cost of Living is released by the government every year as the standard of poverty line and 
the cap of the social assistance (i.e. the National Basic Livelihood Security) benefits in S. Korea.    
 
43
 The eligibility is confined to low-income households whose incomes are between 100% (the eligible 
income for the NBLS benefit entitlement) and 120% of the National Minimum of Living Cost, or those 
between 120% and 150% of the National Minimum of Living Cost and with special family needs (Seoul 
Metropolitan Government internet site, http://www.seoul.go.kr/main/index.html).   
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as part of the national support for the private rental housing sector tenant. However, due to 
the lack of government budget for Housing Voucher, the Ministry did not carry out 
‗Housing Voucher‘ pilot for the last years; thus, the details have not yet been released.   
 
Here, I make recommendations for improving the housing allowance system in S. Korea 
through the results of comparative analysis. Of course, implicit and explicit limitations 
could deter the success of housing allowance reform through policy transfer. Above all, the 
fact that housing subsidy programme is embedded in the national housing and social 
structure is more of a concern. Therefore, although some factors are regarded as the core of 
policy or programme in one national context, they do not work properly in another national 
context. Moreover, as the more practical problem, the limitation or lack of the national 
budget relates to the housing allowance reform in S. Korea. In global economic downturn, 
more emphasis is placed on the budget cut and the reduction of the welfare benefit 
provision and S. Korea is no exception. However, the poverty rate and income inequality is 
higher in S. Korea than in the other three countries. Moreover, the income protection of 
social security system, including housing allowance is the worst. Indeed, the housing cost 
subsidisation rate by housing allowance is the lowest and the effect of housing allowance 
on income and housing problems is the smallest in S. Korea. Therefore, the housing 
allowance system should be reformed in order to increase its effectiveness. 
 
First, the benefit arrangement should consider the adequate subsidisation rate of housing 
costs. The findings explained that one of the most important factors affecting changes in 
income and housing problems is subsidising larger portions of housing costs in given 
circumstances. As the comparative analysis indicates, the subsidisation rate is higher for 
three European countries showing better improvement in income-related problem after 
housing cost expenditure than S. Korea. In particular, the subsidisation rate of the UK 
housing allowance is the highest and the result is clearly positive. Although the UK 
welfare system is ‗residual‘, its housing allowance system contributes to the achievement 
of its aim. Of course, the benefit system needs to control for the excessive benefit claim. In 
the UK, as it is possible for some recipients to receive housing allowance for the full 
eligible rent, the housing allowance system employs benefit caps. In addition, the Dutch 
and Swedish systems adopt diminishing rates of subsidisation from 100% for the low 
housing cost range to 50% for the high range up to benefit caps. However, the Korean 
housing allowance standard does not reach the minimum cost standard for housing defined 
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by the government. Therefore, the adequate housing cost standard to be applied as a benefit 
cap and the subsidisation rate should be discussed together.  
 
Second, the benefit is to be calculated based on the actual rent costs paid by the claimant in 
order effectively reduce the financial burden arising from housing cost expenditures. 
Whether the benefit calculation considers the actual housing costs is the most outstanding 
distinction between S. Korea and other three European countries. The UK system has more 
generous rules under the benefit cap than do the Netherlands and Sweden. Although the 
Dutch and Swedish housing allowance systems require households to pay some portions of 
rent with their incomes, the size of the benefit is calculated based on their actual housing 
costs. Of course, the higher claim compared to their actual housing costs or under-
occupying residence is of concern. Three European countries have responded to these 
problems by applying the eligible housing cost cap and/or the limitation on the residence 
size eligible for housing allowance adjusted for the household income or household size.  
 
Therefore, the provision of housing allowance is more effective in improving income 
maintenance and housing affordability in these countries because their systems reflect the 
actual living condition. In contrast, the Korean housing allowance system is based on the 
housing cost standard of Minimum Cost of Living-that is, the average housing cost in 
mid-sized cities in S. Korea. It does not reflect the reality of the low-income tenant and 
thus the effectiveness of the provision of housing allowance is limited. The current housing 
allowance is a part of the national social assistance system in S. Korea. Therefore, while 
investigating the claimant‘s income and household information might not incur high 
additional administrative cost, the verification of the actual rent payment would be a 
concern. If this problem were solved, the housing allowance system could actually reduce 
the actual housing costs of the low-income household.  
 
Third, the benefit arrangement of the housing allowance system should reflect the structure 
of the national rental housing market. When comparing the Korean housing allowance 
system with the Dutch and Swedish ones, we could not find the different benefit rules 
according to varied tenant tenure in S. Korea, whereas the same benefit rule is applied for 
all tenant tenure groups in these two countries. This operation is in line with the ‗unitary‘ 
rental housing structure in the Netherlands and Sweden. However, the UK with ‗dualist‘ 
rental structure applies varied benefit arrangement to social and private housing tenants. 
Moreover, the undergoing benefit reforms introduce the varied restriction rules on the 
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benefit entitlement of these two types of tenants. In S. Korea, the dualist rental model has 
been rigidly established for a long time (S. Kim, 2010). As the supply of the public rental 
housing has targeted low-income households, its rent price and deposit have been set at a 
rate lower than that of private rental housing market
44
. However, the current housing 
allowance system does not reflect the rental price differential between the public and 
private housing tenants and thus the current housing allowance gives less financial 
advantages to low-income tenants living in the private rental sector. Therefore, the housing 
allowance system needs to contain some benefit principles concerning this institutional 
situation.   
 
Fourth, there is a need to introduce the ‗local rent standard‘ for housing allowance as a 
benefit cap in each locality. This is clearly important because the maximum housing 
allowance is calculated based on the MCL imputation, i.e. the average housing costs in 
medium-size cities. While the Dutch and Swedish housing allowance systems apply the 
same benefit cap across the country, the UK system operates with ‗local rent standard‘ 
based on the actual local rent price for the private housing tenants receiving LHA. 
However, in S. Korea, although the rent differential among regions has a practical effect on 
the financial burden for rent payment, the benefit arrangement does not consider this 
situation. The suggested housing allowance standard, the ‗local rent standard‘, will not be 
able to subsidise the full rent costs paid by individual households. The subsidisation rate 
for the rents cost should be arranged. However, through the application of the ‗local rent 
standard‘, the Korean housing allowance system could provide adequate amount of rent 
subsidy based on local price rather than on the average rent costs in medium-size cities (the 
current MCL standard). This change could improve income and housing problems of the 
low-income household more effectively.     
 
Fifth, the benefit arrangement needs to consider family composition in detail. The family‘s 
housing need may differ according to the characteristics of households. However, whilst 
the maximum NBLS Housing Benefit was adjusted only for the household size, the family 
composition has not been considered for the benefit arrangement in S. Korea. In contrast, 
other three countries consider different family features for the benefit arrangement by 
applying more generous benefits to certain households, e.g. higher subsidisation rate for 
                                                 
44
 The deposit and rent price of public housing are capped by the government during the first year of 
providing support and they change according to the level of the local private rental housing market price at 
the rate of 55–83% of the local market price. 
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the disabled or elderly families in the Netherlands and higher allowance rate for the 
families with children in Sweden. Therefore, in addition to household income, family 
composition has to be considered as part of the benefit arrangement and this feature could 
be used to make a decision about the benefit cap or the reduction in housing allowance.  
 
Sixth, it is necessary to expand the category of the eligible households. Currently, the 
entitlement of the Korean housing allowance is limited to the lowest income households 
with incomes smaller than the MCL that are eligible for the NBLS benefits. However, both 
social assistance beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries who meet the standards of means-test 
for housing allowance are eligible for the benefit in other three European countries. In 
practice, while the eligibility rate is around 5% in S. Korea, it is almost 9% in the UK and 
Sweden. Moreover, households receiving the Dutch housing allowance make up 30% of 
the total households. However, as the delay of Housing Voucher programme indicates, the 
practical issues should be addressed. The expansion of overall eligibility rate is related to 
the lack of the national budget for voucher expenditures and the additional administrative 
costs. Moreover, the equality in the eligibility and benefit arrangement among NBLS 
benefits should not be overlooked.  
     
Finally, we need to discuss the role of the Korean housing allowance from the perspective 
of the wider social security system. Compared to other three countries‘ housing allowances, 
there has been little focus on the role of housing allowance as part of welfare system and 
the government‘s budget expenditure on allowance is minor in S. Korea. However, the 
Korean housing allowance plays the same role in improving income maintenance and 
housing affordability for the low-income tenants as do housing allowance systems in other 
three countries. In this respect, the Korean social and housing policy needs to establish a 
solid status of housing allowance within the system. Similar to other three European 
countries, the Korean housing allowance is a part of the social assistance of which 
provision is conditional on participation in welfare-to-work programme. Importantly, the 
effect of housing allowance on work incentive decrease is smaller in Korea compared to 
the three European countries. Therefore, we need to open a space for the discussion of the 
provision of housing allowance as in-work benefit and work incentive, arguing for the 
housing allowance reform.    
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Final Remarks  
This research offers a clear account of the effectiveness of housing allowance for solving 
low-income tenants‘ income and housing problems in a variety of institutional situations. 
Moreover, the study establishes that the important determinant of housing allowance 
effects is the adequate extent of housing cost subsidisation based on the actual housing cost 
need. It also emphasises the differentiated benefit arrangement of housing allowance 
according to the feature of a household, such as family composition, as well as the feature 
of country, for instance the national rental housing structure. Indeed, through the 
comparative analysis, this study provides important implications for improving the housing 
allowance system in S. Korea. Although, the Korean housing allowance offers minor 
benefits within the national social security system, it could be changed in response to the 
needs of economically vulnerable households through the benefit reform as recommended 
in this study. Moreover, when employing devices that control the appropriate quality and 
quantity of the housing allowance provision, the Korean housing allowance system could 
prevent benefit design-related problems found in other countries, such as the small 
shopping incentive for low-rent housing. 
 227 
Appendices 
 
 
Table A.1 Summary of Dataset   
 the UK the Netherlands Sweden S. Korea 
Dataset Family Resources Survey 2006/07 Housing Research in the Netherlands  
(WoON) 2006 
Household Finances (HEK) 2006 Korea Welfare Panel Study 
(KOWEP) 2008 
 
Ministry/Agency Department for Work and Pensions 
  
  
The Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Environment 
(former The Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment 
, VROM)  
  
Statistics Sweden 
  
  
-Korea Institute for Health and Social 
Affairs 
-Social Welfare Research Centre of 
Seoul National University  
-Ministry of Health and Welfare  
Duration  every year every three years every year  every year  
 
Size (household)  43,166 64,000 11,269 7,000 
 
Sampling  Great Britain: the Royal Mail‘s small 
user‘s Postcode Address File (PAF) 
Northern Ireland: the Valuation and 
Lands Agency (VLA) property 
database. 
40,000 'regular'  
+24,000 oversampling  
Population Register 
+ Longitudinal Individuals Database 
(LINDA) of Statistics Sweden 
Sampling from 2005 Census and 
2006 People‘s Life Survey 
3500(below 60% of median income) 
+3500 (over 60% of median income)  
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Table A.2 Housing Benefit Expenditures by Tenure in the UK (£ million, Real Terms, 2012/13 Prices) 
Year Total LA RSL Private (LHA) 
2000/01       14,861         7,001                    4,065                3,796   -  
2001/02       15,140         6,901                    4,549                3,690   -  
2002/03       16,106         6,889                    5,352                3,864   -  
2003/04       15,398         6,273                    5,359                3,769   -  
2004/05       15,938         6,299                    5,576                4,063   -  
2005/06       16,494         6,232                    5,861                4,401   -  
2006/07       17,115         6,193                    5,991                4,931   -  
2007/08       17,701         6,137                    6,278                5,286                (474)  
2008/09       18,734         5,880                    6,694                6,160             (2,041)  
2009/10       21,570         5,902                    7,496                8,171             (5,146)  
2010/11       22,479         5,670                    7,705                9,103             (6,945)  
2011/12       23,384         5,719                    8,218                9,447             (7,788)  
2012/13       23,838         5,853                    8,764                9,221             (7,906)  
2013/14       22,988         5,669                    8,465                8,854             (7,747)  
2014/15       22,991         5,633                    8,476                8,882             (7,874)  
2015/16       22,884         5,600                    8,486                8,798             (7,855)  
2016/17       22,794         5,523                    8,508                8,764             (7,892)  
2017/18       22,652         5,467                    8,542                8,643             (7,830)  
Source: DWP Statistics Medium term forecast for all DWP benefits file, Housing Benefit worksheet. 
(http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd4/index.php?page=expenditure). 
Note: Results from 2000/01 to 2011/12 are outturn and results from 2012/13 to 2017/18 are forecast.  
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Table A.3 Changes in Poverty Rates by Housing Allowance in the UK (%) 
Poverty lines   40% of median income 50% of median income 60% of median income Absolute 
change (%p) 
PR2–PR3 
Relative 
change (%) 
PR2–PR3 
Total tenant 
with HA 
 PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HA af.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HAaf.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HA af.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
Mean  (%) 15.9 55.2 34.1 32.6 65.0 47.4 47.9 72.3 61.6 10.7 14.7 
Total 100.0             
             
Income Quintiles            
1st Q (low Y) 20.0 67.9 99.1 97.5 94.4 99.9 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
2nd Q 20.0 11.3 91.6 53.6 57.5 98.1 91.0 86.4 99.9 99.7 0.1 0.1 
3rd Q 20.0 0.4 63.3 13.5 9.8 89.2 36.2 47.3 98.4 86.4 12.0 12.2 
4th Q 20.1 0.1 20.6 5.6 1.2 36.1 9.4 5.6 59.0 21.2 37.8 64.0 
5th Q(high Y) 19.9 0.0 1.3 0.3 0.1 1.6 0.4 0.3 4.0 0.7 3.3 81.5 
             
Household Composition            
No children 26.4 33.6 58.7 42.1 44.6 65.3 52.7 53.8 71.9 60.9 11.0 15.3 
With children 34.4 18.0 73.1 60.6 46.7 79.7 72.5 59.6 83.3 79.3 4.0 4.8 
Pensioner 39.2 2.3 37.2 5.4 12.1 51.9 21.7 33.8 62.9 46.6 16.3 26.0 
            
Tenant Tenure            
Public  51.6 16.9 52.8 30.2 35.3 63.0 43.6 50.1 70.1 58.6 11.5 16.4 
Housing 
association 
33.0 15.5 55.0 33.0 31.9 64.7 46.5 49.1 72.6 61.6 11.0 15.1 
Private  15.4 13.8 63.9 49.5 25.0 72.6 62.0 38.2 78.9 71.8 7.1 9.0 
            
Employment Status            
Unemployed 89.7 16.1 54.5 32.8 32.9 64.2 45.7 48.5 71.3 60.3 11.0 15.4 
Employed  10.3 14.7 61.4 45.5 29.7 72.0 62.5 43.2 81.0 73.2 7.8 9.6 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2006-07, author calculations.   
Note: PR1: poverty rate when housing allowance is not provided and before housing costs payment; PR2: poverty rate when housing allowance is not 
provided and after housing costs payment; PR3: poverty rate when housing allowance is provided and after housing costs payment. 
  
 230 
Table A.4 Changes in Poverty Rates by Housing Allowance in the Netherlands (%)  
Poverty lines   40% of median income 50% of median income 60% of median income Absolute  
change (%p) 
PR2–PR3 
Relative 
change (%) 
PR2–PR3 
Total tenant 
with HA 
 PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HA af.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HAaf.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HA af.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
Mean  (%) 2.2 51.1 19.6 11.9 78.2 56.6 44.0 93.8 85.0 8.8 9.4 
Total 100.0             
            
Income Quintiles            
1st Q (low Y)  20.0  11.2 89.8 65.1 58.0 99.9 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
2nd Q  20.0  0.0 70.3 23.1 1.4 97.5 88.8 84.5 100.0 99.9 0.1 0.1 
3rd Q  20.0  0.0 52.6 8.1 0.0 89.0 61.3 32.9 99.9 98.9 1.1 1.1 
4th Q  20.0  0.0 31.2 1.3 0.0 66.9 27.4 2.5 96.6 83.6 12.9 13.4 
5th Q(high Y)  20.0  0.0 11.8 0.6 0.0 37.7 5.6 0.0 72.3 42.3 30.1 41.6 
             
Household Composition            
No children 29.3 1.1 64.9 29.4 8.6 82.8 72.1 60.5 93.5 88.0 5.5 5.9 
With children 28.9 6.2 52.6 28.0 29.6 76.9 61.5 58.1 90.9 82.4 8.5 9.3 
Pensioner 41.8 0.3 40.4 7.0 1.9 75.9 42.3 22.6 96.0 84.6 11.4 11.8 
             
Tenant Tenure            
Public  0.4 3.1 46.9 21.9 6.3 78.1 50.0 34.4 90.6 87.5 3.1 3.4 
Housing 
association or 
Co-op 
93.5 2.3 51.4 20.0 12.3 78.3 57.0 44.5 93.9 85.1 8.8 9.3 
Private  6.0 1.4 47.2 13.7 6.0 76.3 51.2 36.3 92.3 82.1 10.2 11.1 
             
Employment Status            
Unemployed 76.6 1.9 55.0 19.8 10.4 82.6 59.1 44.8 96.7 88.6 8.1 8.3 
Employed  23.4 3.4 38.6 19.2 16.8 63.8 48.3 41.3 84.3 73.0 11.3 13.4 
Source: Housing Research in the Netherlands (WoON) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: Co-op stands for co-operative housing. PR1: poverty rate when housing allowance is not provided and before housing cost payments; PR2: poverty 
rate when housing allowance is not provided and after housing cost payments; PR3: poverty rate when housing allowance is provided and after housing 
cost payments. 
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Table A.5 Changes in Poverty Rates by Housing Allowance in Sweden (%) 
Poverty lines   40% of median income 50% of median income 60% of median income Absolute 
change (%p) 
PR2–PR3 
Relative 
change (%) 
PR2–PR3 
Total tenant 
with HA 
 PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HA af.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HAaf.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HA af.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
Mean  (%) 17.2 71.9 60.4 45.7 82.7 77.5 66.8 89.9 86.5 3.4 3.8 
Total 100.0             
             
Income 
Quintiles 
 
 
           
1st Q (low Y) 20.0 47.5 99.0 97.5 96.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
2nd Q 20.0 22.9 95.6 82.9 65.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
3rd Q 20.0 13.7 88.2 71.6 47.1 100.0 98.0 88.2 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
4th Q 20.0 2.0 67.8 48.3 19.5 90.2 80.5 43.9 99.5 98.5 1.0 1.0 
5th Q(high Y) 20.0 0.0 8.8 1.5 0.0 23.0 8.8 2.0 50.0 33.8 16.2 32.4 
            
Household 
Composition 
           
No children 21.8 22.0 72.2 58.7 49.3 81.6 76.2 67.7 86.1 83.4 2.7 3.1 
With children 31.7 6.8 42.3 28.4 25.3 64.8 54.3 42.6 82.7 74.7 8.0 9.7 
Pensioner 46.5 22.1 92.0 82.9 57.9 95.4 93.9 82.9 96.6 96.0 0.6 0.7 
            
Tenant Tenure            
Co-op  18.1 13.5 69.2 57.8 43.2 78.9 75.7 63.2 87.6 83.8 3.8 4.3 
Private or 
Housing 
association 
81.9 18.0 72.5 60.9 46.2 83.5 77.9 67.6 90.4 87.1 3.3 3.7 
            
Employment Status            
Unemployed 74.3 21.1 85.6 73.5 55.7 92.2 88.8 79.2 95.3 93.3 2.0 2.1 
Employed  25.7 6.1 32.3 22.4 16.7 55.1 44.9 31.2 74.5 66.9 7.6 10.2 
Source: Household Finances (HEK) 2006, author calculations.   
Note: Co-op stands for co-operative housing. PR1: poverty rate when housing allowance is not provided and before housing costs payment; PR2: poverty 
rate when housing allowance is not provided and after housing costs payment; PR3: poverty rate when housing allowance is provided and after housing 
costs payment.  
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Table A.6 Changes in Poverty Rates by Housing Allowance in S. Korea (%) 
Poverty lines   40% of median income 50% of median income 60% of median income Absolute 
change (%p) 
PR2–PR3 
Relative 
change (%) 
PR2–PR3 
Total tenant 
with HA 
 PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HA af.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HA af.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
PR1 
bf.HA&HC 
PR2 
bf.HA af.HC 
PR3 
af.HA&HC 
Mean  (%) 49.1 66.5 63.2 70.3 80.8 78.1 83.0 89.6 88.2 1.4 1.6 
Total 100.0             
            
Income Quintiles            
1st Q (low Y) 20.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
2nd Q 19.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
3rd Q 20.4 46.1 94.4 85.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
4th Q 20.4 0.0 35.6 30.1 50.0 87.9 79.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
5th Q(high Y) 19.6 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 14.3 10.0 13.2 47.0 39.9 7.1 15.2 
             
Household 
Composition 
           
No children 19.6 44.8 67.6 60.7 75.2 81.9 81.0 86.4 88.9 88.9 0.0 0.0 
With children 32.3 11.8 28.2 25.6 29.9 53.4 46.2 57.6 75.1 70.8 4.3 5.8 
Pensioner 48.0 75.9 91.8 89.5 95.5 98.7 98.4 98.8 99.7 99.7 0.0 0.0 
             
Tenant Tenure             
Permanent 
public  
19.5 34.9 48.8 39.5 66.5 77.2 72.2 83.7 86.8 85.1 1.7 2.0 
Other public & 
private  
80.5 52.5 70.8 68.9 71.2 81.6 79.6 82.9 90.3 89.0 1.3 1.5 
            
Employment Status            
Unemployed 69.6 63.8 82.6 79.0 86.3 92.5 90.8 93.5 95.1 95.1 0.0 0.0 
Employed  30.4 15.4 29.6 27.0 33.5 53.9 49.2 59.0 77.1 72.5 4.6 6.0 
Source: 2008 Korea Welfare Panel Study, author calculations.   
Note: PR1: poverty rate when housing allowance is not provided and before housing costs payment; PR2: poverty rate when housing allowance is not 
provided and after housing costs payment; PR3: poverty rate when housing allowance is provided and after housing costs payment. 
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